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P R E F A C E 
In this book I have tried to develop an analysis of the concept of an empirical 
law, an analysis that differs in many ways from the alternative analyses found 
in contemporary literature dealing with the subject. 
[ am referring especially to two well-known views, viz. the regularity and 
necessity views, which have given rise to many interesting papers and books 
within the philosophy of science.1* 
In developing my own views, it very soon became clear to me that the mere 
restatement of these alternative views, followed by a discussion of their defects 
and an explanation of my own view, would not suffice to show what I regard 
as basically unsound in these views. 
If we seriously consider the well-known difficulties facing the regularity view, 
we have to consider the possibility that the time has arrived to stop our at-
tempts to solve, by means of patch-work additions, the fundamental problem 
of empirical laws within the traditional context of logical positivist doctrines. 
I have tried to find a solution which is based on a different philosophical 
context, the main incentive being that the discouraging results of the customary 
attempts to solve the problem might have been the outcome of the fundamental 
philosophical setting within which the problem had been formulated and within 
which everyone looked for a solution. The problem of empirical laws is not a 
problem existing by its own rights - it is shaped by an underlying point of view 
or theoretical framework. 
For this reason I have started with a brief sketch of the logical positivist 
context. However, I want to stress the fact that my intention was not to offer 
an historical exposition, but an exposition which becomes meaningful when 
related to the subsequent arguments concerning empirical laws. 
The notion of direct or theory-free observation has been taken as the fun-
damental characteristic of the logical positivist point of view. This view has 
been further characterised by means of five theses, among which is the thesis 
that observational terms are isolated or theory-independent units of extensional 
meaning. These terms are then supposed to be the starting-points of meaning 
and the end-points of confirmation, and these very characteristics mark the 
privileged position such terms have in a logical positivist philosophy. 
The post-positivist view2, on the other hand, is characterised by the opposing 
notion of theory-loaded observation. This notion leads to other conclusions 
which radically oppose some of the theses of logical positivism. The notion of 
theory-loaded observation itself, although often clearly stated, has not yet been 
systematically elucidated, and I have made an attempt to do this in ch. I after 
my sketch of the logical positivist context. This seemed to me to be necessary 
* See N O T E S , p . 109. 
in order to make my post-positivist point of view as clear as possible, before 
tackling the problem of empirical law itself. 
I have paid special attention to the lawlikeness of concepts and their con-
firmation and falsification. 
These epistemological issues are followed by a separate examination of 
Goodman's riddle in ch. II, because it lies somewhere between the lawlikeness 
of concepts and the lawlikeness of laws. If Goodman's riddle is taken as a 
serious problem, as I think it should, it is primarily a problem of concept or 
theory formation and not a problem of induction. 
In ch. Ill the regularity view has been examined and the well-known difficul-
ties related to such a view are considered, assuming the knowledge gained in 
ch. I. This has led to some interesting results, especially in connection with the 
analysis of counterfactuals and the confirmation of 'normal' singular condi-
tionals, to which I return in the last chapter. 
Three different views of the necessity view are briefly stated and investigated 
in ch. IV. RESCHER'S view3 is, I think, close to mine, which has been developed 
in ch. V. However, there are fundamental epistemological differences between 
our views. 
In the last chapter I have given my own analysis of the concept of an empirical 
law, which should not be taken as a synthesis of a regularity and a necessity 
view, but as opposed to both. It is, as far as particulars may count, the result 
of an analysis of the concepts 'regularity' and 'necessity'. I have tried to argue 
that the greatest shortcoming of the regularity view lies in the fact that the 
proponents of such a view have not been really concerned with the concept of 
'regularity' itself. They usually take this concept to be intuitively clear enough 
to serve as basis for their analysis. Their attacks upon the necessity view are 
based on the reproach that 'necessity' is a very obscure concept, and that it 
should, therefore, be avoided in the philosophy of science. We could, however, 
reproach them in a similar way, since the concept of 'regularity' is anything 
but clear. 
One may say that an empirical law formulates a 'regularity in nature', but 
we can only do justice to the function a law has in science, if we are ready to 
view this regularity as a necessary connection, which does not exist in an 
observer-independent reality, but in a theoretically co-constituted empirical 
world. 
This investigation does not pretend to answer all questions concerning 
empirical laws. It should, therefore, not be regarded as complete, but neither 
should the arguments and suggestions be regarded as completely free from 
ambiguity. 
Much remains to be done in order to offer a generally acceptable theory and 
better understanding. 
I. T H E E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L C O N T E X T 
1. THE LOGICAL POSITIVIST CONTEXT 
It is, of course, rather hazardous to speak of 'the' logical positivist theory, 
but with the following I do not try to give an accurate description of the view 
of any logical positivist. I rather want to give a model or a framework in this 
section, which may help the systematic analysis I want to offer. 
According to the positivist view, the ultimate link between our knowledge 
of the world and the world itself is direct observation. This direct observation 
provides one with a special kind of knowledge expressed in so-called obser-
vational language, and however liberal the reductionism that one likes to claim 
and however pragmatically one wants to draw the distinction between obser-
vational and theoretical terms, I hold it to be fundamental to logical positivism 
that empirical knowledge gained from direct observation has an epistemologi-
cally privileged status.4 
The pre-eminent characteristic of this kind of observation is its theory-
independence or its theory-freedom. The word 'direct' in the above context 
indicates that no theory or no other knowledge intervenes anywhere. The naked 
eye or ear, etc., meets with brute facts or raw data. Assuming for the moment 
that there is something like direct observation and that there are observational 
terms and statements, let us systematically investigate what this assumption 
entails if we are to make sense of it. I think it will be agreed that at least the 
following five, mutually dependent presuppositions, must then be valid: two 
ontological (i and ii), two epistemological (iii and iv), and one methodological 
(v). 
i. The reality {or the world or nature) of which we have knowledge in common 
sense and science is observer-independent. 
This thesis is not exclusive to logical positivism, but that is of no importance 
here. It states that nature is what it is, and would be what it is, even if there were 
no observers5 and the term 'direct' in 'direct observation' serves to indicate 
that it is of such an observer-independent world that we acquire knowledge of 
in direct observation. In other words, if one claims the possibility of direct or 
theory-free observation, one must also claim the existence of an observer-
independent reality of which one gains knowledge by means of such observations. 
ii. Nature or reality is populated by mutually independent data or brute facts. (I 
do not, at this stage, make a distinction between data, brute facts, events or 
phenomena and I shall almost always use the term 'data', when referring to this 
particular type of context). 
With this thesis I particularly allude to the negatively formulated idea that 
there are no necessary connections in nature tying data together. A datum is an 
isolated unit, it is literally self-supporting. It is observer-independent by being 
an element of the independent reality, but it is also datum-independent or 
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independent of other data for its being that very datum. But 'as a matter of 
contingent fact', as one is likely to say, a datum can, spatio-temporally, be 
related to (e.g. 'go together with') one or more other data. So we can speak of 
connections between data based on such contingent relations in space-time. 
This is the only way in which we may legitimately say that there are empirical 
connections between data, and it is very important to realize that they leave the 
separate facts or data untouched. There is no place for other, empirical connec-
tions within the positivist context. 
There is one special kind of the 'going together in space-time', namely the 
constantly 'going together' or the constant conjunction of a datum of a certain 
kind, A, with one of another kind, B. Such a constant conjunction is (part of) a 
regularity in nature, but again this is a purely contingent matter. Secret forces, 
as they are sometimes derogatively called, are dismissed and there is only the 
constant conjunction and the regularity without exceptions and these concepts 
apparently are taken to be completely transparent.6 And like the separate or 
single data, a regularity also is what it is, independent of any observer. Such 
regularities can be known by induction, which is taken to be the pre-eminent 
characteristic of empirical science, and they are formulated in universal state-
ments. This is a first-order approximation of the logical positivist view of 
empirical laws, the regularity view.7 
iii. There are observational terms which are isolated or theory-independent units 
of meaning. 
In direct or theory-free observation we acquire, in one way or another, know-
ledge of the mutually independent and observer-independent data referred to 
above and this knowledge is laid down in observational terms. At best these 
terms are the names of the data we are aware of in direct observation, which 
is pure, not mixed up with theoretical or subjective interference. Somehow 
the same data are given the same name. (I think it is in principle impossible 
to give a satisfactory explanation of this 'somehow' as long as one presupposes 
theory-free observation. However, I must pospone this point till later - see 
section 3). These names can only be theory-independent units of meaning, 
because theorising does not enter into direct observation at all and consequently 
they acquire the exact role they are preordained to play in a logical positivist 
methodology. The observational terms are the constants in the 'Aufbau' of 
empirical knowledge, having a fixed meaning, as NAGEL calls it. They are isolat-
ed or theory-independent in the sense of not referring to other terms; they have 
the meaning they have, independently of the meaning of other terms. In partic-
ular, they constitute the end-points of confirmation, which becomes possible 
just by their not referring to other terms, but I shall come back to this in section 
2. At this moment suffice it to say that the meaning of observational terms should 
be characterised as purely extensional: there is no place for intentions*, 
because there is no empirical basis for such things in a positivist ontology. As 
* T h e term 'intention' is used here in the sense o f 'meaning' a n d not in the sense o f 'purpose ' . 
It is synonymous to what e.g. Q U I N E and G O O D M A N call 'intension'. 
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there are no necessary connections tying things together in nature, similarly 
there are no obscure entities or mystic forces or intentions tying terms together 
in our language. QUINE and GOODMAN are consistent with respect to this point, 
being allergic to intentions, which, in their view, can only be obscure inter-
mediary entities. CARNAP, HEMPEL, NAGEL and others are not consistent if 
they appeal to 'the' meaning of a term in cases where the extensional approach 
seems to fail.* 
iv. Observational statements are isolated or theory-independent. 
Observational statements, i.e. statements containing only observational 
terms as non-logical terms, are theory-independent firstly because the observa-
tional terms are theory-independent and secondly, because the 'synthetic 
operation', to borrow Reichenbach's term, does not introduce any theory-
dependence at all. 
We may elucidate this by means of an example. If we take 'raven' and 'black' 
as observational terms, then 'all ravens are black' is an observational state-
ment. It is based on a directly observed constant conjunction: 
Rfl i .Raj , Ra2.Ba2, .... Ran.Ban (R = raven, B = black) 
and it is brought about by induction. The atomic observational statements like 
'Ra k ' and 'Bam ' are isolated or theory-independent, because 'R' and 'B' are; 
the conjunctions are theory-independent, because the synthesis, by being based 
upon a directly observable 'going together', does not introduce such a depen-
dence and the separate data/e.g. 'Ra k ' and 'Bak', remain what they were before 
the synthesis; and the universal statement is also an isolated or theory-inde-
pendent unit, because induction does not create any theoretical connections 
either. In particular, induction does not introduce any obscure, stronger than 
extensional connections. The separate data again remain what they were before. 
Thanks to this theory-independence, observational statements, especially the 
so-called experimental (NAGEL) or empirical (CARNAP) laws, may survive the 
replacement by an alternative of a theoretical framework, in which they have 
been taken up originally.8 
v. Extensional logic is an adequate framework for scientific as well as episte-
mological and methodological investigation. 
The logical framework, laid down by propositional and (first-order) predicate 
logic has been used in nearly all investigations by philosophers such as CARNAP, 
HEMPEL, NAGEL, QUINE, GOODMAN and many others. This framework has 
become a very reliable ingredient of the method of philosophical inquiry. It is 
taken to be adequate for the analysis of concepts like 'confirmation', 'lawlik-
eness', 'theory', 'explanation', 'counterfactual', etc., and it is also used as an 
analytical tool with respect to the way of reasoning in daily life and science. 
In my opinion, this confidence in the adequacy of extensional logic can be 
understood in the light of the four theses mentioned before: extensional logic 
fits, so to speak, the ontological and epistemological facts, briefly sketched in i to 
iv above. Observational terms as theory-independent units of extensional 
* We shall meet with examples o f this in ch. III . 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 3 
meaning and observational statements as isolated units of empirical knowledge 
constitute a very good interpretation basis for first-order predicate calculus: 
the universe of discourse is formed by the isolated data, named by individual 
constants; groups of the same data (a class if you like) are named by predicates9; 
and the adequacy of the truth-functional composition of statements is guar-
anteed by the isolatedness of observational statements (they can only be bound 
extensionally or truth-functionally). This adequacy of extensional logic con-
stitutes a part of the logical positivist philosophical point of view and I think 
it is an important part, because many contemporary problems in the philosophy 
of science are at least partially created by this 'faith in extensional logic'. But 
this point, like all others mentioned above, will become clear in the course of 
this study. 
2. THE POST-POSITIVIST CONTEXT 
In section 1 we started with the notion of direct observation. Knowledge 
gained by such observation is taken as the starting-point of all other knowledge 
and as the end-point of confirmation10 by the logical positivists. And observa-
tional terms are basic in this sense that they do not refer to any other terms or 
do not entail any meaning-connections; they only and immediately, i.e. not 
through the medium of any theory, refer to data. 
In this section we shall start with the opposite notion of theory-loaded obser-
vation. SHAPERE has given the following characterisation of this view: "there 
is one by now familiar objection (against the theoretical-observational distinc-
tion, H.K.) (that) marks out a transition to a view of science which stands in 
radical opposition to that of the empiricist-positivist tradition and has, both 
by its own freshness and its own failures, helped to bring about the shift of 
emphasis in the problems of the philosophy of science. (. .) according to this 
criticism, not only is the relevance of observations at least partly dependent 
on theory; even what counts as an observation, and the interpretation or meaning 
of observational terms, is at least partly so dependent. All 'observation terms' 
in science are, in this view at least to some extent 'theory dependent' or 'theory-
laden' in a sense which is passed over by the usual ways of making the distinc-
tion. Data are not 'raw'; there are no 'brute facts'." 1 1 
This view can be recognised in the work of many authors, but the notion of 
theory-loaded observation itself has not yet been analysed very thoroughly. 
One may say that a theory is a "conceptual network through which scientists 
view the world", like K U H N 1 2 ; or that "scientific theories are ways of looking 
at the world", like FEYERABEND 1 3; and one may agree with the early post-
positivist POPPER, that "there is no such thing as 'pure experience' (compare: 
'direct observation', H.K.), but only experience interpreted in the light of 
expectations or theories which are 'transcendent'."14 or with HANSON, when 
he says "Seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also the way 
in which the visual experience is had" and "seeing is a 'theory-laden' undertak-
ing" 1 5 ; and at last we may refer to MARY HESSE, who gave the example of a 
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layman and a physicist in an atomic physics laboratory and concluded that 
"Each entity is observed in the ways appropriate to i t " 1 6 where this appropriat-
eness is determined by the theory 'through which' observation takes place 
(compare Kuhn's expression quoted above). But all these remarks only describe 
what one takes to be a fact, namely that observation is always theory-loaded, 
and a systematic explanation of this fact, if it is a fact, has never been given, 
except in one case 1 7, to which I shall come back in section 3. There I shall 
consider questions like "How is it possible that all observation is theory-loaded 
if one does not presuppose an innate theory, which can load observation from 
the beginning?" and "Is it not much more 'natural' to presuppose theory-free 
observation as the starting-point of empirical knowledge, followed by the 
formation of a theory, which can then load further observation?" 
For the moment, however, we can use this somewhat vague notion of theory-
loaded observation in its opposition to direct observation, and investigate what 
its consequences are for some of the points mentioned in the theses of section 1. 
i. Empirical data, and therefore empirical reality, are not observer-independent. 
Tf all observation is theory-loaded, executed from a certain point of view 
(POPPER), if there is always observation through a certain theory (KUHN, 
FEYERABEND) or if observation is the having of a certain experience in a certain 
way (HANSON), then what we observe, the empirical datum, is co-constituted as 
that datum by the theory or the concepts through which we observe. Thus, empir-
ical data are, for the very fact of their being those data, essentially observer-
dependent; they are those data only by being observed in the appropriate way. 
Consequently there cannot be as far as empirical science is concerned, any raw 
or pure or theory-independent data or brute facts, free from theoretical slants, 
but only data "analysed, modeled and manufactured according to some 
theory".18 
A metaphysician may, perhaps, lay claim to a special faculty which enables 
him to distance himself sufficiently from reality so as to see it as it really is 
(although, in my opinion, he shall see nothing at all), but a scientist can only 
have knowledge of a world which is co-constituted by theory-loaded observa-
tion and consequently cannot speak of an observer-independent world. 'Nature' 
as we know it in daily life, and science, is co-constituted by our theories or 
conceptual systems through which observation becomes at all possible. And if 
RESCHER says (compare note 5) that it would take a bold act of rashness to deny 
that such an observer-independent Nature is regular in various respects, I 
would say that the assertion, as well as the denial of such a claim seems to be 
meaningless because it would presuppose the existence of a rather mysterious 
Nature. 
This should, I think, be taken as the post-positivist alternative to thesis i of 
section 1. 
ii. There are no terms or statements with a fixed or theory-independent meaning. 
This is the post-positivist alternative to theses iii and iv of section 1. Obser-
vational terms with a privileged epistemological status do not exist, therefore 
there can be no isolated observational statements either: "The meaning of 
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every term we use depends upon the theoretical context in which it occurs. 
Words do not 'mean' something in isolation; they obtain their meaning by 
being part of a theoretical system".1 9 The meaning of any term whatsoever, 
and thereby of any statement, is determined by the meaning-connections it has 
with other terms within a particular conceptual system. Of course the term 
'meaning-connection' needs to be clarified, but it should be clear by now, that 
this theory-dependence of every empirical concept and every empirical state-
ment, however simple it may seem, stands in direct opposition to the extension-
al approach to the problem of meaning within the precincts of logical positivism, 
which resulted in theses iii and iv of the previous section. If all empirical con-
cepts have a meaning by their being connected with other terms, then there are 
no concepts which do not refer to other concepts. But then, there can be no 
observational terms either, because these terms must be characterised by the 
very fact that they do not refer to other concepts (compare note 10). Only terms 
which do not refer to other terms can be used as the end-points of confirmation 
and the starting-points of meaning. And when the possibility of such terms is 
denied, as it is by post-positivism, then a fresh answer is required for both the 
problem of meaning and the problem of confirmation (one should e.g. offer an 
analysis of the term 'meaning-connection', mentioned above). With respect to 
confirmation it is illustrative to compare Carnap's view with Mary Hesse's and 
Hanson's. CARNAP states that, if confirmation is to be feasible at all, we need 
theory-independent end-points (i.e. observational terms). MARY HESSE and 
HANSON on the contrary, state that, if confirmation is to be feasible at all, there 
must be meaning-connections between 'observational terms' and theories, so 
that these terms cannot be taken as isolated units.2 0 
Enough has been said for the moment to formulate briefly the post-positivist 
alternative to theses iii and iv. It will be clear, I think, that this alternative has 
consequences for the concept of law, which is the aim of this study. The discus-
sion about this concept mainly centers around the question what experimental 
laws (NAGEL) (or empirical laws; CARNAP) are. In other words, the problem 
of law is nearly always reduced to the question "What makes a universal con-
ditional, which contains only observational terms, lawlike; or what is the cri-
terion for distinguishing between accidental and lawlike universals about obser-
vables?". 2 1 And these experimental laws were taken to be isolated or theory-
independent from a logical positivist point of view (compare thesis iv of sec-
tion 1). They were taken to be directly, that is theory-independently, confir-
mable by their instances, while a theory, or a theoretical law in Carnap's words, 
"cannot be put to a direct test". 2 2 But as soon as observational terms are essenti-
ally theory-dependent one can no longer claim that there are isolated experimen-
tal laws and much of the discussion about these 'laws' becomes senseless within 
a post-positivist context. But we shall come back to this later. 
I will not formulate a post-positivist alternative of theses ii and v at this stage, 
because the concept of theory-loaded observation itself should first be further 
elucidated (sections 3 to 6) . From this analysis we may perhaps formulate an 
alternative view concerning 'connections in nature', which cannot be connec-
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tions in an observer-independent reality, and we may then be able to review the 
adequacy of extensional logic. 
3. THEORY-LOADED OBSERVATION 
My intention with the following example23 is to stimulate the formation of 
some new empirical concepts, i.e. concepts not previously formed. This has the 
disadvantage of artificiality, but it has the advantage of elucidating what the 
essential impact of empirical concept formation is. Afterwards I hope to lessen 
the disadvantage of the example by a switch to 'normal' concepts. 
Being obliged to explore the example in a written text some complications 
arise that do not normally arise in practise. I shall refer to these as 'example-
complication' and I trust the reader will be able to imagine the factual process. 
In the rectangle below I have given a number of objects: 
A + P a — 0 A 
A A 
L D • Z n 
0 D n A P i 
"& 
i 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 
9 
1 8 1 9 
A 
1 10 1 11 1 12 13 1 M 
The numbers only serve to refer to the objects in the rectangle: e.g. (5 ,15) 
is the object in the top right-hand corner. This method of referring to any 
particular object is an example-complication, as in practise I should merely 
point it out with my forefinger. This would mean that such a pointing-out could 
already be understood and, as is well known, one has to learn this. A baby 
looks e.g. at the tip of your forefinger when you point to a certain object. Like-
wise the reader is supposed to be able to observe the objects as separate objects. 
If necessary, I can add more objects. 
Now if I do something with some of these objects, I shall have to be explicit 
about this, while in practise no words would be needed (example-complication). 
The success of the example will depend on my description being followed step 
by step. The reader who only skims through what follows will fail to grasp the 
points I wish to stress. 
First I put (5,14) in the first row below (I), second (1,4) in row II, then (3,4) 
in row I, (2 ,11) in row II, (5,9) in row I and (3 ,1 ) in row II. The result can be 
sketched as follows: 
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row 
1 0 D a 
row II
 1 A L 
I could go on with my investigation of the objects within the rectangle and 
continue to put them in one of the two rows, on the basis of this inquiry, but 
that would not be very interesting. I may, however, ask someone else to go on. 
Could he? If he claims that this 'going on' would be purely a haphazard opera-
tion of arbitrarily distributing the objects between rows I and II, I shall take his 
answer to be in the negative. By admitting this, e.g. when he stipulates in which 
row a particular object belongs, he would be admitting that he does not under-
stand what I did, because this was not a matter of mere arbitrary selection. He 
cannot observe in the way I can observe and for him the empirical data, that I 
observe, do not even exist. I must come back to this remark, but let us first 
continue the investigation, assuming that, if an answer is given, it would not be 
that the process is haphazard. Now where would one put (5,11)? In row I? 
No, that would be wrong, it belongs in row II, but it is an understandable or 
intelligible answer, it is not a gamble. From what I have done up till now one 
could perhaps have got the idea that I put the objects from the rectangle alter-
nately in rows I and II: the first thing in row I, the second in row II, the third 
in row I again, and so on. This would at least render the above answer intelligi-
ble. The trial, briefly expressed by the concept 'alternately' was, however, an 
error and this became clear as soon as I explained that (5,11) should be put in 
the second row. Observation had not yet occurred in the right way, although 
something had definitely been observed (the trial made this possible!) and the 
answer based upon this observation, but without any understanding of what I 
had done. 
If someone answered my question of where to put (5,11) with: "In row II" 
that would be correct, but whether he observed in the right way, or not, and 
whether he already understood what I did, or not, remains to be examined. 
We would now have: 
row i 0 Da 
row II A L 
Where shall we put (4,2)? In row I? Yes, that is correct, but the answer "In 
row II" would again have been intelligible. For one might have reasoned that 
all objects built up of straight lines belong in the second row, while all objects 
which are also constituted by bent lines belong in row II. Up till now this 
conjecture or trial has always been confirmed, but now, with (4,2), we have met 
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a trial-falsifying instance and the trial is again unsuccessful. According to this 
trial, (3,15) would also have been a falsifying instance, for it belongs in row II, 
while one would have put it in row I on the basis of this trial. On the other hand, 
(3,10) would have confirmed it, because it belongs in row I, where it also belongs 
according to this trial. In the same way (5,6), which belongs in row I, would 
also have been a confirming instance. And again we must conclude that anyone 
who observed the objects within the rectangle through this conjecture, i.e. who 
observed those objects as being bent or not-bent, had not yet observed from the 
right point of view (POPPER) or in the right way (HANSON). And he who directly 
gave the correct answer may have observed in the right way, but might also be 
in error, even if he has put all the objects, referred to up till now, in the right 
row. 
In the meantime we have now got: 
row i Q Da A <8 P 
r o w l l — A L — fl 
Where shall we put (5,15)? I expect that many readers will answer: "In row 
IT'. This answer is completely understandable and I trust everybody sees why. 
It is very simple: in row I all letters within the rectangle we have met with 
so far are taken up and in row II all (logical and geometrical) symbols. Now 
(5,15) being the geometrical symbol for a triangle, should be put in row II. 
This trial or conjecture has been confirmed by all instances investigated up 
till now. But in saying this an interesting point is raised. If we observe the 
objects in the rectangle through the conjecture 'all letters in I - all symbols 
in II' and say that this has always been confirmed up till now, then apparently 
(3,1) has been observed not as the 12th letter of the alphabet, but as the geom-
etrical symbol for 'angle' (angle A of triangle ABC is often symbolised by LA, 
just as triangle ABC is symbolised by A ABC, using (5,15)). Object (3,1) might 
at first sight have appeared to be an exception to the conjectured rule, because it 
could have been observed as the 12th letter of the alphabet. But it is not a trial-
falsifying instance after all. It has become an understandable or explainable 
exception, which turns out to be a nice confirmation: (3,1) is not the 12th letter, 
but a geometrical symbol and therefore belongs in row II. This clearly illustrat-
es, I think, that what we observe, the empirical datum, is co-constituted by how 
we observe; in the given example (3,1) could be observed through the concept 
'letter' or through the concept 'symbol' and in both cases we observe a different 
empirical datum. 
But let us now return to (5,15). I must disappoint those who believed it to 
belong in row II, as it belongs in row I, although it is not a letter of the alphabet 
and although it is a geometrical symbol. And (1,9) which is neither a letter nor 
a formal symbol, also belongs to row I. We cannot give an explanation of these 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 9 
facts leaving the trial 'all letters in I—all symbols in IT intact, as we could in the 
case of (3,1). Objects (5,15) and (1,9) are not explainable exceptions, but falsifica-
tions of this trial, which must now be accepted as an error, and the observer 
should try again. He has not yet observed in the right way, he does not yet know 
the data I know. 
Let me add some extra information: (2,15) and (1,1) belong in row II and 
(3,6) and (4,13) belong in row I. Then we have got: 
- w i Q D a A^8 P A 9 D A 
- A L — n I i i 
Can the observer go on now? (5,3)? In row II? Yes, that's correct. And (3,8) 
in row II, yes. (2,6) in row I? No, have another look, it belongs in row II, 
as does (1,12) and (2,13). And (2,2) must indeed be put in row II. 
At this stage, most students attending my lectures, where I actually went 
through this process, succeeded in understanding me. This involves their being 
able to continue my investigation as I would have done it. They went through 
many different conjectures and at last, some sooner, some later, 'saw' it or had 
an 'Aha Erlebniss', if you like. At a certain moment they understood what 
I was doing and how I was doing it. They could, from that moment on, observe 
what I already could observe and they gained knowledge of empirical data which 
they had not even known to exist. 
Now I can only hope that the reader also had such an 'Aha Erlebniss' on the 
basis of the evidence just described. I shall assume for the moment that the 
reader has been successful and shall say that he has formed concepts. 
Now, once the concepts have been formed, we can give names to them. The 
giving of a name to a concept is, as such, very important for communication, 
but which name, i.e. which letter-sequence or word we shall use as a name for 
a certain concept is, at least in our culture, a highly conventional matter. Let 
us use the letter-sequences desolc and nepo, or the words desolc and nepo, as 
names for the concepts just formed: the objects in row I are desolc, those in row 
II are nepo. I think, that letter-sequences become words just by acquiring this 
function of naming a concept; otherwise such a sequence remains a meaningless 
string of letters. 
Before going on I must be sure (and perhaps you also want to be sure), that 
you have indeed formed the concepts 'desolc' and 'nepo'. Therefore I am oblig-
ed to make use of an artifice which is not essential to what follows (example-
complication). This artifice consists in the betrayal of a secret, which is possible 
in this example and which is essentially dependent upon the fact that you have 
already formed many other concepts to which I can appeal. The secret is simply 
this: if an object in the rectangle completely encloses a certain area it is put in 
row I (desolc is the reverse of closed; the name is not purely conventional after 
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all) and if an object has an open area it is put in row II (nepo - open). But again, 
the possibility of betraying the secret, present in this example, should not be 
taken to be a conditio sine qua non for concept formation. On the contrary, 
at the most fundamental level of concept formation we have no possibility of 
betraying a secret. In the case of the colour concepts, for example, we cannot say 
what red things 'have in common', what the characteristic of green things is, etc. 
In such a case the question is simply whether one sees it or not or whether one 
has formed these concepts or not. Thus, the betrayal of the secret in our exam-
ple should not be taken as essential: with enough patience, nearly everybody 
would, sooner or later, be able to form these concepts in the way briefly sketch-
ed. I shall come back to the 'nearly' mentioned in the last sentence in section 5. 
Let us now review this process. A certain activity was deployed therein, one 
tried and erred and at last understood, one gained certain knowledge in the 
form of the concepts 'desolc' and 'nepo'. This activity is, I think, a very import-
ant kind of empirical inquiry. As a matter of fact, I do not think it is normal 
science in Kuhn's sense2 4, but it need not be revolutionary science either. For 
there need not be a rival or conflicting or paradigmatic concept of the concept 
which is formed in such an investigation. We could call it evolutionary science, 
but perhaps these remarks are rather premature here and I shall have the oppor-
tunity to come back to this point later. The point I wish to stress here is that a 
certain activity was deployed which I have called an important kind of empirical 
inquiry. 
Before one started this investigation, before one formed the concepts 'nepo' 
and 'desolc', one did not know anything about nepo and desolc things. One 
could not observe them and one did not even know of the existence of empiri-
cal data such as '(5,15) is desolc'. And now, afterwards, one can observe such 
things and have knowledge of such data as the one mentioned. Concept forma-
tion means precisely this learning to observe in the appropriate way. And there-
fore : the empirical concept formed entails a method of observation. 
Having a concept is being able to do something, namely to observe in a cer-
tain directed way or from a certain point of view. Once one has learned to observe 
as one should, one has formed concepts. This 'as one should', this appropriaten-
ess, constitutes the meaning of the concepts, its intention if you like, and in the 
following sections of this chapter I shall attempt to analyse this further. I 
intend to show that the concept is itself a minute theory, complete with lawlike 
connections, however rudimentary one may wish to call it. The empirical con-
cept, as a minute theory, lays down the appropriateness of a method of observa-
tion. This is the primary ingredient of the meaning of an empirical concept. 
Once one has formed the concepts or minute theories 'nepo' and 'desolc', one 
can practise normal science with them. One can now investigate the 11th letter 
of p. 36 of Kuhn's 'The structure of scientific revolutions' and establish whether 
it is nepo or desolc by observing it through the concepts 'nepo' and 'desolc'. 
This was not possible before, one was blind with one's eyes open, one saw but 
did not observe anything of this kind. Of course, one observed letters and other 
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symbols, but this only stresses the point: one could observe these things just 
because one had a method of observation laid down in the concepts 'letter' and 
'symbol'. And this observation in normal science should now be characterized 
as theory-loaded observation in this sense, that we observe through the minute 
theories or concepts 'nepo' and 'desolc'. In this very elementary sense all observa-
tion is theory-loaded; all observation is observation from a certain point of view 
(POPPER) or through a conceptual scheme (KUHN). It is always the having of a 
certain experience in a certain way and not simply an exposure of the senses to 
the world (HANSON). And it is not only the having of a visual experience but 
also the way in which it is had (HANSON again). Without such a theory-loaded-
ness there can be no observation and it is precisely this theory, that makes 
observation in a certain way possible, which we come to know in the trial and 
error investigation called concept formation. And then, if all observation is 
theory-loaded, the empirical data we become able to observe, cannot be called 
'raw data' or 'brute facts.' Empirical data are always conceptually or theoretically 
co-constitutedjust because they are those data by being observed theory-loadedly. 
The empirical datum of science is essentially theory-dependent or concept-
dependent for its being that datum. Theory-free or directly observable data are 
not the things we have knowledge of in empirical science. 
Before finishing this section we must reconsider the question how it is pos-
sible that all observation is theory-loaded: must not the process of concept 
formation have a theory-free starting point, so that, basically, logical positivism 
is right in this respect? Must not we suppose that there once was a theory-free 
observer facing theory-independent data? Is not every little baby an example or 
a confirming instance of this supposition? Does not every human being start as 
a theory-free observer meeting with naked data, forming concepts as isolated 
units of extensional meaning, which then may load his further observation? 
It is precisely this problem of where to find a fixed and stable, i.e. theory-inde-
pendent, starting point of empirical knowledge which, according to MARY 
HESSE, may explain why the distinction between an observational and a theoretic-
al language lives such a long life2 5, because this distinction provides an answer 
to this problem by providing a theory-independent observational basis. I 
think we can give a much more satisfactory answer by now. 
A human being does not start as a theory-free observer and a baby is not a 
theory-free observer facing raw or theory-independent data or brute facts. 
Not because of the fact that a human being is born with some theory in mind, 
but simply because he does not start as an observer at all. A baby is not an 
observer at birth, just as it is not a biped at birth. It must learn to observe and 
as a rule, but not always, it has the ability to learn to observe in a directed or 
theory-loaded way (if I had omitted the last six words of this sentence, I would 
have said the same thing; for clarity I have added them). It has, in other words, 
the ability to form empirical concepts or the ability to learn how to load its 
observation appropriately. A baby can learn to handle things, to manipulate 
them, to move them and to play with them as we, at least, often call it. In such 
a process it forms the very wide and unspecific concept 'thing' and at the same 
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time it constitutes things as empirical data. Concept formation, or the learning 
how to observe appropriately, and datum-constitution are closely interrelated: 
they are brought about at the same time in one and the same process. In growing 
up, the baby learns to handle and thus to observe things in many other ways, 
forming new concepts and at the same time constituting new empirical data by 
trial and error. Once we have recognised the fact that a human being must learn 
to observe in order to be an observer at all, we must also recognise all observa-
tion to be theory-loaded, because this 'learning to observe' means learning to 
observe theory-loadedly or the formation of the concepts through which observa-
tion becomes possible. And the problem of the starting-point has then disappear-
ed: we do not start theory-free and we do not form our first concepts by 
theory-free observations. We learn to observe by trial and error and this is 
the same as the formation of empirical concepts as minute theories in a sense to 
be explained in the following three sections. 
I doubt whether the proponents of theory-loaded observation had this radical 
alternative to direct observation in mind. Many of their remarks suggest that 
there still are two stages in observation, a 'pure stage' followed by an inter-
pretive stage, but this, I think, would be pointless, because it would reintroduce 
theory-free observation through the back-door. The difficulty here is one of 
formulation as is also clear from what I have said in this section. I said e.g. 
that concept formation is the learning how to load one's observation appropriate-
ly. This also suggests that there is some measure of theory-free observation, 
which must be loaded with theory, but this is not what is meant at all: the ex-
pression 'theory-loaded observation' is a pleonasm. We can only separate the 
concept as an isolated unit from the theory it implies, if we sacrifice the con-
cept. Such a separation destroys the concept, it simply vanishes and we deprive 
ourselves of a method of observation, which might have been important. The 
same holds for the data: we can only separate the datum as an independent or 
self-supporting datum from the concept or theory through which we can observe 
it, if we destroy it. 2 6 This does not imply, that e.g. atoms did not exist before 
our modern concept 'atom', which provides us with a very complicated method 
of observing atoms (which, among many other things, means that we cannot 
meet them in the street and that we cannot observe them in the way we can 
observe the telephone on my desk) was formed. Of course atoms existed before 
modern physics, but this only means, that if human beings in 1500 A.D. had 
known our modern theory and had formed the concepts in which this theory is 
focussed, then they would have observed atoms. They could e.g. have observed 
sodium and chlorine ions, arranged in the cubic crystal structure of NaCI, in 
an X-ray analysis. But then the datum 'that thing there is a sodium atom' is a 
theoretically or conceptually co-constituted datum, as it is for ajmodern chemist. 
In what sense is our answer to the starting-point question more satisfac-
tory than the logical positivist answer? In section 1 under thesis iii I stated that, 
presupposing theory-free observation, it is impossible to explain how 'the same 
data are given the same name' or how certain data are brought together in the 
same group or class of objects. If one does not know the concept 'red', then 
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how can it ever be explained, presupposing theory-free observation, that one, 
at a certain moment, succeeds in bringing together in one group such different 
things as a ripe tomato, a bottle of blood and that chair over there? One might 
answer that in all these cases we have the same sensory impression, but how do 
we know this? How can we judge impressions as being 'the same' if we have not 
yet formed the concept 'red'? Once we have formed this concept it is easy: we 
observe that tomato, that bottle of blood and that chair through that concept 
or minute theory so that we can know an order in a multitude of impressions. 
But we can only answer the starting-point question if we say that the formation 
of a concept is primarily the learning to observe through that concept. Presup-
posing theory-free observation, however, an answer like this is prohibited.27 
One final remark should be made in connection with this point. POPPER also 
considered the question of the starting-point, while not presupposing theory-
free observation. In his view all observation is theory-loaded and therefore 
theory must precede observation; but this theory is in turn preceded by other 
observations, which "in their turn, presupposed the adoption of a frame of 
reference: a frame of expectations: a frame of theories. (. .) There is no danger 
of an infinite regress. Going back to more and more primitive theories and 
myths we shall in the end find unconscious, inborn expectations".28 Of course 
this is also an answer to the starting-point question and apparently we must not 
take too seriously his remark that "The question how it happens that a new 
idea occurs to a man (. .) may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but 
it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge".29 I do not like 
this answer, not because it implies a psychological statement (I think my answer 
also does and one should welcome such a scientific risk in epistemology), but 
because it is an answer to a wrong question. The question "Is not there a danger 
of an infinite regress?" is wrong because it presupposes that theory precedes 
observation, which implies a separation that I warned against earlier. The way 
in which one observes and the theory or concept which loads one's observation 
come to be known at the same time, in one and the same inquiry, namely con-
cept formation. 
4. THE EMPIRICAL CONCEPT AS A MINUTE THEORY 
In this section I shall not refer only to the nepo-desolc example of section 
3, but mainly to the colour concepts. Without this switch which, in my opinion, 
will justify itself in due course, I should be obliged to develop the nepo-desolc 
case artificially further and further while the colour concepts have, as a matter 
of fact, gone through just such a development and it will, therefore, be easier 
to use these as our example. 
The formation of 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc., is also primarily a case of learn-
ing to observe in a certain way, appropriate to certain data: all data are observ-
ed in the ways appropriate to them (MARY HESSE) and this also holds for red, 
green, blue, etc., things; otherwise, we may add, there would not even be such 
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empirical data as 'this thing here is blue'. It is this appropriateness, this 'certain 
way' or this 'how' of our observation, which makes observation possible. It 
directs or loads our observation, which cannot thus be imagined as being theory-
free. In this section, as well as in the next two, 1 shall try to analyse this 'how' 
and this analysis should make it clear in what sense an empirical concept is a 
minute theory. In other words, this analysis should explain what we mean by 
the meaning or intention of an empirical concept. 
As in the case of 'nepo' and 'desolc' the formation of the colour concepts 
has been successful only if one discovers, at last, after many trials and errors 
and some sooner, some later, the trial that holds, the way in which we should 
indeed observe, the 'how' of observation. We should e.g. not observe things as 
bigger or smaller, as square or round, as beautiful or ugly, as nepo or desolc, 
etc. etc., until at last one grasps the correct trial and this cannot be further 
explained as in the case of 'nepo' and 'desolc'; the secret cannot be betrayed. 
One grasps the correct trial at a certain moment or not; one has the mentioned 
'Aha Erlebniss' or not; one succeeds at a given moment to make the required 
'creative jump' or not. In the next section we shall investigate the problems 
connected with this inexplicability, such as the role of the teacher, the possibil-
ity of different people having the same concepts and the question whether every-
body is able, in principle, to make the same creative jump or not. Now this 
inexplicable 'how' of observation, that trial that holds, is the primary meaning-
ingredient of the concepts which are formed: 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc., all mean 
the same in this respect. In what sense they are different concepts will be explain-
ed later. We said, we could not explain this 'how' any further, but we can give 
it a name, i.e. colour. This 'how', shared by 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc. constitutes 
the meaning of the concept 'colour' and we may now answer the question "How 
do we learn to observe when we form the concepts 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc.?" 
with "We learn to observe things as coloured things or, what boils down to the 
same, we learn to constitute certain data, namely coloured things, by observing 
appropriately". But notice, that this is only a naming of the 'how' and not its 
explication. In the case of 'nepo' and 'desolc' we could have named the how of 
observation, which is present in both 'nepo' and 'desolc', e.g. by using the letter 
sequence folor, which becomes the word folor just by acquiring this function 
of naming the 'how' of observation. But in this case we could betray the secret, 
as we did. 
Let me repeat the warning of section 3 here: we should by now realise the 
error of saying that there are folored and coloured things in an observer-
independent reality, which come to be known as soon as we appropriately 
observe them, i.e. through the concepts 'folor' and 'colour' respectively; we 
cannot say this, precisely because these data are only those data within that 
appropriate method of observation by which they are co-constituted; the 'how' 
of our observation and the data for which this 'how' is appropriate are brought 
about in one and the same process of concept formation. I will now first say 
something more about such concepts as 'folor' and 'colour' and then I will 
come back to 'red', 'green', etc. 
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A concept like 'colour' conies to be known by trial and error: one must try 
and err in order to grasp at last the correct trial; one also learns how to observe 
in 'incorrect' ways. In the nepo-desolc case the observer tried to understand how 
I observed in terms of a putting of the objects from the rectangle alternately 
into two groups, he tried to understand it as an observation of bent and straight 
things or as a putting of linguistic symbols in one row and of formal symbols 
in the other. In all these cases he failed because he had not yet observed appro-
priately, he had not yet observed folored things, which did not yet exist for him. 
But it is very important to err in such ways, because it provides us with a first 
kind of order in a chaotic multitude of possible ways of observation. The concept 
'folor' comes to be known as distinct from the concepts 'form' or 'symbol' or 
'size' etc., and analogously the concept 'colour' comes to be known as distinct 
from 'size', 'folor', 'taste', 'form', 'smell', etc. In this way these concepts, as 
methods of observation, are ordered amongst a great many other concepts or 
methods of observation. They get a position in the conceptual scheme, part of 
which may be present beforehand, but part of which may also be formed in the 
same process of concept formation. The order in the conceptual system is 
brought about by the relation 'distinct from'. Of course, being routineers in 
concept formation, and most ten-year old people are, these relations are brought 
about rather automatically and they may therefore seem trivial, but they are 
not unimportant, because they constitute part of our methods of observation: 
learning how not to observe contributes to learning to observe from the right 
point of view. Once we have formed the concept 'colour' and thereby the colour 
concepts (see below), we know that in order to establish the colour of a thing, 
e.g. to test 'that thing over there is red', it is not necessary to observe its form, 
its size, its weight, its being ugly or not, etc. And this knowledge is stored, so to 
speak, in the concept 'colour' and rests upon the relations 'distinct from'. That 
it is trivial knowledge, if it is, does not imply that it is epistemologically unim-
portant to explain where it comes from. 
Observation of coloured things, then, is observation loaded with, or through, 
the concept 'colour'. This concept directs our observation (there would not even 
be observation without a direction!) and this direction is partially determined by 
the relations, 'distinct from', that this concept has with a great many other con-
cepts. The concept 'colour' thereby enables us to bring about an order in a 
multitude of sensory impressions, which implies the constitution of the class 
of coloured things. The extension of a concept is, in this view, indissolubly 
bound to its intention. The concept as a method of observation or as a point of 
view, to borrow Popper's term 3 0, enables us to speak of its extension. 'Colour' 
is a minute theory in that it focusses these 'distinct from' relations by which it is 
taken up into the conceptual scheme. It is a minute theory in that it focusses this 
conceptual scheme and it has the meaning it has by being taken up in this 
scheme, which is not only built up of such 'distinct from' relations as we shall 
see. 
We must now return to the fact that, in learning how to observe, we form 
different concepts (e.g. 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc.). This is a rather simple point: 
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once the 'how' (e.g. 'colour') of an observation is understood or grasped, other 
concepts (e.g. 'red', 'green', 'blue', etc.) have more or less also been formed, be-
cause that 'how' or that method of observation is learned or discovered in an 
ordering of things, which could not be ordered in that way before: the learning 
to observe in a certain directed way comes down to the same as the learning to 
order things in a certain specific way. If we learn to observe coloured things, we 
learn to order them according to their colour.31 But here we must also take care 
not to separate what cannot be separated: there is not first the method of obser-
vation and then, as a consequence, the order. No, we learn how to observe in 
learning how to order and vice versa. These are two aspects of one and the same 
process of concept formation and we cannot understand the one without the 
other. The ordering should be understood as a special kind of manipulation of 
things, to which we referred before in connection with the baby's formation of 
the concept 'thing' (section 3). 
Of course not all concept formation can be said to be a matter of learning 
to order in as simple a manner as in the cases of the colour and folor concepts 
(these are at least simple in our very 'theoretically loaded eyes'), but we are still 
at the very elementary starting-point level. Later on we shall see (first in section 
5), that the formation of 'more advanced' concepts takes place in a different 
way. Also in those cases we may say, I think, that a concept is primarily a method 
of observation. But returning to the colour concepts, we may say that the 'how' 
of observation, laid down in the concept 'colour', is at the same time the 'how' 
of the order which is brought about. And if someone would ask what this 'how' 
is, I could only answer "Colour". It cannot be further explicated, it can only be 
named, as I said before. And via the concept 'colour', being part of the meaning 
of'red', 'green', 'blue', etc. these concepts are taken up in the conceptual scheme. 
But they have another meaning-ingredient, constituted by their having a specific 
place in an order, a place which can be filled by the appropriate data 3 2 and this 
aspect of their meaning distinguishes the colour concepts from each other. 
Let us now consider in a little more detail what it means to say that, e.g. 
'red', is a minute theory. First, of course, 'red' contains the 'how' of the observa-
tion or ordening, by which it gets a position within the conceptual scheme via 
'colour'. And part of the meaning of 'red' may be formulated by 'red is a colour' 
or by 'if a thing is red then it is coloured'. Both these statements formulate the 
same necessary connection between 'red' and 'colour' and thus also between the 
empirical data known by means of, observable through or co-constituted by, 
these concepts, e.g. 'this is a red thing' and 'this is a coloured thing'. But notice 
that we do not mean a necessary connection between facts in an observer-
independent reality, nor a necessary connection between linguistic entities, 
which has no empirical foundation at all. It is impossible to apply the positivist 
analytical tool of the factual-linguistic dichotomy in such cases (compare 
Quine's criticism in his 'Two Dogma's', to which I shall come back later). It is 
much more as Hanson stated: once a concept or minute theory has been formed 
"scientists will cease distinguishing between its (i.e. the concept's, H.K) struc-
ture and that of the phenomena themselves."33 But this 'fusion' can only be 
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justified within an epistemology, marked by theory-loaded observation. Within 
such a context one may speak of necessary connections in a theory-dependent 
world (compare thesis ii of the logical positivist context, sketched in section 1). 
Connections such as the one between 'red' and 'colour' are necessary in a very 
simple sense: part of the meaning of 'red' is 'colour', which contains the 'how' 
of observing coloured things. The negation of the statement 'red is a colour' 
would come down to the same as "I don't know what 'red' and 'colour' mean". 
Such a necessary connection is empirically founded as a necessary connection, 
but not in the inductivist sense of a constantly going together of a thing's being 
red and its being coloured. It is empirically founded in the following sense: in 
concept formation the 'how' of observation is, finally, discovered. This 'how' 
or this trial that stands the test is discovered in empirical inquiry, it is not known 
a priori, and then, only afterwards, we can recognise in such empirically confirm-
ed trials such necessary connections as the one between 'red' and 'colour' and 
between 'folor' and e.g. 'nepo'. But the necessity of such a connection does not 
imply an 'irrevisability' or a 'true, come what may' (Quine). On the contrary, 
what may come may indeed force us to break such connections open, which 
would then imply the destruction of our colour concepts and we would be 
deprived of a possible method of observation. This stresses the empirical 
character of such necessary connections. There is no guarantee whatsoever that 
the trial we at last discover in concept formation will continue to stand the test 
to all eternity. Thus, if we speak of necessity, this is always a necessity relative to 
our conceptual scheme.34 
And how else could it be: concepts are always concepts within such a scheme 
and data are always theoretically or conceptually co-constituted data. Thus, 
if we speak of a necessary connection between concepts or data, it can only exist 
relative to a conceptual scheme. But this possibility of its being refuted empha-
sises the fact that the necessary connection as such is empirically founded. And 
the question whether we can imagine such future evidence, which would force 
us to break such a connection open and therefore to reject our method of obser-
vation or, in other words, which would lead us into a conceptual crisis, is very 
interesting because of the answer we must give to it: we cannot imagine such 
data because of the very fact that they are excluded by our conceptual scheme or 
our theories. If we could understand such data we would have a concept through 
which we could observe them, at least in principle, and in that case the necessary 
connection would already have been broken open. We can imagine or under-
stand a red thing to be square or round only because, with the concept 'red', we 
know that the form of a thing is irrelevant to its being red. This goes back to the 
relation 'distinct from' between 'colour' and 'form' and thereby between 'red' 
and a certain form. Our ability to understand this rests upon the fact that it 
constitutes a possibility within our conceptual scheme. Analogously, our not 
being able to understand a red thing not to be coloured as well, rests upon the 
fact that it is impossible within our conceptual scheme, that has been formed in 
empirical inquiry, namely concept formation. But we shall meet with this point, 
namely the possibility of refutation, several times again and I shall then go 
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further into the matter. We are, after all, able to make such conceptual revisions; 
concepts like 'particle', 'energy', 'simultaneity', 'mass', etc., from physics, 
and concepts like 'individual', 'state', 'social change', etc., from social science35 
have been revised precisely because of the necessary connections they contained 
within the 'old' conceptual schemes or theories. 
But the concept 'red' still contains other connections as a part of its meaning, 
it is a still more extensive minute theory. By having a place in an order, 'red', 
is connected with the other places in the order: it has that place by its not 
occupying the other places. We may formulate this simply by 'red differs from 
green, blue, etc' or by 'if a thing is red then it is not green, not blue, etc.', 
Again these connections are necessary in the same sense as the one discussed 
before: they are not 'necessities in nature', nor are they purely linguistic truths, 
but they are relative to the conceptual scheme in which they acquire meaning 
and they may be falsified, which would cause a conceptual crisis. That red differs 
from green, blue, etc., is necessary for the formation or the having of those 
concepts. Otherwise there would be no order nor a 'how' of observation: there 
would be no colour concepts at all. Of course we can only say this in retrospect; 
we can only recognise these necessary connections with retrospective effect. 
And if we do form these concepts then the necessary connections are there. They 
are established in the trial and error investigation which is called concept for-
mation. 
It can now be seen more clearly that concepts, even if they would be called 
observational predicates by a positivist, are not isolated units of meaning. 
Concepts are only concepts in relation to many other concepts; among them 
are the 'distinct from' relations and the necessary connections. By focussing 
these relations an empirical concept is a minute theory. It may also be more clear 
by now that an empirical datum is neither observer-independent nor independ-
ent of other data for its being that datum. An empirical datum is not an isolated 
and raw fact. The empirical datum 'this is blue' is only that datum thanks to the 
existence of many other data in respect of which it can be ordered and thereby 
constituted as that datum. 
There are other theory-ingredients of an empirical concept like 'red', that are 
more important than the ones mentioned in this section, especially in connection 
with the analysis of the concept of empirical law, which is the aim of this study. 
These ingredients will be called the lawlike traits of a concept or its lawlike 
character. They will be investigated in the next two sections. POPPER 3 6 has 
frequently referred to the lawlikeness of a concept, but the idea has never been 
extensively elucidated. 
5. THE LAWLIKENESS OF AN EMPIRICAL CONCEPT - 1 
Up till now we have tried to elucidate some implications of concept formation 
(sections 3 and 4), but we relegated certain points to this section: from section 
3 the question that nearly everybody can form certain empirical concepts in 
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the way sketched by means of the nepo-desolc example and the point of the 
'Aha Erlebniss' or 'creative jump'; from section 4 the inexplicability of 'the 
trial that stands the test', which is suddenly discovered by making that creative 
jump, the role of the teacher in concept formation and the problem of how we 
can ever say that different people have the same concepts. 
These problems are all closely interrelated and we cannot try to answer them 
separately. 
Let us start with the following question: "How can a teacher know that his 
pupil has, as a matter of fact, formed the colour concepts at a certain moment?" 
In other words: "How can he know that his pupil has grasped the correct 
trial?" He can have no recourse to a 'betrayal of the secret' as I could in the 
nepo-desolc case. Of the second letter of this page we can say that it is 
nepo because it has an open surface, but we can only say that it is black 
because it is black. What could be a basis for the teacher's judgement that 
his pupil now has succeeded in the formation of the colour concepts? Of 
course, we are here assuming the infallibility of the teacher or, better, the presen-
ce of a universally accepted authority, by which we do not mean a person, but 
rather an objective rule. But we shall come back to this. There is a twofold 
basis I think. First, there is the fact that, from a certain moment on, the pupil 
'always' correctly describes the colour of the things he is asked to describe. This 
may be taken as confirmatory evidence for the teacher's judgement. And this 
constitutes 'confirmation by positive instances' for the trial and thus also for 
the concepts in question, in the eyes of the pupil (remember the nepo-desolc 
case). Second, the teacher may ask 'crucial questions', e.g. "Can a thing be red 
and blue at the same time?" A few months ago I asked my four-year old son 
for the colour of the tomato he was eating. He promptly answered "Red" (a 
confirmation of the first kind). Then I said that it was also blue and he rejoined 
with "Oh no, that is impossible, if something is red it cannot also be blue, can 
it?" (a confirmation of the second kind). The teacher could e.g. also ask "Must 
a thing be red and square at the same time?", checking whether or not his 
pupil has gained knowledge of the relevant 'distinct from' relations (compare 
section 4). As a matter of fact, about a year ago I said to my son (the same as 
the one mentioned before) that the table he was sitting at was white. "No", he 
said, "it is round". The answers to such questions or remarks may indicate 
whether the pupil has formed the minute theory stored in the colour concepts or 
not. On such a twofold basis the teacher may soon be pretty sure that his pupil 
has really made the required jump," i.e. that he really can observe appropriately 
now. And he may reason that as long as his pupil displays exceptions or as 
long as he gives the wrong answers to 'crucial questions', he does not yet observe 
in the right way or that he has not yet formed the colour concepts. 
If this were all, the situation would be rather uncomplicated, in my view. Of 
course, we should never know for certain whether a person really had formed 
certain concepts, because there is always the possibility that he grasped a trial 
that parallelled the correct one in all cases up till now (compare the 'letter 
vs. formal symbol-trial' that parallelled the correct one, i.e. 'folor', for a great 
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many things; section 3). But most of us would be satisfied with the practical 
certainty we may get on such a twofold basis, perhaps fearing getting entan-
gled in metaphysical speculation about 'obscure intermediary entities' which 
should be present in a person's mental equipment when he has grasped the 
correct trial. But the mentioned uncomplicatedness would be marked in par-
ticular by the fact that we always have an answer to exceptions: even when a 
person who has up till now always called nepo things nepo and desolc things 
desolc, red things red, brown things brown, etc. we should know in advance the 
explanation of his behaving irregularly, e.g. by suddenly calling a red thing 
green. This explanation would simply be, that he has not yet observed appro-
priately or that he has not yet grasped the correct trial or that he has not yet 
formed the concepts in question. 
However, what has been said is not all. If it were, the minute theory laid down 
in, e.g. the colour concepts, would constitute a barren bit of knowledge because 
it would not leave room for genuinely new exceptions, for which an explanation 
could not (yet) be given; it would be a minute theory in the sense of section 4 
and that would be that. Fortunately we can say much more and this will make 
it clear that even such simple concepts as the colour concepts are very fertile 
or have an important heuristic value. 
Let me first say that I do not have in mind a further analysis of the 'creative 
jump'. We have now reached a point at which I can agree with POPPER, who 
relegated such an analysis to empirical psychology.37 What can be said in 
addition comes down to this: not the regularity in the behaviour of a person 
who apparently has formed certain concepts nor the irregularities explicable 
in the way just mentioned, but the exceptions in the behaviour of a person, who 
should, normally, have formed those concepts are of primary importance. With 
this I allude to the point that nearly everybody can form certain simple concepts 
in the way mentioned in section 3, be it the one sooner the other later. And of the 
fact that not everybody can form those concepts, I say, that it is of far greater 
importance, epistemologically, than the fact that the vast majority of people 
can form them. That it is a fact and how it can be a fact, will be shown in a 
moment. It is this fact, that both makes the matter more complicated and makes 
our minute theories fertile. 
I have stressed the fact of there being such exceptions, because exceptions 
have received a stepmotherly treatment in epistemology and methodology, even 
in Popper's philosophy, I think. 'Regularity without exceptions' (compare the 
quotations in note 7) constitutes the fundamental notion of lawlikeness, but the 
function of exceptions will appear to be of the utmost importance in the estab-
lishing of empirical laws, as it is in empirical concept formation. 
Let us come to the point now. Thus far our analysis of concept formation 
was related to the teacher-pupil situation. We must now imagine a different 
situation. Suppose that a long time ago, when no physical theory of light or a 
physiological theory of sense organs was at hand, two gentleman, Mr. A and 
Mr. B, who grew up in the same 'cultural circle', walked in a garden on a sunny 
day, both eating a ripe tomato. Mr. A, not knowing what else to say, remarks: 
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"This is a delicious red tomato". He does not expect any reaction, but Mr. B 
appears to be surprised and asks: "You called this tomato red?" "Well, yes, 
look here" and A shows him his tomato. "But it is green, can't you see?" 
Mr. B answers. 
In brief: Mr. A says of the tomato that it is red and Mr. B says that it is 
green. 
Suppose further that this difference is not caused by the fact that Mr. B has 
given a different name, i. c. 'green', to the concept which Mr. A named 'red', 
and vice versa. In other words suppose, that the difference is not caused by the 
fact, that A and B gave different names (in the sense mentioned before in con-
nection with the nepo-desolc example) to the same concept. In that case they 
could easily reach agreement by conventionally adjusting their naming. 
Suppose, finally, that the disagreement is also not caused by the fact, that A 
observed the tomato through the colour concepts (or: as a coloured thing) and 
B through shape concepts (or: as a thing with a certain shape), or vice versa. In 
other words, it is not the case that what B describes as 'green' would be describ-
ed by A as e.g. 'bulgy' and neither is it the case that what A described as 'red' 
would be described by B as 'cubic'. If, upon further investigation, such a cause 
of the trouble would become manifest, the difference could also be removed by 
conventional adjustment. 
Both A and B pretend to describe the colour of the tomato in question. And 
it may be that they have always, up till the time of their conversation in the 
garden, given the same description when describing the colour of things. And, 
as a matter of fact, they give the same description of the colour of the grass they 
are walking on. But now Mr. A is really surprised and says: "If you say that 
this tomato and the grass over here is green, then you do not observe a difference 
in colour in these two cases. That is very strange and I cannot understand it". 
"But it is completely clear to me and I wonder why you use two different names 
for the same concept. That is rather confusing". 
Both are honourable men and they are not satisfied with this situation of 
disagreement. They could, for example, have reacted with resignation: "Well, 
we ought to be tolerant, so for A this tomato is red and for me it is green; full 
stop". Why do they not reason this way? Because both took it for granted that 
they had made the 'correct creative jump' or that they had grasped 'the trial 
that stands the test' or that they could observe in the appropriate way in order 
to observe coloured things. They both thought that they understood the minute 
colour theory. This understanding presupposed intersubjective agreement, 
because they took it to be understanding by the very fact that it enabled them to 
communicate with other people. If they should reason in the way just mention-
ed, with resignation and with an appeal to pseudo-tolerance, they would, in 
principle, give up their concepts as a means of intersubjective understanding. 
Mutual understanding would be an inexplicable miracle and there would be no 
room left for discussion about the truth of their statements. But if they want to 
maintain understanding, they must go on with their discussion and investigation 
in order to reach better understanding. 
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First Mr. A might suggest that B has not yet grasped the correct trial or that 
he has not yet formed the colour concepts, but Mr. B cannot accept this. There 
is no reason at all why B should be the pupil and A the teacher. Why should 
it not be the other way round? The situation is completely symmetrical in this 
respect. The result of such a move would again be a mutual non-understanding. 
Moreover, it would be a completely ad hoc escape, because it can, a priori, be 
said to be applicable in all future cases of disagreement. This holds, of course, 
for both sides and the best they could say would be that both had a piece of 
private knowledge, relinquishing any intersubjective character of their minute 
theories. Second, Mr. A cannot simply accept Mr. B's description of the tomato 
as a falsification of his colour concepts. For it would not at all be clear why his 
own observation should not be taken as a falsification of B's concepts instead, 
and it would therefore again be a completely ad hoc manoeuvre, the situation 
again being completely symmetrical. Moreover, Mr. A and B could not even 
consider this possibility seriously. If e.g. Mr. A really took B's description as a 
falsification of a part of his colour theory, this would imply that he admitted 
that he can no longer observe in a way, laid down in the concepts 'red' and 
'green', that he could do until a moment ago. But if one has learned to do 
something, i.e. to observe in a certain way, one cannot suddenly decree that 
one cannot do it any longer. Such a step would not solve any problem and no 
better understanding would be gained, neither by A nor by B. 
The most important reason for these failures can be found in the static 
approach to the matter. I will make this clear by continuing the story. Mr. A 
does not take B's description as a falsification of his colour concepts, nor does 
he qualify it as a sign of B's failure to have formed these concepts up till now. 
He takes it as an exception to his colour theory that requires an explanation. But 
taking it as an exception implies that he made his colour concepts normative 
or lawlike. He can only meaningfully speak of an exception when he has some 
norm to judge what is normal. And this, of course, is also an ad hoc manoeuvre, 
but when he adds that the exception requires an explanation, he has an explana-
tion in mind which removes the ad hocness. And to do this, Mr. A formulates a 
completely new conjecture: "I think you are blind in a certain sense. You can-
not observe a difference in colour, when you observe this tomato and the grass 
we are walking on. Your blindness could be called 'colour blindness'". And 
Mr. B may reason in a completely analogous way: "From your point of view 
(sic!), you may say that, but it does not solve any problem. You only gave the 
problem a name, as I could give it a name e.g. 'colour obsession', suggesting 
that you observe differences in colour where I observe none". 
And Mr. B is right; A only made his concepts 'red' and 'green' lawlike in an 
ad hoc way and deduced on this basis that B is ab-normal in the literal sense of 
the word, i.e. deviating from the norm 'red', and he named this abnormality 
'colour blindness'. But now Mr. A retires in his laboratory and after a long, 
long time he meets Mr. B again. A tremendous advance has been made. A 
physical theory of light and a physiological theory of the structure and the 
functioning of the human retina have been developed. Now Mr. A can say to 
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Mr. B: "I think you are colour blind. There is a certain defect in the structure 
of your retina. Visit an oculist and he will confirm my prediction". But B has 
already visited an oculist and he knows that he is colour blind: "I think there 
is no further disagreement. We have both reached better understanding and 
therefore restored intersubjective agreement. Both our conjectures, yours of 
colour blindness and mine of colour obsession, have lost their ad hoc character". 
In my opinion, we can learn many things from this example, which is of 
course not meant to describe the factual history of the colour concepts. (I 
could also have chosen the folor concepts as my example; some people cannot 
observe a very small 'e' to be desolc; they need a magnifying glass because they 
are short-sighted; compare also the use of a letter-chart by an oculist). 
In the first place the example illustrates the fundamental role exceptions play 
in concept and theory formation. And we mean those exceptions for which no 
acceptable explanation can be given at the moment of their occurrence; we shall, 
call them genuine exceptions. Mr. B's observation that this tomato is green 
constituted a genuine exception to A's concept 'red' (and 'green' of course) 
because A could not explain it by saying that B had not yet formed the colour 
concepts or that he had not yet observed in the appropriate way but that he 
would, sooner or later. So there is, at that moment, a genuine exception, in 
particular to 'red differs from green' or 'a thing cannot be red and green at the 
same time'. Therefore, the on-going process of concept formation and thus 
theory formation becomes possible thanks to such genuine exceptions. If there 
were no exceptions of this kind empirical knowledge would be restricted to a 
collection of such minute .theories as the one sketched in section 4. And these 
theories would indeed be barren and static pieces of knowledge. But, fortunate-
ly, genuine exceptions do occur and they make our concepts fertile by initiating 
further investigation, thereby determining empirical inquiry as a dynamic under-
taking. And we should honour them for this. We can only understand science as 
a dynamic concern if we give genuine exceptions the place they deserve in our 
epistemology: they make further concept and theory formation possible and 
necessary and they may thereby lead to better understanding. They do not get a 
fair chance in a logical positivist methodology, because 'regularity without 
exceptions' is preached there; and it must indeed be preached there in order to 
uphold the inductivist view of empirical knowledge. 
Secondly it will be clear that there would be no exceptions without lawlike 
concepts. Mr. A must claim e.g. that a red thing cannot possibly be also green 
in order to qualify B's observational result as a genuine exception. Otherwise 
he could only accept it as a falsification of his concepts in the following sense: 
the concept 'red' cannot be said to be intersubjectively valid, it can at best be 
taken as a piece of private knowledge. Thus, if we are not prepared to acknowl-
edge such a lawlike character or such necessary connections as 'red differs from 
green', we can do no justice to the fact that scientific investigation is an on-
going process of concept and theory formation. 
In the third place, this lawlikeness of concepts must be empirically confirmed, 
it is not justified per se. At first it is a matter of imputation and it therefore 
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has a purely ad hoc status. But the concept as a lawlike concept comes to be 
confirmed by the result of on-going concept or theory formation. At first the term 
'colour blind' is only a name of the exceptional datum, which could only be 
observed by observing it through the lawlike concept 'red', but later on the 
concept of colour blindness is formed within a physiological theory, resulting 
from further investigation to which the exception was the incitement. And this 
confirmed 'red' as a lawlike concept. B's description is no longer a genuine 
exception, but it became an explicable exception or even stronger, within the 
new conceptual system, B's observational result became a 'normal case'. The 
meaning of 'red' has now been extended with an empirically confirmed lawlike 
trait through which it is connected with the concept 'colour blind' and with the 
theory by which this phenomenon can be explained or understood. The meaning 
of 'red' is determined by its being taken up into this theory and we cannot view 
'red' as an isolated or theory-independent unit of meaning. This extended theory 
enables us to observe a datum like John's colour blindness. In other words the 
formation of new concepts, i.e. 'colour blind', implies the co-constitution of 
data which could not be observed before. Concept formation and datum con-
stitution again go hand in hand, but we should notice the fact that the concept 
'colour blind' has been formed in a way different from the way in which we 
formed e.g. 'nepo' and 'desolc'. In science most concept formation takes place 
in the way of the concept 'colour blind', but this way always presupposes the 
presence of other empirical concepts, which can be used as a norm in further 
investigation, in which new concepts may then be formed. 
Let us now return to the teacher-pupil situation and the question how a 
teacher can ever know whether or not his pupil has made the correct creative 
jump or whether or not he has grasped the correct trial, which cannot be further 
explained. The role of the teacher seemed very important: the teacher determin-
ed whether or not his pupil had erred and whether or not his pupil's description 
was the correct one. But the role of a teacher is overestimated if we should 
say that it is a condito sine qua non for concept formation. A teacher can never 
force his pupil to form certain concepts. The decisive point lies in the pupil's 
ability to grasp the correct trial, he must take the jump by himself as his teacher 
cannot make him do so. This implies that concept formation is in principle 
possible without a teacher. A child is much like Hanson's paradigm observer 
who "is not the man who sees and reports what all normal observers see and 
report, but the man who sees in familiar objects what no one else has seen 
before". 3 8 Of course, a child does not learn to observe what no one else has seen 
before, but he must learn to observe and describe what he could not see and 
describe before and this activity does not differ principally from that of the 
paradigm observer. If a pupil from a certain moment on observes and describes 
in the same way as his teacher, we may say that he has become a normal observer 
having the same concepts as his teacher and able to cooperate with his teacher 
in doing normal science, in Kuhn's sense. But the justification of the pupil's 
concept does not lie in the fact that he grasped the correct trial, which stood 
the tests brought about by the teacher. Nor can the justification of the teacher's 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 25 
concepts be found in the mere fact that he is the teacher. The justification of 
their concepts is obtained by an empirical confirmation of their concepts as 
being lawlike. Their concepts come to be justified once they have stood an 
empirical test in the sense of the example described above. In other words, their 
concepts come to be justified once they have proven to be fertile by enabling 
them to reach better understanding by on-going concept formation. This is 
clearly illustrated by a 'good teacher' at an elementary level: when his pupil, 
after many trials, nevertheless continues to err, a good teacher will stop using 
the explanation that his pupil has not yet grasped the correct trial. Such a teach-
er will see that this 'explanation' leads to a piling-up of ad hoc theses: every time 
a pupil makes a mistake in the eyes of his teacher, that teacher might say that 
he has not yet observed from the right point of view. But being a good teacher, 
he will realise that such an explanation could be used ad infinitum and he will 
therefore question his own concepts. His being a teacher cannot be taken as a 
justification any longer and he will face his pupil's observations as genuine 
exceptions, which need to be explained. He is then no longer a teacher, but he 
and his pupil become co-operators. And only if they succeed in giving the 
required explanation through further concept formation, will their concepts 
have stood the test: they have then been confirmed as being lawlike. What 
constituted a genuine exception before can now be observed as a normal datum. 
The 'bad teacher', on the other hand, will continue to use the ad hoc explana-
tion: he is the authority taking it for granted that there will eventually come a 
time when his pupil will succeed in learning to observe in the correct way. He 
may thereby temporarily block further investigation which could restore mutual 
understanding. He does not leave room for genuine exceptions, which might lead 
to a falsification of his concepts (see below for this possibility) and he acts very 
unscientifically because he does not seem to reckon with the fact that science 
aims at an empirical foundation of all knowledge - even of simple concepts -
which implies intersubjective understanding, as we said before. As a matter of 
fact, he frustrates all future inquiry, because he deprives science of its dynamic 
character: he already has the answer to all future exceptions. In our example 
Mr. A acted in a scientific spirit by giving up his role as a teacher. 
We have given an example in which a genuine exception led to a confirmation, 
but it may also turn out to be a falsification upon further inquiry. Notice the 
proviso 'upon further inquiry': as we said at the beginning of the example, Mr. 
A cannot simply qualify Mr. B's observational result as a falsification of his 
colour concepts, because this would also block the way to better and intersub-
jective understanding of the empirical phenomena. On-going investigation may, 
however, lead to nothing. More precisely, it may happen that we can only ex-
plain the genuine exceptions in question by adding new ad hoc statements to 
the ad hoc imputed lawlikeness of the concept, which made the exception an 
exception. We may, after some time, find ourselves confronted with a piling-up 
of ad hoc trials, not being able to extend and to refine our original concepts. In 
such a case some will go on and try again, but others will lose confidence in the 
concepts in question. In our example, further investigation led to an extension 
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and refinement (eventually a restriction) of the original concepts - new concepts 
were formed and new data co-constituted - and an explanation of the exception 
became possible. Afterwards, we may say that the exception caused a 'minor 
conceptual crisis', i.e. a crisis that could be warded off by an extension, refine-
ment, etc., of the conceptual system at hand. 
There is, however, no guarantee that future exceptions will also turn out to 
be explicable in this way, i.e. by a further extension, amending or refinement 
of the conceptual system. And when a result of such evolutionary science is long 
in coming, when it leads only to a piling up of ad hoc theses, some people may 
give up hope that continuing the investigation on the basis of the conceptual 
system at hand will ever be successful. They think it better to face the possibil-
ity of the exception being a falsification of the 'theory at hand', as well as 
the underlying inexplicable trials, grasped in a creative jump. These people find 
themselves confronted with a much graver conceptual crisis. They no longer 
believe in the possibility of evolutionary science, but think it necessary to 
reach better understanding by the formation of an alternative to the very theory 
evolutionary science started from. They commit themselves to do revolutionary 
science, facing 'a big crisis'. They have chosen the most difficult way because 
they can only prove their position by providing an alternative conceptual system 
(e.g. an alternative colour theory) and they must play the role of Hanson's para-
digm observer, who can see in familiar things what no one else has seen before. 
The alternative theory must constitute an alternative method of observation so 
that the empirical data which could be observed and understood through the 
'old' theory can also be understood and observed through the new one and the 
new theory must also enable us to observe and understand the genuine excep-
tions in respect to which the 'old' theory is taken to fail, as normal or explicable 
cases. Only when they succeed in doing this do they prove their point, because 
they cannot confine themselves to the remark that the 'old' theory has been 
falsified. A theory is not a coat that can be taken off at will. Therefore HANSON 
is right when he says: "Should someone claim he has a good reason for abandon-
ing a theory T, but can suggest no alternative to T, no other way to form con-
cepts about the phenomena T covers (my italics, H.K.), I deny that he has good 
reasons for abandoning T! " . 3 9 
But there will also be those who stick to the 'old' theory, relying on the 
possibility of getting rid of the piled-up ad hoc trials by extending, etc., this 
theory. They face the situation as a minor crisis. 
Nothing can be said in advance about the possible success of these two ap-
proaches. The exceptional orbit of Uranus could be explained by evolutionary 
science: the discovery of Neptune fitted very well in the conceptual system at 
hand. An analogous attempt to account for Mercury's exceptional behaviour 
failed in this sense, that the 'Vulcan-trial' remained purely ad hoc. Revolution-
ary science had to be done (by Einstein) in order to reach better understanding. 
The ether-theory was, for a long time, defended by scientists, who thought 
it possible to get rid of the ad hoc additions by doing evolutionary science. 
But revolutionary science settled the debate, at last. 
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It could, however, not be said in advance which way would lead to success, 
i.e. to better understanding. 
When the 'progressives' have, in their own view, succeeded in the formation 
of an alternative theory, then the battle has just begun. The 'conservatives' 
(without any pejorative connotation, unless they start to behave like the 
aforementioned bad teacher!) defending the 'old' theory, cannot be easily 
convinced and I think this is perfectly understandable after what has been 
said about concept formation up till now. They are asked to give up their 
familiar conceptual system and to learn to observe in a completely new way, 
incompatible with the way in which they observed through the 'old' theory. 
They are asked to become paradigm observers and a severe hindrance is form-
ed just by the familiar conceptual system, which enabled them to observe and 
to explain a great many empirical data. (This is a difference with the child, 
whom I compared with Hanson's paradigm observer a moment ago: the child 
is not hindered by an empirically well-confirmed alternative system of con-
cepts). 
PLANCK has given a rather negative judgment of such a battle: "Eine neue 
wissenschaftliche Wahrheit pflegt sich nicht in der Weise durchzusetzen, dass 
ihre Gegner überzeugt werden und sich als belehrt erklären, sondern vielmehr 
dadurch, dass die Gegner allmählich aussterben und dass die heranwachsende 
Generation von vornherein mit der Wahrheit vertraut gemacht ist" 4 0 , and of 
course some 'conservatives' may start to act like Authorities, like Ostwald, 
Mach and Boltzmann in Planck's view. But this is, at least, a onesided apprecia-
tion of such battles. They also play an important role in the confirmation of the 
newcomer. A new theory gains its empirical confirmation from the fact that it 
leads to better understanding of certain empirical data and this implies inter-
subjective agreement. Once the battle is over and it appears that the new theory 
has beaten its rival (which is of course not the only possible result), it has proven 
that it leads to better intersubjective understanding: we have all learned to 
observe in a new way and we have thereby reached better understanding. We 
have formed new concepts and new data. Going through such a battle the new 
theory is subjected to a very severe test. The death of the (authoritarian) oppo-
nents, the 'old and honourable men', cannot explain the victory of a new theory, 
because these men also had their pupils from 'die heranwachsende Generation'. 
And these pupils, educated in terms of the 'old' theory, may nevertheless reject 
this theory and adopt the new one. They do so because of its greater explanatory 
power (in the sense frequently indicated). With the new theory one can observe 
and explain what could not be observed, explained or derived before. When the 
authorities or bad teachers die, a practical obstacle may be removed, but this 
does not guarantee the victory of the theory they opposed. 
In this way, the confirmation of a concept as lawlike or as implying a necessary 
connection and also its falsification become possible thanks to genuine excep-
tions. And genuine exceptions only exist if we acknowledge this lawlikeness, 
which cannot possibly be the result of an observed regularity, simply because an 
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irregularity (i.e. a genuine exception) is needed to establish it. Confirmation and 
falsification are both the result of on-going concept formation. 
We must add two remarks at the end of this section. The first is this: neither 
a minor crisis nor a big crisis can be solved by convention. Such a manoeuvre 
would again block the road to better understanding. It would again frustrate 
the dynamic character of empirical science and misapprehend the function of 
exceptions. A colour-blind person such as Mr. B is not someone who refuses to 
join a convention. On the contrary, he could not join it even if he wanted to. 
And the battles fought to defend old theories and to have a new one accepted 
would be completely irrational if it were a matter of convention - why make so 
much fuss about a convention? Later on, when we consider the concept of empir-
ical law, we shall come back to this point. 
New genuine exceptions, and this is our second remark, always remain possi-
ble. They may incite evolutionary science, leading to new lawlike traits of the 
concepts at hand and their confirmation. But they may also initiate revolution-
ary science, they may force us to consider the possibilty of our conceptual 
system, including its lawlike traits or necessary connections, being falsified. It 
may, for example, happen that we must consider the possiblity of dissolving the 
empirically confirmed necessary connections present in the concept 'red', in 
order to make room for an alternative connection, which could lead to an expla-
nation of the exception within a new colour theory. Of course we cannot imagine 
such an alternative because our imagination of colour phenomena is bound to 
our present colour theory, but this does not exclude the possibility of this theory 
being falsified (compare my remark in section 4 with respect to the statement 
'red is a colour'). So the lawlike traits or necessary connections are not irre-
visable, come what may. If one interprets the term 'necessary' in this way, as 
QUINE did, and then rejects it, one is right, but at the same time one makes a 
rather gratuitous remark about empirical knowledge. It is gratuitous because 
it opposes a necessity in an observer-independent reality, but in empirical 
science we get knowledge of an empirical reality, which is co-constituted by the 
conceptual system or theory which makes observation possible and this reality 
changes when our theories change. And from the point of view of theory-
loaded observation, exceptions are a definite necessity for an empirical science 
and hence necessary connections are, far more than 'a constantly going-to-
gether' or a 'regularity without exceptions'. 
6. THE LAWLIKENESS OF AN EMPIRICAL CONCEPT-II 
I now wish to draw attention to another kind of lawlikeness present in empir-
ical concepts, which may, once more, make it clear in what sense a concept is a 
minute theory or essentially theory-dependent. Much of what has been said in 
section 5 is also valid here. 
The lawlikeness I have in mind consists of a norm (or norms) determining cer-
tain circumstances, under which a thing may be observed through a concept, to 
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be relevant for the applicability of that concept. The problem of relevant con-
ditions or circumstances is frequently mentioned in the literature, but has never 
been systematically analysed. We may illustrate this lawlikeness by an example: 
part of the meaning of 'red' (and the other colour concepts) is that the intensity 
of the irradiating light is relevant to the applicability of this concept. Likewise 
the kind of light is a relevant circumstance. In other words, we can only get 
confirming or falsifying evidence for the statement 'this is red' when we observe 
it in the presence of 'sufficient light', as CARNAP once put it 4 1 and when it is 
irradiated by white light and not e.g. by a sodium vapour lamp. 
This lawlikeness determines the dispositional character of such concepts (cf. 
POPPER in note 36). The concept, entailing such lawlike traits, enabling us to 
observe certain data, determines a lawlike behaviour of those data. On the 
basis of such a lawlikeness, an observation of a red tomato in the evening, 
resulting in its being grey, does not constitute evidence against its being red, 
nor for its being grey. The observation was not performed under normal cir-
cumstances. The colour 'behaviour' of that tomato is governed by the lawlike 
character of the colour concepts. It is normal, given the concept 'red', that a 
red thing appears to be grey in the evening, when the light intensity has become 
too small to observe coloured things. The colour change can be explained by 
the conceptual system at hand. (cf. Ayer's discussion of the shape of a coin). 
But in order to see what this lawlikeness means, we must go back to a situa-
tion in which the conceptual system has not yet sufficed to explain this phenom-
enon of what we now call an apparent colour change. After all, 'red', as a 
lawlike concept, must once have been formed. 
When, in this situation, Mr. A observes the behaviour of the tomato, he 
cannot explain it. He observes a change of colour, but he is not content with the 
'explanation' that apparently things may be red at one time and grey at another 
time. He does not take things 'as they are', but he wants to restore understanding. 
This introduces two questions: first "Why is he not content with a description 
of 'the facts'?" and second "What is meant by understanding and its restora-
tion?" The first question might be answered with: "Because a description of a 
change does not make him understand why it happened. A description, in this 
case, is not an explanation, but simply a restatement of the fact to be explained". 
This leads us to the second question, which may be answered with: "If A wants 
to understand or to explain a change, this means that he wants to be able to 
observe it as a normal phenomenon". But this is either tautologous or very 
cryptical and it must be elucidated. Mr. A is supposed to have the classical 
concept of change, which implies that every change has a cause. A change wit-
hout a cause would not be a normal change or it would not even be understand-
able as a change within his concept of change. Let us assume that he uses this 
concept in its secularised sense of a methodological rule.4 2 A change always has a 
cause in his eyes, and it becomes a normal phenomenon when he has traced its 
cause or when he has discovered the circumstance which is responsible for the 
change and which thereby has become relevant. He has then restored the possibili-
ty of normal science in that he can explain it within his conceptual scheme. 
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(The first question, mentioned above, could now be substituted by "Why does 
he have this concept of change or why does he demand understanding in causal 
terms?", but I cannot go into this question here). 
On the basis of his concept of change, Mr. A says: 
if a thing is red at t 1 ; then it is red at any other time, tn, if all relevant cir-
cumstances are the same at tj. 
This is simply an application of his methodological rule to the concept 'red': 
it excludes the possibility of a red thing changing its colour without any cause, 
because in that case it could not even be conceived by A as a change. In this 
way, Mr. A formulates a very elementary lawlike trait of 'red', determining a 
lawlike constancy behaviour and it will be clear, I hope, that this does not mean 
a constancy in an observer-independent nature, but a constancy which is 
conceptually co-constituted. 
This classical concept of change is also used to mark the difference between 
classical statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics as conceived by BOHR. 
Quantum mechanics describes and explains phenomena which have a princi-
pally statistical character and A's concept of change can no longer be applied. 
But classical statistical mechanics is statistical for practical reasons and A's 
concept of change is applicable in principle to the phenomena this theory ex-
plains 4 3 - it is even used as a norm here to be able to speak of the practical 
statistical character of classical mechanics. When BOHR frequently stresses the 
fact that he concept of causality cannot be applied to quantum phenomena, 
this means that the classical concept of change cannot be applied either.44 
But Mr. A cannot but understand a change through his concept of change: he 
could not meet quantum processes - he could not understand them, because he 
has not formed the appropriate concepts through which such an understanding 
would become possible. So, if he wants to understand a change, he first tries to 
reach his goal by evolutionary science, i.e. by a further formation of the con-
cepts he has already formed. And when such attempts do not succeed - and 
they may fail, they may lead to a piling-up of ad hoc additions, as we know - a big 
conceptual crisis may arise and then A's concept of change is no longer sacro-
sanct. 
But now, meeting with a factual change, that evening in the garden, Mr. A 
must trace the relevant circumstance, he predicted to exist. His first conjecture 
is: 
when it gets cold a red thing turns grey. 
It was indeed becoming cold that evening and he proposes its being cold or 
warm to be a relevant circumstance. This conjecture has an ad hoc character 
and as long as this has not been removed, Mr. A has not succeeded in explain-
ing the change of colour or in restoring understanding or in forming his 
colour concepts so that he can observe the change as normal. He may adduce 
many positive instances, but being a good scientist, he does not accept a mere 
cumulation of positive instances as a good ground for the removal of the ad hoc 
character. If a mere description of a change does not explain it (see above) then 
why should an infinite number of descriptions of analogous changes do so? 
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As the conjecture is ad hoc as a universal statement, the inductively established 
universal statement would be ad hoc and we cannot get rid of this by an appeal 
to a great number of positive instances, but we shall come back to this in a 
moment. 
Mr. A, as a good scientist, no longer looks for positive instances. He waits 
until it has become winter, when it is much colder then that evening in the 
garden, and he observes that things, which were red on a sunny day in the sum-
mer, are also red on a sunny day in the winter. So he meets with negative in-
stances, but, again as a good scientist, he does not take these as falsifications 
of his conjecture. He realises that he will always need negative instances as 
genuine exceptions and not as falsifications, if he wants to get rid of the ad hoc 
character of his conjecture, if this is possible at all. He therefore takes them as 
genuine exceptions, which implies the making of his conjecture lawlike or 
normative in an ad hoc way (compare section 5). But he should then formulate 
a new conjecture enabling him to reduce the genuine exceptions to normal phe-
nomena or explicable exceptions. 
We shall not continue the description of these attempts and assume, that A is 
forced to add ad hoc conjectures again and again. Instead of getting rid of the 
ad hoc character or instead of succeeding to confirm the conjectured lawlike 
trait by on-going theory formation, a piling-up of ad hoc additions occurs. He 
then loses his confidence in his conjecture, considers it as erroneous and has 
to start anew. The points to be noticed here are, that first, cumulation of positive 
instances alone is not enough for the confirmation of a concept as lawlike or for 
the getting rid of its being ad hoc (see also below) ; second, the appearance of 
negative instances alone is not a good ground for the falsification of the law-
likeness of a concept; and third, the piling-up of ad hoc additions to which the 
negative instances, as genuine exceptions, give rise may form good ground for 
giving up the conjecture and only then negative instances may be called falsifi-
cations. Negative instances never declare themselves to be falsifications. Mr. A 
is doing evolutionary science and this often implies a temporal ad hoc status of a 
concept. Moreover, the one will lose confidence sooner than the other (EINSTEIN 
never lost confidence in the classical concept of change, through which Mr. A 
performs his investigations45), but the falsification of a conjecture is only defini-
tively established once the unbeliever has established an alternative conjecture. In 
other words, a conjecture can only be taken as rejected, when the ad hoc char-
acter of an alternative conjecture has been removed by theory formation on the 
basis of on-going investigation. 
Now this is exactly what Mr. A tries to do. His second conjecture is: 
when it gets dark a red thing turns grey. 
Again A may present an overwhelming number of positive instances, as in the 
first case. But this alone does not remove the ad hoc character of A's second 
conjecture. One might propose that the fact, assuming it to be a fact for the 
moment, that no negative instances have been observed is a ground for taking 
the conjecture as established or well-confirmed and, therefore, as no longer 
ad hoc. So, one might argue, a cumulation of positive instances of a conjecture 
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removes its ad hoc character, when no negative instances are found. But this is 
very ambiguous. 
First, one may intend to say that negative instances remain possible in the 
future or that negative instances may have occured in the past but that they 
remained unnoticed. Second, one may intend to say that it is impossible that 
negative instances will turn up. With respect to this second interpretation we 
can be very brief: in that case one makes the conjecture lawlike (or normative) 
and the cumulation of positive instances in the absence of negative instances 
does not confirm this; or, the repeated observation of a red thing turning grey 
upon darkening is not a good ground for the thesis that a red thing must turn 
grey when it is getting dark, even if it has never been observed that a red thing 
did not turn grey when it was getting dark. Upon this second interpretation, no 
confirmation or removal of ad hoc character has taken place; the cumulation of 
positive instances in combination with the absence of negative instances does not 
confirm a necessary connection. 
But the first interpretation, which leaves negative instances possible and 
which may be called the positivist (or: inductivist) view, leads directly to the 
question what will be done when a negative instance does, as a matter of fact, 
occur. A consistent positivist should, I think, answer that in that case the con-
jecture in question is falsified. But fortunately, positivists are not very consistent 
in this respect. If they were, they would alienate themselves and their methodo-
logy completely from scientific practice. The correct answer would be, that a 
negative instance is taken as a genuine exception, which implies making the 
conjecture lawlike. But if the status of the conjecture is so determined that 
negative instances alone, be it that they have not been observed up till now, can-
not falsify it, but constitute genuine exceptions, then one has also made the 
conjecture lawlike or normative or the connection necessary. So, also upon the 
the first interpretation, the cumulation of positive instances in the absence of 
negative ones does not confirm the conjecture in question or remove its ad hoc 
character. One might object to this analysis of the first interpretation, that it 
suddenly introduces scientific practice. Now, I think, the practice of science is 
often a good guide in the solving of methodological problems, but I 
also think that it is possible to give the ratio of the practice we referred to (this 
also explains why we called Mr. A a good scientist in connection with his 
first conjecture). Even if it were a fact that there are, omnitemporally, no 
negative instances of the conjecture, our knowledge of this fact would not 
enable us to give a non-ad hoc explanation of the change of colour in question. 
For in that case, i.e. if omnitemporally there were only positive instances, there 
would be no difference between such an 'explanation' and e.g. the one we can 
give of the redness of an apple from Hempel's well-known basket4 6 
in which all apples are red. No more than the redness of all apples in that bas-
ket can explain the fact that a particular apple in that basket is red, can the 
turning grey of all red things upon darkening explain the fact that this tomato 
turned grey yesterday-evening. If there is only accumulating positive evidence 
and no negative instances, and if this is, as a matter of fact, always so, the 
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best we can say is that the conjecture formulates an 'historical accident on a 
cosmic scale', as KNEALE called it. 4 7 And the fact that a scientist wants to under-
stand the phenomena he can observe through his concepts, which means that 
he wants to get rid of the ad hoc character, results in his wanting more than a 
mere formulation of a regularity without negative instances or of an historical 
accident on a cosmic scale. Therefore, scientific practice, searching negative 
instances and taking them as genuine exceptions, is completely understandable. 
We needed this lengthy excursion to make it clear that no matter how many 
instances Mr. A may adduce in the absence of negative instances, this alone will 
not enable him to achieve the required understanding. 
Fortunately, Mr. A is still a good scientist and he is not fascinated or fooled 
by the large number of positive instances: positive instances alone do not con-
firm in any way, just as negative instances alone do not falsify in any way. Mr. 
A realises that, if he really wants to restore understanding within his concept of 
change, he must confront his conjecture with negative instances. He knows that 
even the formulation of an historical accident on a cosmic scale cannot help 
him and that he needs a lawlike or necessary connection for the explanation he 
is after. He needs extra evidence to establish this lawlikeness. And indeed 
negative instances turned up: Mr. A makes his conjecture lawlike: 
when it gets dark a red thing must turn grey 
and the negative instances are genuine exceptions. He gives them a name: 
'phosphorescence phenomena'. But this manoeuvre of naming does not, of 
course, by itself constitute a confirmation of his lawlike conjecture (compare the 
naming of Mr. B's behaviour in section 5 with 'colour-blind'). Only when he has 
formed the concept 'phosphorescence' by on-going investigation does he succeed 
in getting rid of the ad hoc character of his lawlike conjecture. Once he has form-
ed a theory of light in which the concept of intensity is taken up and in which 
different emission phenomena are explained, once he has formed a theory of 
the retina and in particular of the functioning of the cones and rods in the retina, 
he has succeeded in reducing the genuine exceptions to normal cases and gained 
an empirical confirmation of his lawlike or necessary connection. 
The genuine exception has then revealed itself as a new datum, called 'phos-
phorescence', which could not be observed before and which is co-constituted 
by the conceptual system now at hand. A new concept has been formed in a way 
different from the nepo-desolc example, but comparable to the formation of the 
concept 'colour-blind'. I think this idea of confirmation by on-going concept or 
theory formation may be compared with what HARRE called 'an ontological 
experiment'48, which in his view, could also remove the ad hoc character of a 
theory. 
A thing's being phosphorescent is now as normal a datum as a thing's being 
red and thus its turning grey upon darkening. Moreover, Mr. A can now explain 
why there were so many positive instances of his first conjecture and only now 
he may take the negative instances of this first conjecture as falsification. 
Mr. A's attempt to confirm his conjecture or to get rid of its ad hoc character 
or to arrive at an explanation of the observed phenomena, came down to the 
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attempt to reduce (possible or actual) negative instances, viewed as genuine 
exceptions, to normal or explicable phenomena. It came down to the formation 
of a theory or conceptual system through which the exceptions could be observ-
ed as phenomena which should indeed be observed, if that theory or conceptual 
system were a reliable method of observation. The concept 'red' now implies the 
lawlike connections as a part of its meaning, determining a lawlike behaviour 
of red things. But this concept cannot be viewed as an isolated unit of meaning, 
because it is connected with a very extensive conceptual system by means of 
these lawlike traits: it has the meaning it has by being taken up in that system. 
But there is not first the system in which 'red' is then taken up. The formation 
of this conceptual system implied the formation of 'red' as a part of it: the 
system and the concept cannot be separated without destroying them both. 
We restricted ourselves to one specific lawlike trait, but 'red' entails other 
lawlike connections as well, e.g. about the kind of light that must irradiate a 
thing in order to be able to verify of falsify wether or not a thing is red. 
Two questions deserve to be considered in concluding this section: first, one 
might ask whether negative instances, as genuine exceptions, are really needed, 
as I have said several times; second, one may remark, that on-going theory 
formation never completely removes the ad hoc character, so that the required 
confirmation cannot be gained. 
Let us consider the first of these two questions. With our example we did not 
intend to say that the phosphorescense phenomena, referred to in this example, 
are indispensable for the confirmation of this particular lawlike conjecture. 
Other phenomena might have been considered in our example, e.g. a red-hot 
piece of iron that remains red upon darkening (but not upon cooling!). But 
a confirmation of a lawlike connection may also take place indirectly: it may 
be armed against negative instances by its being deducible from other connec-
tions which have been directly confronted with negative instances, viewed as 
genuine exceptions and which came to be explicable by on-going theory for-
mation. In other words, a lawlike connection may be confirmed as lawlike by 
its being deducible from other connections, which have been confirmed as law-
like before. I do not think it is important where exactly genuine exceptions 
start to operate, but I think it is important for the confirmation of lawlike traits 
that they operate at some level. 
The second question comes down to this: is it not true that only a shift of the 
ad hoc character from the original conjecture to 'later' conjectures takes place? 
In that case it can never be completely removed. 
The answer to this question should start, I think, with the making of a dis-
tinction between two attitudes towards a theory or a conceptual system. First, 
one may view a conceptual system in the flux of on-going investigation. In that 
case, in the external sense, so to speak, one cannot speak of necessary con-
nections at all. For this means that one views a theory as a member of a series 
of possible successors which have come to be accepted as the alternatives of 
their predecessors. And externally, as we also remarked in section 5, the neces-
sary connections do not exist: new empirical evidence may come and may in-
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deed force us to break the internally necessary connections (see below) open. 
This may occur on the basis of new exceptions for which the attempts to reduce 
them to normal cases or explicable exceptions leads to a piling-up of ad hoc 
additions. Such exceptions may occur at all levels. They may occur at the 
'simple' level, e.g. a red thing remaining red upon darkening when it is neither 
red-hot nor phosphorescent, and at the 'advanced' level, e.g. light not only 
being a wave phenomenon. When such exceptions occur, normal science may no 
longer be possible; revolutionary science, leading to an alternative theory, may 
then be necessary to restore understanding and thereby to restore the possibility 
of normal science. 
Second, one may view a conceptual system as enabling us to understand or 
explain the phenomena, which can only be observed through this theory. It is 
then taken as a relatively closed system enabling us to do normal science. It is, 
so to speak, separated from the abovementioned flux. In this case - and we 
may call this case internal - a theory is a system of necessary connections, deter-
mining the meaning or intention of the concepts in it. The 'simple' as well as the 
'advanced' connections are necessary for, if they were not, the understanding the 
theory offers us would slip from our grasp. Normal science is normal just because 
there is a conceptual system which consitutes its norm as laid down in the 
necessary connections. 
As the concepts of necessity or lawlikeness can only be meaningfully applied 
internally (externally it is neither applicable in a true nor in a false way to 
anything and therefore Quine's attack is spurious), the concepts 'true' and 
'false' can also only be applied internally or given a conceptual context. If 
we say of a thing that it is red, we can verify this by observing it through the 
concept 'red' and such a verification implies, in principle, that all relevant cir-
cumstances are of the required kind (i.e. normal) and that the instruments used 
are the suitable (or normal) ones. The concept through which we observe makes 
it possible to judge circumstances and instruments. When such an observation 
shows that the thing is red, then the statement 'this is red' is true. This truth is 
internally indubitable: if it should be doubted this would mean that the concept 
'red', as a confirmed method of observation, should be doubted. And internally 
this is not the case. But the statement is of course not indubitable externally. 
Just as there is no place for necessary connections in the sense of 'remaining 
necessary come what may', there is no true statement in the sense of 'remaining 
true come what may'. The concepts of truth and necessity may be meaningfully 
applied internally, so that an empirical truth or a necessity in nature is always 
a truth or a necessity in an observer-dependent empirical reality. I have not the 
faintest idea what these concepts could mean externally or independent of a 
conceptual scheme or relative to an observer-independent reality, because we 
can have no knowledge of such a reality in empirical science. 
It may clarify matters to add a remark about this dependency. In section 3 I 
already stated, that atoms existed before our modern concept 'atom' or our 
atomic theory was formed. I think we can now make this a little more precise. 
Every empirical concept implies lawlike traits determining a lawlike beha-
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viour, including the so-called lawlike constancy behaviour of the data which 
can be observed through that concept or which are co-constituted as those data 
by that concept. Thus, once a concept, as a lawlike concept, has been empirical-
ly confirmed, we may say, on this basis, that those data exist when we do not de 
facto observe them (e.g. this book is still here when you have turned around 
and no longer de facto observe it), or that they existed a long time ago, when 
nobody could possibly observe them, because the appropriate concepts had 
not yet been formed (the example of the atoms), or that they will continue to 
exist. But all these cases of existence are cases of an existence in an observer-
dependent, i.e. conceptually co-constituted, reality. And the lawlike traits of 
our concepts form the basis of these statements. This means, that the concept 
of existence (atoms existed 1.000.000 years ago, the earth existed long before 
there were human beings, this book continues to exist if I do not de facto 
observe it, stones will still exist in A.D. 2050) can also only be meaningfully 
applied internally. But the above-made distinction between internal and exter-
nal should not, I think, be identified with Carnap's distinction between internal 
and external questions, when he considers the concept of existence.49 
In this chapter I have tried to analyse the notion of theory-loaded observa-
tion as opposed to theory-free or direct observation. Theory-loaded observa-
tion is observation through a concept and therefore through a conceptual system, 
because a concept is always a concept within a theory. We tried to express this 
by saying that each empirical concept is a minute theory: it focusses the system 
in which it gets the meaning it has. This meaning is built up from (a) what we 
called the distinct-from relations, (b) the lawlike traits determining certain 
instruments to be appropriate for the verification of 'a full sentence' (to borrow 
Carnap's term) of that concept, and (c) the lawlike traits determining the behav-
iour of the data observable through that concept under relevant circumstances. 
From this epistemological context we shall now first analyse Goodman's riddle 
and then two views concerning the concept of empirical law, namely the regu-
larity view and the necessity view. That we treafGoodman's'riddle first, in a 
separate chapter, and not as a part of the problem of lawlikeness, will be justi-
fied by showing that it is primarily a problem of concept formation. 
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ri. GOODMAN'S R I D D L E 
1. THE FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
In a first approximation the story seems very simple. Up till now (the 16th 
August, 1972) all examined emeralds have been green. Let us suppose that on 
this basis, i.e. a regularity without exceptions up till now, the universal statement 
all emeralds are green (I) 
is formulated. All examined emeralds have been positive instances and they 
are taken to confirm (I), if we use Nicod's conception of confirmation, as it was 
formulated by HEMPEL. (I) can be equivalently reformulated as a universal 
conditional hypothesis and: "anobject confirms a universal conditional hypoth-
esis if and only if it satisfies both the antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional; it disconfirms the hypothesis if and only if it satisfies the anteced-
ent, but not the consequent of the conditional".50 It is this conception of con-
firmation that is used by GOODMAN in the exposition of his new riddle. 
GOODMAN then introduces his famous predicate in the following way: "Now 
let me introduce another predicate less familiar than 'green'. It is the predicate 
'grue' and it applies to all things examined before t 0 just in case they are green 
but to other things just in case they are blue". 5 1 * GOODMAN has taken t0 as 
the present time t, but we shall pin it down to the first September of 1984 (the 
Orwellian time). 
Upon this definition of 'grue', the positive instances of (I) are likewise positive 
instances of 
all emeralds are grue (II) 
Both (I) and (II) are equally well confirmed by the same evidence. Or, in 
Goodman's own words, "the prediction that all emeralds subsequently examin-
ed will be green and the prediction that all will be grue are alike confirmed by 
evidence statements describing the same observations".52 But with (I) we 
predict an emerald to be green in the Orwellian era and with (II) we predict that 
it then will be grue and thus blue and not green. So, we arrive at contradictory 
predictions about the colour of an emerald after t 0 on the basis of exactly the 
same evidence. 
Intuitively we should take (I) as confirmable by the mentioned positive instan-
* I take G o o d m a n ' s explication to imply the following: 
t < t 0 : examined: green - grue 
not green, e.g. blue - not grue 
not examined : blue - grue 
not blue, e.g. green - not grue 
t > t 0 . ' examined : blue - grue 
not blue, e.g. green - not grue 
not examined : blue - grue 
not blue, e.g. green - not grue 
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ces and. (II) as non-confirmable and it is precisely the problem of finding a 
criterion for distinguishing between confirmable (or lawlike, according to 
GOODMAN) andnon-confirmable (or accidental) universal statements that consti-
tutes the new riddle of induction.53 In Goodman's view the only way out of 
this dilemma can be found in the history or biography of the rival predicates 
'green' and 'grue': entrenchment constitutes the only possible criterion to 
establish an asymmetry between (I) and (II) via the predicates 'green' and 'grue'. 
In all other respects these predicates are symmetrical. What can be said of 
'green' can completely analogously be said of 'grue'. In particular the one is not 
'primitive' and the other 'derived', or the one is not 'purely qualitative' and the 
other not, or the one is not 'non-positional' and the other 'positional'.54 And 
we must be careful not to destroy this symmetry in a way forbidden by the very 
formulation of the problem. 
I do not agree with Goodman's solution of the problem. I think, for example, 
that Slote's question "why should a predicate with which inductive generalisa-
tions have been more frequently made necessarily be a predicate with which 
it is preferable, more reasonable, to make such generalisations?"55 is a good 
question.56 
But neither do I agree with the problem itself and it is the main aim of this 
chapter to make this clear, although I shall incidentally insert a remark con-
cerning the inadequacy of Goodman's solution if it were a genuine problem. 
Before going ^on, however, we must formulate Goodman's problem more 
precisely and in my opinion Mary Hesse's article 'Ramifications of 'grue" is a 
good guide to this purpose. 
Following MARY HESSE, we introduce two gentlemen. First, Mr. Green, who 
speaks the language L 1 ( in which 'green' and 'blue' are primitive concepts, 
namely colour concepts. The predicates 'grue' and 'bleen' are introduced in Lj 
by means of the following definitions: 
(x) (t){(x is grue at t) = ( t<t 0 ->x is green).(t>t0->x is blue)} (Li-1) 
(x) (t){(x is bleen at t) = ( t < t 0 H * x is blue).(t>t0->x is green)} (Lj-2) 
Second, Mr. Grue, a speaker of the language L 2 , in which 'grue' and 'bleen' 
are primitive and colour concepts; 'green' and 'blue' are introduced by means 
of the definitions: 
(x)(t){(x is green at t) = ( t<t 0 ^-x is grue).(t>t 0 ^x is bleen)} (L2-I) 
(x) (t){(x is blue at t) = ( t < t 0 ^ x is bleen).(t>t0->x is grue)} (L 2-2) 
There has been much debate about the definition of a predicate like 'grue' 
(a Goodmannian predicate), but I think it is safe to make use of the kind of 
definition originally formulated by BARKER and ACHINSTEIN and (equivalently) 
reformulated by BLACKBURN. 5 7 
Furthermore, we should avoid the introduction of "needless asymmetries 
into the definition or interpretation of the problematic predicates", as MARY 
HESSE warns us 5 8 and she makes three assumptions which should prevent us 
from doing so: 
first, L t andL 2 differ only in two descriptive predicates; 'grue' replaces 'green' 
and 'bleen' replaces 'blue' wherever they occur in a description; 
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second, Green and Grue accept all four predicates as colour predicates; 
third, both Green and Grue commit themselves to "emeralds remain the same 
colour after t 0 " in their respective predictions.59 
(The last assumption is a consequence of the second: Grue, for example, de-
scribes the colour of an emerald before t 0 as 'that emerald is grue' and he predicts 
of an emerald after t 0 that it will be grue; so if 'grue' is a colour concept, he 
implicitly states that there is no colour change at t 0). 
Given these definitions and these assumptions, Green and Grue, on the basis 
of the same observations, as GOODMAN puts it, arrive at contradictory predictions 
about the colour of an emerald in the Orwellian era. And both can agree that 
there is such a contradiction between their respective predictions. In Green's 
view, such an emerald is green, while Grue says that it is grue and thus, via 
(Li-1), blue and therefore not green. In Grue's view it is grue, while Green 
said that it was green and hence, via ( L 2 - l ) , bleen and thus not grue. Or, in 
L x Green predicts 'green' and Grue predicts 'blue' and in L 2 Grue predicts 
'grue' and Green predicts 'bleen'. Neither of them predicts a colour change. 
Now intuitively we choose and not L 2 , but, although intuition is not al-
ways a bad guide, the very problem is to show why our intuition is a good 
guide in this case. As long as we have not succeeded in doing this, then "if 
we simply choose an appropriate predicate then on the basis of these same obser-
vations we shall have equal confirmation, by our definition, for any prediction 
whatever about other emeralds - or indeed about anything else. We are left 
once again with the intolerable result that anything confirms anything".60 
The problem has been stated precisely enough by now, I think, and in the 
next section I shall try to show that there is already a problem at the 'singular 
level', i.e. in calling the evidence statements like 'this emerald is green' or 
'this emerald is grue' true. This point has been overlooked up till now, as far as 
I know, but it has far reaching consequences for the formulation of Goodman's 
problem. 
2. THE TRUTH OF 'a is GREEN' AND 'a is GRUE' 
Suppose Green and Grue examine emerald a at t t under the same relevant 
circumstances (compare ch. I, section 6). 
Green says: a is green 
Grue says: a is grue 
It is always assumed that there exists no problem at this stage of the expo-
sition of Goodman's riddle. Both singular statements are taken to be true de-
scriptions of emerald a and both Green and Grue supposedly can agree upon 
this fact. Everyone followed GOODMAN with respect to this point. There is 
complete symmetry between 'green' and 'grue' and complete agreement between 
Messrs. Green and Grue about what they say at this 'singular level'. Disagree-
ment can only arise at the 'universal level', which is reached by inductive general-
isation or projection, for then they derive their contradictory predictions 
about the colour of an emerald after t 0. 
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But we should nevertheless stress the question: "Can Green (Grue) really 
agree with Grue (Green), that 'a is grue' ('a is green') is true?" 
Let us first examine the usual affirmative answer to this question for the 
case of Green: "Can Green really agree with Grue that 'a is grue' is true?" 
(notice, that we could just as well have examined this question for the case 
of Grue and what follows would be exactly the same except for the replacement 
of 'Green' by 'Grue' and of 'green' by 'grue' and vice versa; we shall come 
back to this). The answer is never explicitly stated just because the question 
has never been viewed as a problem. But I think there could be no objection 
if we were to say that all authors let Green reason as follows: 
Mr. Green: "When I heard Grue say 'a is grue', I checked the time of obser-
vation, t l 5 and established that t t< t 0 . Of course, I did not need this in-
formation for my own investigation of the colour of a. By means of my 
definition of 'grue' (Lj-1), and this is the only thing I know about this 
concept, I know that Grue says: 
( t !< t 0 ->a is green).(ti >t0~>a is blue). 
This would be the translation in my language, Lu of what Grue intends 
saying in his language, L 2 . 
Now, I can indeed accept this conjunction as true, because ' t ! < t 0 ' and 'a 
is green' are both true, as I established myself, and therefore the first 
conjunct is true; and the second conjunct is also true, because ' t ^ t o ' is 
false. So, the conjunction is true. And Grue's description of emerald a, be 
it a strange one, is as true as my own description of that emerald". 
But Green, and with him all those who let him argue in this way, shows him-
self to be a hardened logical positivist. He, and with him all those who let him 
argue in this way, seem to be blind to the facts. For it is a fact that empirical 
reasoning and empirical inquiry is not governed by extensional logic in this way. 
There is no scientist who will ever accept a singular empirical conditional as 
true just because its antecedent is false (this seems a platitude to me). No scien-
tist will accept the empirical conditional 't t > t 0 - > a is blue' as true just because 
tj as a matter of fact is smaller than t 0. If, for example, a physicist says of this 
particular piece of copper, which is not heated, 'if this piece of copper is heated, 
then it expands' and he takes this to be a true description of this piece of copper, 
as he certainly will, please do not say that he is right in doing so because this 
piece of copper is not heated. He will laugh at you or, if he can still remain 
serious, he will say that you do not understand what empirical science is. And 
if the scientist in question is very patient he will explain that he has quite differ-
ent evidence as a basis for his description of this piece of copper and that the 
falsity of the antecedent of such a description never constitutes any evidence 
for its truth, let alone that it would be the only ground for it. Nevertheless 
this is exactly what Green (and with him all those...) does. It is rather difficult, 
if not impossible, to explain why this point has been systematically overlooked. 
Everybody acknowledges the discrepancy between the use of the empirical con-
cept 'if...then', which I will call the empirical conditional, and the use of the 
formal logical concept which is generally called material implication, but it 
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seems to have been forgotten the very moment it becomes important. And 
everybody knows that a counterfactual or a contrary-to-fact or unfulfilled con-
ditional cannot be called true solely on the ground that its antecedent is false: 
other evidence is required to establish the truth of such a statement. The analysis 
of this 'other evidence' is precisely the problem of counterfactuals. But Green 
(and with him all those...) fails to appreciate this fact. 
(Later, in ch. Ill, I shall investigate the problem of counterfactuals. It may 
seem a little strange to call 'tt > t 0 - > a is blue' or 'if this piece of copper is heated 
then it expands' counterfactual. One might reserve this term for conditionals 
whose antecedents are not only false, but cannot be 'made true' either. The 
antecedent of the copper-statement, for example, can be made true simply by 
heating this piece of copper as yet, and the antecedent of the statement about 
the emerald can be made true simply by waiting until the time of observation, 
t l s becomes equal to or greater than t0. One might also reserve the term 'counter-
factual' for conditionals in the subjunctive mood. The two conditionals mention-
ed above are in the indicative mood. Whether this makes sense or not will be 
considered in ch. III. For the moment suffice it to say that the conditionals, 
considered here, share an important characteristic with the suggested 'real' 
counterfactuals, namely that their antecedents are false. And therefore these 
conditionals are in the same boat with the 'real' counterfactuals with respect to 
the requirement of other evidence. Whether or not there is a separate problem 
of 'real' counterfactuals, marked by an 'unrealisable' antecedent, remains to be 
considered. For the present we shall use the term 'counterfactual' in the wider 
sense, including singular conditionals in the indicative mood whose antecedents 
are, de facto, false). 
Now, let us suppose, that we succeeded in convincing Mr. Green (and with 
him all those...) of the unacceptability of the step in his argument in which he 
concluded that % > t 0 ^ a is blue' is true, because this step was solely based on 
the falsity of 'tj. > t 0 ' . This, of course, has far reaching consequences, because 
he now takes Grue to say that emerald a is green and that it is, or would be or 
would have been, blue if tj is, or would be or would have been, equal to or 
greater than t 0. Or, in other words, Green takes Grue to describe two properties 
of the emerald in question. 
First he takes him to say that a is green, and with this he can agree (In ch. 
V I hope to show that Green's ground for this agreement is not sound either. 
His argument is purely extensional: from the fact that ' t x < t 0 ' and 'a is green' 
are true, he concludes that the first conjunct, i.e. ' t 1 < t 0 - ^ a is green', is true and 
I do not think that any serious empirical conditional is accepted as true solely 
on such an extensional basis. For the time being, however, I shall not compli-
cate matters by introducing this point here). 
Second, he takes him to describe a dispositional property of that emerald, 
viz. 'blueable', that is 'turning blue at t0'. There is no mystery connected with such 
a description. The scientist, who takes 'if this piece of copper is heated then it 
expands' as a true description of this piece of copper, which is de facto not 
heated, simply says, that this piece of copper is expansible or that it has the 
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dispositional property of being expansible. (This scientist might as well have 
formulated his description by 'if this piece of copper were heated then it would 
expand' or by 'if this piece of copper had been heated then it would have expand-
ed'). To take yet another example, if we say of a lump of sugar 'if it is immersed 
in water then it dissolves', we say that that lump of sugar is soluble. There is 
nothing strange about our ascribing a dispositional property to a thing, except 
that other than instantial evidence is required to confirm it. Nor is there any-
thing strange about the ascribing of two properties at once to a thing, one of 
which is dispositional ('green' is also dispositional as we argued in ch. I, sec-
tion 6, but we shall leave this out of the discussion for the moment, although we 
shall certainly come back to it). We can, for example, say (it is the 16th August 
in Holland), that that oak-leaf over there is green and 'brownable', i.e. 'turning 
brown in autumn'. We could express this by using a single word to indicate 
both predicates, e.g. 'that oak-leaf over there is grewn' (MARY HESSE referred 
to beech leaves and others to leaves in general). 
These examples only serve to elucidate in what sense Mr. Green now under-
stands what Grue says with his description of the emerald. 
And Green cannot accept Grue's description as true as long as he is ignorant 
of the required other evidence, Grue must have in Green's eyes, in order to justify 
his ascription of a dispositional property to emerald a, as it is expressed in the 
counterfactual part of the Lt-translation of Grue's statement 'a is grue'. Therefore 
the generally accepted presupposition that there is complete agreement between 
Green and Grue at the 'singular level' about the truth of their singular descrip-
tions of emerald a must be dropped. Green will ask Grue for the other evidence 
that he must have from Green's point of view. This point of view may be said 
to be determined by his language, Lu but it would be more correct to say that 
it is determined by the conceptual system of Mr. Green, which can be expressed 
by L j . This will become clear if we show another consequence of what has been 
said thus far. The presupposition that both, Green and Grue, agree that the 
predicates 'green', 'blue', 'grue', and 'bleen' are colour concepts (the second 
assumption formulated in section 1), cannot be upheld either. As far as Mr. 
Green knows the meaning of 'grue', and his knowledge of the meaning is 
completely exhausted by his definition (L^-l), this concept has a dispositional 
meaning aspect which is not entailed by his own colour concepts. Within his 
conceptual system Green cannot understand 'grue' as a colour concept, be-
cause in that system a colour concept has no dispositional trait determined by 
the circumstance 'time', albeit that it has such traits determined by the cir-
cumstances 'sufficient light' and 'kind of light'. Even stronger, the factor 'time' 
can by itself never constitute a basis for a dispositional trait of a colour con-
cept within Green's conceptual framework. Reference to a certain time would 
always be faced as a purely ad hoc escape, as was explained in ch. I, section 6, 
unless empirical evidence forced us to renounce the classical concept of change 
in connection with the colours of things, in which case the colour of a thing 
would be a 'fundamentally statistical property'. And also, in that case, it is 
Grue's other empirical evidence Green is waiting for. If Grue cannot reveal the 
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other evidence that he must have according to Green, Green cannot but sup-
pose Grue to have the eyes of Big Brother through which he can observe how 
things are (will be, would be, would have been) in the Orwellian era. 6 1 Green 
cannot understand Grue when he says that he does not imply a colour change at 
t 0 (compare the third assumption of section 1). Within Green's conceptual 
system, expressed in L 1 ; Grue's singular statement 'a is grue' does imply a 
colour change at t 0. 
We started this analysis with the question: "Can Green really agree with Grue 
that 'a is grue' is true?" and this analysis has shown, I think, that Green cannot 
simply do this. But, as we remarked when introducing this question, the matter 
is completely analogous for Grue judging the truth of 'a is green'. Our analysis 
does not lead us to an asymmetry between 'green' and 'grue'; it does not make 
us choose between L t and L 2 . This becomes clear when we hear Grue's re-
sponse to the view Green arrived at after having been convinced of the untenabil-
ity of his earlier, purely extensional view. 
Grue's answer may be formulated as follows: 
"If you ask me for other evidence in order to show that 'a is grue' is 
true, I have not the faintest idea what you could mean. It is all very simple: 
the colour of that emerald is grue, can't you see that? Moreover, I can 
only accept your description as true if you give me evidence for your 
statement that a is 'bleenable', which is, as far as I know, implied by your 
saying that this emerald is green. And I cannot possibly understand your 
concepts 'green' and 'blue' as colour concepts. If you cannot give me such 
other evidence, I must assume that you have the eyes of Big Brother". 
In short, there is a serious problem at the 'singular level' and it seems to be 
a conceptual problem rather than a problem of induction in Goodman's sense. 
Green and Grue have arrived at a rivalry of (part of) their conceptual systems, 
it seems. 
But before making this more precise in the next section, we must face two pos-
sible objections against our analysis. 
First, it might be remarked that the definitions (L x-1) through (L 2-2) are, 
after all, not of a suitable form, just because they lead to a problem about the 
truth of the singular descriptions of emerald a. In this case, my interpretation of 
these definitions, which amounts to a specific dispositional character of Good-
mannian predicates (viz. 'grue' and 'bleen' in Lt and 'green' and 'blue' in L 2 ) , 
is not questioned. It is only said that they are not the correct definitions of the 
predicates GOODMAN intended. 
I think that this is not a sound objection. For suppose we try to remain as 
close as possible to Goodman's own circumscription of 'grue' and that we 
define: 
(x){(x is grue) = (Ex.Gx)v(—Ex.Bx)} 
in which E = examined before t 0 
G = green 
B = blue 
We can then tell the same story as the one told above, using this definition 
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of 'grue' and I do not think that one could object to this definition. (Of course, 
this definition may be equivalently reformulated as 
(x){(xisgrue) = (Ex->Gx).(~Ex^Bx)} 
but this is completely inessential.) So, I do not think that it makes much sense 
to discuss the form of the definitions any further. 
Second, one might object that my interpretation of the definitions is not 
correct and this is a much more important point. With ULLIAN, one could say 
that "One extension is as good as another for a class qua class, no matter how 
much (or how little) its description may cut across the boundaries of our 
ordinary classification. Unless we privilege special classes - and logic alone 
cannot allow us to do this - there is no hope of distinguishing those extensions 
which may be taken as belonging to bona fide predicates".62 
In other words one must view e.g. 'grue' purely as the name of a class of 
things, 'grue' is the label of the collection of all those things which are green 
before t 0 and of all those things which are blue at t 0 or thereafter. And 'green' 
is the label of the collection of all those things which are green before t 0 and 
of all those things which are green at t 0 or thereafter. It is as simply as this: 
'grue' is the sum of two classes, just as green is the sum of two classes. This, 
at least, is Green's view when he objects to my interpretation. This view may 
be pictured as follows: 
I II III 
The Green-Picture 
Grue's view may be pictued as follows: 
I II I I I 
The Grue-Picture 
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Green and Grue are now again members of the extensionalist camp of GOOD-
MAN and ULLIAN, of course. They were not convinced by my analysis. And in 
Green's view, for example, one extension (e.g. I + 11) is as good as another 
(e.g. LT + III) for a class qua class, so that we must appeal to extra-logical fac-
tors in order to distinguish between these extensions in such a way that we 
may prefer the one to the other, living in a pre-Orwellian period. And as long 
as one defends a 'super-extensionalism', as Goodman does, the only extra-logi-
cal factor one can have recourse to is entrenchment. For, the being more en-
trenched of a predicate in comparison with a rival predicate means that it 
has the largest extension (via past projections, parent predicates, etc.). Within 
such a purely extensional interpretation of 'grue' it is enough for Green to 
establish that a thing, e.g. emerald a, belongs to II of his picture, in order 
to verify 'a is grue'. No problem about a dispositional character arises and 
therefore there is no problem at the 'singular level', it seems. 
This objection, however, which attempts to rehabilitate Goodman's problem 
as a riddle of induction, does not, I think, stand critical examination. 
To see this, we confront both extensionalists, Green and Grue, with the 
question: "What would, according to you, the colour of emerald a be, if the 
time had not been t l s but greater than t 0, provided that all relevant circumstances 
had, at that other time, been the same as they are now?" 
Les us sketch the situation explicitly.63 Both Green and Grue have examined 
emerald a and checked the time, tt. 
Green says: a is green (i) 
Grue says: a is grue (ii) 
Both say: t ! < t 0 (iii) 
Both accept on the basis of their pictures: (i), (ii) and (iii) are true. Now suppose, 
contrary-to-fact: t t > t 0 (iv) 
Both reject (iii) upon the supposition as true. But they must, when (iv) is 
supposed to be true, also reject one of (i) or (ii). And our question to Green 
and Grue comes down to: "Which of these two statements would you reject or 
maintain?" 
Green's answer is this: "I would maintain (i) and thus reject (ii). If you 
suppose that all relevant circumstances were the same at that other time as 
they are now, then you in fact say that no single event, that could possibly 
cause a colour change, would occur. And your question becomes something 
like this "What would be the colour of this green emerald at a time greater 
than t 0 if nothing were to occur that could possibly change its colour?" and 
this, in its turn, comes down to "What would be the colour of this green 
emerald at a time greater than t 0 if it would remain green?", at least in 
my view. And the answer to this question is simply that it would be green". 
Grue's answer is, of course, completely symmetrical: he rejects (i) and upholds 
(ii) on extactly analogous grounds. 
One may object, that it was in fact not Green or Grue, who gave the answer, 
but 1.1 made them reason in the way they did. I made them appeal to the law-
like trait of their respective colour concepts, which governs a lawlike constancy 
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behaviour. And I let them reduce the question I asked them to a tautological 
question, by indoctrinating them with the classical concept of change, which I 
discussed in ch. I, section 6. In fact, I did not allow them to remain the exten-
sionalists they were at the beginning. Now, this is all true, but I think there is no 
other possibility left for them. I think they are forced to give an answer of the 
kind given a moment ago. Or course they could have given it more vaguely. 
They could, for example, have confessed their belief in a 'constancy of nature' 
or they could have said that a thing remains the same colour if 'nothing 
happens', etc. 
However, I do not think that they can stick to their purely extensionalist 
view of their respective colour concepts as it was sketched in their respective 
pictures. The answer I let them give is the only understandable answer. If Grue, 
for example, had rejected (ii) and upheld (i), not only the symmetry would have 
been destroyed, as has frequently been remarked in the literature, but he would 
also have claimed a colour change at t0, which would not be explainable in 
principle within his conceptual scheme, in which the classical concept of change 
is supposed to be applicable in the case of a colour change. It would be a 
completely ad hoc manoeuvre without any possible empirical foundation. 
Grue rejects (i) precisely because he does not want to relinquish his under-
standing of colour phenomena. He cannot simply drop the built-in lawlikeness 
of his concept 'grue', as he would be obliged to do if he rejected (ii) instead, 
because this would have implied a severe shock to his conceptual system of 
colour concepts, through which he could observe and explain or understand 
all colour changes up till now. And he has not met with empirical data that may 
force him to do so. But it is precisely this lawlikeness, which constitutes the 
basis for Grue's saying that emerald a would be grue at a time greater than t 0, 
ceteris paribus, which at the same time, in Green's language, makes the afore-
mentioned dispositional character of 'grue' reappear. When Green hears Grue 
say that that emerald would be grue at a time greater than t0, he hears him say 
that it would be blue at that time. And for the same reason that Grue had to 
maintain (ii), Green upholds (i): that emerald a would be green at a time greater 
than t 0, ceteris paribus. 
When we now return to the situation, explicitly stated before, and ask Green 
whether or not he can accept at tx ( t t <to) Grue's description 'a is grue' as true, 
his answer must be: 
"No, I cannot now accept 'a is grue' as true, because this not only means 
that a is green now, but also that it is (will be, would be, would have been) 
blue at a time greater than t 0 . As far as I know what 'grue' means, this 
concept implies a dispositional character that may be named 'blueable'. And 
the first time you tried to convince me of this dispositional character (at 
the beginning of this section), I said that I needed the other evidence, Grue 
must have in my view, before I could judge the truth or falsity of 'a is 
grue'. But now the situation is different, since you introduced the proviso 
'provided that all relevant circumstances would at that other time, greater 
than t 0, be the same as they are now' in the question you posed to Grue and 
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me. And, given this proviso, I cannot leave the question whether or not 'a 
is grue' is true unanswered until I have inspected the other evidence, becau-
se the 'ceteris paribus' excludes the possibility of there being such other 
evidence. If all possibly relevant circumstances should remain unaltered, 
then that emerald remains green and it is then plainly false to say that it is 
'blueable'. Therefore it is simply false to say that it is grue now". 
And again Grue will give the symmetrical answer at tj ( t !< t 0 ) to the ques-
tion with respect to 'a is green': he not only cannot accept this statement as 
true, but he must say that it is false. 
The symmetry is not destroyed by the considerations of this section: there is 
complete symmetry in understanding and in non-understanding. This non-
understanding is the root of the problem at the 'singular level'. It seems that 
Green has a green-blue theory of colours, formulated in L 1 ; and Grue a grue-
bleen theory expressed in L 2 , and the fact that Green (Grue) calls Grue's 
(Green's) description of the colour of emerald a false, while Grue (Green) 
calls it true, makes it clear, that they do not understand each other's colour 
theory. In the next section we shall go further into this conceptual problem. 
There is no riddle of induction now, neither for Green nor for Grue in their 
respective languages, L j and L 2 . From Green's point of view, 'c is grue' is 
false and 'grue' is not a rival of 'green'. Green cannot accept 'grue' as an em-
pirically confirmed concept (compare for this notion of confirmation sections 
5 and 6 of Ch. 1), let alone find himself confronted with the problem of choos-
ing between 'all emeralds are green' and 'all emeralds are grue'. As long as the 
mentioned conceptual problem has not been solved, the new riddle of induction 
cannot even be formulated in either language (perhaps it ceases to be a problem 
once the conceptual gap has been bridged!). Of course Green arrives at 'all 
emeralds are green' and Grue at 'all emeralds are grue', but the problem of 
making a choice between these statements is the same as the problem of choos-
ing between two colour theories. 
In concluding this section, let us suppose, just for the sake of argument, that 
the original Mr. Green (and with him all those who let him argue in that way) 
was right and that he indeed could call 'a is grue' true on an extensional basis. 
This would imply that he could have used the term 'grue' in all those cases where 
he as a matter of fact used 'green' up to now. In particular 'grue' could have been 
used in all those cases in which 'green' was projected or in all those cases which 
made 'green' the veteran in comparison with 'grue', according to GOODMAN. 6 4 In 
other words, 'grue' could as well have been the veteran and 'green' the newcomer. 
As a matter of fact 'green' and 'grue' share exactly the same entrenchment, 
like 'green' and the German 'griin'. Therefore entrenchment cannot possibly be 
a criterion for distinguishing 'green' from 'grue'. 
Of course this is only valid if one is liable to accept "ty >t 0-»fl is blue' as true 
on the basis that 'tt > t 0 ' is false. For in that case't! > t 0 ^-o is blue' is, at a time 
prior to t 0, an empirically empty addition and 'grue' is nothing more, empirical-
ly, than the translation of 'green' in a, thus far, unknown language, L 2 . So, 
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in a pre-Orwellian era and facing the matter extensionally, 'grue' and 'green' 
acquire exactly the same entrenchment. 
GOODMAN cannot accept this, but, as far as I can see, he should then discern 
the non-truth-functional analysability of 'tt > t 0 ^ a is blue' as the source of his 
not being prepared to do so. And this implies that he must acknowledge the 
dispositional character 'grue' has in Green's eyes, which brought us to the 
conceptual problem of 'green' and 'grue'. 
3. THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM OF 'GREEN' AND 'GRUE' 
Suppose that the analysis of section 2 is accepted as correct, as I think it is, 
what then, exactly, is the conceptual problem we arrived at? 
It is this: 
On the one side, there is Mr. Green with his green-blue theory of colours 
through which he can observe coloured things. His theory is the appropriate 
method to do this. With this theory he can also explain all phenomena of 
colour change he knows of. The lawlikeness of his colour concepts enables 
him to explain the behaviour of coloured things, be it that they remain the 
same colour or that they change colour. He can observe and explain these 
phenomena by doing normal science. He knows what are the suitable or nor-
mal instruments: normal organs of sight are required, the wearing of violet 
sun-glasses is forbidden but the wearing of normal (!) spectacles or contact 
lenses will be imperative in some cases etc.; and he knows what relevant cir-
cumstances are: things should be illuminated with white light of a minimum 
intensity. He does not view his concepts as isolated units of (primitive) mean-
ing, but as concepts that are those very concepts by being part of bis colour 
theory. We shall, in future, refer to these concepts by using the words 'green-1' 
and 'blue-1'. Then there are those artificial constructs, 'grue-1' and 'bleen-1', 
introduced in his language, L t , by means of the definitions (L^-l) and (L t-2). 
But as they are constructed by these definitions, 'grue-1' and 'bleen-1' are mere 
symbols in a system of other symbolds, namely L x . Green can only view them as 
possible empirical concepts by taking them to be conjectural concepts in the 
following sense. To say of a thing that it is, e.g. grue-1, means that it has the 
dispositional property of being 'blueable', i.e. turning blue under certain cir-
cumstances which come to be realised at t0, while it is green before t0. Green 
does not know anything about these 'certain circumstances' and he has there-
fore not the faintest idea of what the property of 'blueability' could be. But some 
new relevant circumstances may turn up and he cannot on the basis of his 
conceptual system exclude this possibility. Just as he might have accepted the 
concept 'grewn' as a confirmed empirical concept within his theory and have 
applied it to those oak leaves over there, but not to the leaves of the birch in my 
garden (they are grellow!), he might, at this moment, accept 'grue-1' and 
'bleen-1' as candidate concepts. They may acquire the status of empirical con-
cepts within his system upon further inquiry and theory formation. 
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Briefly, if Green wants to leave open the possibility of 'grue-1' and 'bleen-1' 
becoming empirical concepts in his green-blue theory, he must say that they 
entail a dispositional trait (or a lawlike trait), which has not yet been confirmed, 
as such, as far as he knows, and which therefore makes these concepts con-
jectural. 
On the other side, there is Mr. Grue with his grue-bleen theory of colours 
through which he can observe coloured things, etc. etc. His primitive colour 
concepts shall be named 'grue-2' and 'bleen-2' and the constructed terms 
'green-2' and 'blue-2'. These constructed terms are taken as candidate con-
cepts by Grue. The question, in what sense 'grue' and 'green' can be said to be 
rival or conflicting concepts, should now be split up into two questions: one 
about the rivalry between 'green-1' and 'grue-1' and the other about the con-
flict between 'green-1' and 'grue-2'. 
Let us first consider the couple 'green-1' and 'grue-1'. I do not think that 
there could be a conflict, which would be a conflict within L 1 ; between these 
two concepts. 
Suppose Mr. Green-1 and Mr. Grue-1 examine emerald a at time tj., prior 
tot 0 . 
Green-1 says: a is green-1 
Grue-1 says: a is grue-1 
By being speakers of Ll or, more correctly, by being defenders of the green-
blue theory, they agree on the follwoing points: 
first, they both say that 'green-1' implies 'not blue-1', because this is a lawlike 
trait of those concepts (ch. I, section 4 ) 6 5 ; 
second, both use the classical concept of change, so that every colour change 
must have a cause or that every colour change must be accompanied by a 
change of one or more relevant circumstances (ch. I, section 6); 
third, and connected with the second point, both acknowledge the empirically 
confirmed lawlike character of 'green-1', which governs a lawlike constancy 
behaviour of green things (compare ch. I, sections 5 and 6); 
and, finally, both say that 'grue-1' implies the disposition of 'blueability'. 
As a consequence, both agree that Green-1 's description implies: 
a is (will be, would be, would have been) green-1 if tt is (will be, etc.) 
equal to or greater than t 0 and ceteris paribus. 
And both agree that Grue-1 's description implies: 
a is (will be, etc.) blue-1 if tx is (will be, etc.) equal to or greater than t 0. 
(This is based on the dispositional character Grue-1 claims for 'grue-1'). 
Now, Green-1, facing 'grue-1' as a candidate concept, asks Grue-1 for the 
evidence for that dispositional part of 'grue-1'. He asks for the beforemention-
ed 'other evidence' (section 2), Grue-1 must apparently have, so that he can 
judge whether 'grue-1' can be awarded the status of an empirically confirmed 
concept within his green-blue theory. He asks for evidence of the kind that 
can be given for the turning yellow of, e.g. white things when they are illuminat-
ed with sodium light or for the turning grey of coloured things upon darkening, 
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or of the kind that can be given for the 'brownability' (the turning brown in 
autumn) of oak leaves. 
So, Grue-1 should do one of two things. First, he might show that there is 
a relevant circumstance for a thing's being green-1, not discovered by Green-1 
up to now (as was the relevant circumstance of there being sufficient light), 
and that this circumstance shows its effect at t 0 and thereafter. 
Second, Grue-1 might show, that, for example, emeralds change their lattice 
structure under certain circumstances, so that they only reflect light of a blue-1 
wavelength, and that these circumstances shall be realised at t 0 and thereafter. 
Up to now Grue-1 has not revealed anything of this kind to Green-1, but 
even if he had, there would, in neither of the two cases, be a conflict or a rivalry 
between 'green-1' and 'grue-1'. Green-l's prediction (or counterfactual state-
ment) of emerald a being green-1 in the Orwellian era, was only taken as true 
under the ceteris paribus proviso. This proviso will be violated if Grue-1 could 
succeed in doing one of the two things suggested above. 
Of course, our examination of 'green-1' vs. 'grue-1' within Lt introduced an 
asymmetry at the very beginning, by viewing 'grue-1' as entailing a disposi-
tional trait, which had not yet been confirmed and which was not entailed by 
'green-1'. Therefore no rivalry could arise. We must now face a possible con-
flict between 'green-1' and 'grue-2'. 
On the one side, there is Mr. Green (the same one as Mr. Green-1) with his 
green-blue theory, expressed in L 1 ; and on the other side, Mr. Grue (not to 
be identified with Mr. Grue-1) with his grue-bleen theory, expressed in L 2 . 
In L j 'green-1' and 'blue-1' are primitive colour concepts (but not isolated 
or theory-independent units of extensional meaning) and 'grue-1' and 'bleen-1' 
are candidate concepts, constructed in terms of'green-1', 'blue-1' and a tempor-
al term. 
In L x 'grue-2' and 'bleen-2' are colour concepts and 'green-2' and 'blue-2' 
are candidate concepts, constructed in terms of 'grue-2', 'bleen-2, and a 
temporal term. 
Green and Grue examine emerald a at time t l 5 prior to t0. 
Green: a is green-1 
Grue: a is grue-2 
Green implicitly predicts (or counterfactually states - we shall here restrict 
ourselves to predictions): 
a is green-1 in the Orwellian era, ceteris paribus (I). 
Grue predicts: a is grue-2 in the Orwellian era, ceteris paribus (II). 
(We assume here, that 'green-1' and 'grue-2' both have a lawlike character, 
which makes these predictions implied by their mutual descriptions). 
The only thing Green knows of 'grue-2' is 'grue-1' and he identifies them. 
So does Grue with 'green-1' and 'green-2'. 
These identifications are crucial: they bridge the gap between Lj and L 2 as 
the formulations of two colour thories. 
Upon his identification, Green reads Grue's prediction (II) as: 
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a is blue-1 in the Orwellian era, ceteris paribus (IIT). 
And (III) clearly conflicts with his own prediction (I). 
Analogously, Grue reads Green's prediction (I) as: 
a is bleen-2 in the Orwellian era, ceteris paribus (IV). 
This contradicts Grue's prediction (II). 
(We assume here that 'green-1' implies 'not blue-1' and that 'grue-2' implies 
'not bleen-2'). 
Now the conflict is there: 
Green takes his description, and therefore the implied prediction (I), as true. 
As a consequence he must call Grue's prediction (II), in his translation (III), 
and hence Grue's description of emerald a, false. 
Analogously, Grue must call Green's description of that emerald false. 
This is a conflict about singular descriptions and, I think, it is a symptom 
of a conceptual gap between the green-blue theory and the grue-bleen theory. 
This gap may be taken to be bridged by the definitions in L j for Green and the 
definitions in L 2 for Grue, but this is only apparently so. This will become clear 
if we take it seriously that L j and L 2 express alternative colour theories. Grue 
says of 'grue-2' that it is a colour concept within his theory. Green identifies 
'grue-2' with 'grue-1'. But 'grue-1', as it is defined in L l 5 and thus 'grue-2', 
is not a colour concept within Green's theory, but a mixture of a colour con-
cept and a dispositional concept, determining a colour change at t 0, without 
any change of relevant circumstances. It is a concept which is not compatible 
with Green's colour theory: it cannot be understood by Green together with 
his colour theory. 
Grue may remark, that he agrees with Green's identification of 'grue-2' 
with 'grue-1', but that nevertheless 'grue-2' (or 'grue-1') is a perfect colour 
concept, not implying a change of colour at t0, ceteris paribus. And in spite 
of his definitions, Green is completely in the dark about what Grue could possi-
bly mean by 'colour'. 
Of course, the same holds for Grue's definitions of 'green-2' and 'blue-2'. 
There is complete symmetry in non-understanding. The problem is not a problem 
of induction, but a problem of concept and theory formation. Green, to take him 
as our example, must learn to observe in the way Grue can observe. In other 
words, he must learn to observe in a way directed by the alternative grue-bleen 
theory, before he can see what Grue sees. He must form Grue's concepts. This is 
not an easy job for Green: he must learn to observe in familiar things what he 
could not see until now and his own colour theory is a severe hindrance to do 
this. He will need the continual assistance of Grue. He will have to dissolve 
necessary connections of his own theory and there will not be much left of it in 
the end. 
Once Green has succeeded in forming the alternative theory, the question of 
which one should be preferred arises. And then "other considerations should 
certainly be given priority over entrenchment", as MARY HESSE remarked.66 
After he has learned to observe as Grue observes, Green may return to his 
own theory, because it is less ad hoc or because it explains the colour phenomena 
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better than its rival, which does not achieve anything that could not be achieved 
by the green-blue theory. But the contrary may also happen: Green may prefer 
Grue's theory, because it enables him to observe and explain many new pheno-
mena, which could not even be seen through the 'old' theory. Up to now, Green 
had not met a Mr. Grue, to tell him the story of 'grue' and 'bleen' or to teach 
him the grue-bleen theory and as long as the situation in which two radically 
alternative colour theories actually exist, is not realised, Goodman's problem is 
spurious.67 In particular, it is spurious in connection with the question of what 
empirical laws are, because this question is posed within an (at that moment) 
accepted conceptual framework, as we shall see. 
And if we really find ourselves confronted with two rival theories, Goodman's 
problem as a problem of induction or of confirmation by positive instances does 
not arise either. Within Green's theory, a green emerald may be taken as a 
positive instance of 'all emeralds are green' and likewise, within Grue's theory, a 
grue emerald may be called a positive instance of 'all emeralds are grue' and, if 
positive instances confirm, and taken in isolation they cannot do this, as I 
argued in ch. I, section 6, then they confirm in both cases. Green and Grue 
observe different things by observing through alternative conceptual systems. 
Green's and Grue's observations are not the same in such a case, as GOODMAN 
has taken them to be. The problem which then arises is the problem of choosing 
between the rival theories and entrenchment cannot help us a bit in making 
such a choice "and to put emphasis upon it without investigating the full 
theoretical ramifications of the puzzle itself, is to betray an unacceptably restrict-
ed and conservative view of the progress of science".68 The problem of theory-
choice, and thereby of theory-formation, is not Goodman's problem, because 
that problem presupposes that Green and Grue, on the basis of the same observa-
tions, arrive at contradictory predictions, while Green and Grue, being defenders 
of alternative theories, arrive at contradictory predictions and descriptions by 
observing different things. It even remains to be seen whether their predictions 
and descriptions were in fact contradictory. Even this cannot be decided in 
advance. They may, in the future, appear to be compatible: the 'old' theory 
may, for example, become a special case of the, wider, 'new' theory. 
If we take Goodman's problem seriously, it says that there may always come 
a new and perhaps better theory than the one we have now. As long as such a 
theory has not been revealed to us, no new riddle of induction arises and as 
soon as such a theory is there we should not judge the newcomer by its being 
inductively confirmed, but by its explanatory power, its (lack of) ad hocness, 
etc. 
We should conclude, I think, that Goodman's riddle, in Goodman's inter-
pretation, has no bearing whatsoever on a philosophy of science. 
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III. T H E R E G U L A R I T Y VIEW 
1. THE REGULARITY VIEW AND SOME SYNTACTICAL-SEMANTICAL DIFFICULTIES 
When discussing the regularity view, R , we must keep in mind the fact, that 
this view has been offered as an answer to the question of what experimental 
(NAGEL;CARNAP: empirical; SCHEFFLER: observational) laws of science are. The 
proponents of R presuppose a distinction between experimental laws and theor-
ies, which fundamentally goes back to the distinction between observational 
and theoretical terms. Experimental laws contain only observational terms with 
a fixed, theory-independent meaning and are therefore capable of direct confirma-
tion by positive instances, while "a theory cannot be put to a direct experimental 
test" 6 9 because it contains not only observational terms but also theoretical 
terms, for which no direct observational procedure is available in order to 
identify their referents. As a consequence the meaning or truth (or falsity) of 
experimental laws is independent of the theory under which they may be (tem-
porarily) subsumed: an experimental law may survive the eventual demise of 
this theory (compare note 8) . 7 0 Although every logicalpositivist admits that the 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms is vague, and therefore 
also the one between experimental laws and theories, it is nevertheless taken to 
be of great importance. 7 1 
The regularity view then, constitutes the logical positivist answer to the 
question what experimental laws, as distinct from theories in a logical positivist 
context, are (compare ch. I, section 1, thesis iv). It is the answer to the question 
what laws of science in the observational language, L 0 , are. This must be kept in 
mind when we discuss R . 
As a first approximation, we may say that, according to R , 
an experimental law is a true synthetic statement of universal form, assert-
ing a regularity without there being any exceptions. 
We can elucidate this with some quotations. 
According to REICHENBACH, laws (we omit the addition of 'experimental') are 
"statements about repeated occurrences, including the prediction that the same 
combination will occur in the future, without exception" 6 or it is "a relation 
of the form if...then, with the addition that the same relation holds at all 
times". 7 2 
AYER expresses his agreement in the following way: "a proposition expresses 
a law of nature when it states what invariably happens. Thus, to say that un-
supported bodies fall, assuming this to be a law of nature, is to say that there 
is not, never has been, and never will be a body that not being supported does 
not fall." 7 3 
HEMPEL states: "The laws required for deductive-nomological explanations 
share a basic characteristic: they are, as we shall say, statements of universal 
form. (..) (That) is a statement to the effect that whenever and wherever condi-
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tions of a specified kind F occur, then so will, allways and without exception, 
certain conditions of another kind, G" . 7 4 
And finally BRAITHWAITE: "Scientific laws will be taken as asserting no more 
(and no less) then the de facto generalizations which they include; the law that 
every hydrogen atom consists of one proton together with one electron will be 
interpreted as meaning that, as a matter of fact every hydrogen atom, past, 
present and future, has this constitution."7 
When describing their views, the proponents of R frequently add a remark 
about the necessity of a law. So REICHENBACH: "We do not wish to say that 
physical necessity is due to invisible forces tying things together, or that it is a 
priori, or that it is a law of reason projected into nature, or whatever else 
has been subtly devised by certain metaphysicians. (..) 'Physical necessity' 
is expressible in terms of 'always'."6 And AYER: "The 'necessity' of a law 
consists, on this view, simply in the fact that there are no exceptions to it ." 7 5 
BRAITHWAITE also rejects the necessity view by stating that a law does not 
assert more than a de facto generalisation (compare the quotation above). 
Every possible concept of necessity is expelled, unless it means nothing more 
than a constant conjunction of certain events or characteristics. 
In its most simple form a law may be expressed by 
all A's are B's 
or: (x) (Ax-^Bx). 
The symbols 'A' and 'B' indicate descriptive terms like 'metal' 'expand upon 
heating' or 'water' and 'boiling point of 212 ° F.' 
The major problem that proponents of R recognize is not the truth of such a 
statement, nor its synthetic character, nor the concept of regularity that is 
used, but the distinction between lawlike and non-lawlike or accidental universals. 
This may be elucidated by an example. When we compare the following two 
statements, which are both supposed to be true: 
all metals expand upon heating (I) 
all screws in Smith's car are rusty (Nagel's example) (II) 
we could say that the first statement is a law, but that the second is not a law, 
if we at least presuppose that both are true. Both statements, being the result 
of a 'synthetic connective operation' (REICHENBACH), are of universal form and 
both assert a regularity without exceptions or a constant conjunction. What, 
then, is our criterion when calling the first statement a law, the second not? 
The proponents of R should provide a criterion for demarcating those uni-
versal statements, which are laws if they happen to be true (the lawlike universals 
7 6 ) , from those universals which are not laws even if they appear to be true (the 
accidental universals). (I shall invariably use the term 'lawlike'. Other terms are 
'nomic' and 'nomological'). 
That the search for such a criterion of lawlikeness is in fact the central prob-
lem in a logical positivist analysis of the concept of law means that concepts 
such as the synthetic character of a law and the assertion of an exceptionless 
repetition are taken to be clear enough. The concept of regularity fares badly 
in modern literature. The use of expressions like 'uniform connection' (HEM-
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PEL) and 'constant conjunction' (NAGEL) and the appeal to common sense leaves 
the impression that this concept is considered to be quite clear. 
The analytic-synthetic distinction is still taken for granted, even after Quine's 
severe attack. 
I shall come back to both these points later, but we must first say something 
more about the attempts to formulate a criterion of lawlikeness. This problem 
has been said to be intriguing, delicate and recalcitrant77 and some of the 
attempts to solve it will be considered in this section.78 
The first attempt to solve some of these problems, can be formulated as fol-
lows : a universal conditional is lawlike when it contains no individual constants, 
i.e. terms referring to a particular object or a specific spatio-temporal area.19 The 
statement about the rusty screws, (IT), contains an individual constant, namely 
'Smith's car', and must therefore be qualified as accidental, while (I), the state-
ment about the metals, does not contain such a term, and may therefore be 
called lawlike. 
This proposal has been amended, since individual constants may not occur 
essentially or in an uneliminable way.80 Otherwise we would get the strange 
situation, that (I), not containing individual constants, would be lawlike, where-
as an equivalent reformulation of (I), e.g. 'all metals in my room or elsewhere 
expand upon heating', would be accidental. We do not arrive at this result 
when we speak of the essential or uneliminable occurrence of individual con-
stants: the individual constant 'my room' in our example can be eliminated 
without change of meaning, according to PAP. 
(REICHENBACH has chosen an alternative approach by defining 'universal' by 
the absence of individual constants and then requiring that a statement must be 
universal in order to count as a fundamental lawlike statement.81 I shall come 
back to the addition of the word 'fundamental' in a moment). 
(When GOODNAM, and AYER follows him in this respect, rejects the criterion 
of the non-occurrence of individual constants, he rejects it in its unqualified 
sense. In other words, he did not reject the criterion in its amended form in 
which the essential or uneliminable occurrence is used 8 2). 
This amended criterion meets with two difficulties. First, there seem to be 
universal statements which, containing individual constants essentially, are 
nevertheless regarded as lawlike, e.g. Kepler's first law and Galileo's law of 
freely falling bodies. Second, all individual constants, which at first sight seem 
uneliminable, appear nevertheless to be eliminable. 
To eliminate the first difficulty, REICHENBACH made a distinction between 
original and derivative nomological statements83 and HEMPEL, following him, 
speaks of fundamental and derivative lawlike statements.84 Fundamental law-
like statements must satisfy the requirement that no individual constants occur 
essentially, but in derivative lawlike statements such constants may occur and 
they are lawlike because they can be derived from fundamental lawlike state-
ments.85 According to this view, Kepler's and Galileo's laws are lawlike, be it 
derivatively, because they can be deduced from Newton's laws and his theory 
of gravitation. But NAGEL and PAP have drawn attention to the fact that we 
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need, additional premises for the deduction of e.g. Kepler's first law from New-
tonian mechanics, and these additional premises essentially contain individual 
constants (e.g. about the relative masses and velocities of the planets and the 
sun). And if we do admit such additional premises in one case, why should 
they not be admitted in the case of the statement about the rusty screws, (II)? 
(II) is lawlike since it can be deduced from the fundamental lawlike statement 
'all iron screws rust when exposed to air' and the additional premises 'all screws 
in Smith's car are iron' and 'all screws in Smith's car are exposed to air'. 8 6 
Although HEMPEL considered this objection, he did not answer it in an accept-
able way8 7 and LAUTER, when expounding Reichenbach's criterion of law-
likeness88, leaves this point undiscussed. 
But even if this objection of NAGEL and PAP is invalid, the appeal to Reichen-
bach's distinction would not be of much help, a point raised in Nagel's remark 
that Kepler's and Galileo's laws were lawlike before the time of Newton.89 
The second difficulty concerning the criterion of lawlikeness under discussion 
has been formulated by different authors.90 It seems that we can always elimin-
ate the individual constants occurring in a universal statement. We may, for 
example, reformulate (II) as: 
all scarscrews are rusty 
where 'scarscrew' uniquely refers to a screw in Smith's car. This statement 
does not contain an individual constant and is therefore, according to the 
present criterion, lawlike. But then (II), being equivalent to this statement, 
must also be lawlike. By using an analogous strategy, every statement whatsoev-
er would be lawlike. One might protest that this is only a pseudo-elimination: 
we merely construct a new term, 'scarscrew', which is defined as 'screw in 
Smith's car', so that the individual constant is no longer overt, but hidden, 
and by biding it we have not eliminated it. 
This objection is fully justified and leads to a broader and less artificial attack 
on the problem. A new criterion comes to be formulated on the basis of differ-
ent kinds of predicates. 
A second attempt has been formulated: a universal statement is lawlike if it 
contains only purely qualitative or non-positional predicates.91 
A predicate is purely qualitative when the explication of its meaning does not 
require the reference to a specific spatio-temporal area or a particular object.92 
This criterion led to several objections. First, it has to face the objection that 
Kepler's and Galileo's laws (we shall restrict ourselves to these standard exam-
ples) should be called accidental rather than lawlike. An appeal to the Reichen-
bachian distinction between fundamental and derivative lawlike statements 
does not enable us to avoid this objection either. 
Second, it may be objected that the notion of a purely qualitative predicate 
is very vague, because it makes use of 'the meaning' of a predicate, and we 
can hardly pretend to elucidate the concept of law on the basis of such a vague 
criterion. This objection was also raised by HEMPEL and GOODMAN. 9 3 HEMPEL, 
however, simply begs the question by offering a definition of an experimental law 
relative to a formal language L , in which each term is either primitive or defin-
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able in terms of such primitives. And this is followed by his remark that these 
primitives "will be assumed to be qualitative in the sense just indicated" (that 
is in the sense quoted in note 92). But this manoeuvre is, to borrow Quine's 
expression, a 'feu follet par excellence'. We cannot solve the problem of law-
likeness by constructing a language in which the original problem cannot be 
formulated any longer. 
Now, the force of this second objection depends of course on our position 
regarding 'meaning as intention'. Like POPPER, one might be satisfied with 
the explication of the distinction between positional and non-positional predica-
tes or between individual and universal concepts (to use Popper's terms), 
in which case this criterion would be free from this objection. But others, in 
particular QUINE and GOODMAN, are allergic to such 'meanings', which "as 
obscure intermediary entities, may well be abandoned".9 4 In Goodman's terms 
the introduction of "ghostly entities called 'meanings' that are distinct from 
and lie between words and their extensions" is superfluous, because he thinks 
"that difference of meaning between any two terms can be fully accounted for 
without introducing anything beyond terms and their extensions."95 The 
appeal to the meaning or intention of a predicate is completely excluded in 
this view, because there are no meanings to which one could eventually appeal. 
So, from this point of view the objection to the proposed criterion is a very 
severe one. As a matter of fact, I think that the proponents of R, defending 
their thesis within a logical positivist context, should indeed view this objection 
as disastrous. 
It should be clear from the rough sketch of the logical positivist context, 
given in ch. I, section 1, that an appeal to the meaning of a concept, taken 
as its intention, is an inconsistent manoeuvre in that context. We have already 
shown that at the observational level - and we are still discussing laws at an 
experimental (observational) level - predicates must be characterized as isolated 
units of extensional meaning, and in my view QUINE and GOODMAN are consist-
ent when adhering to extensionalism, whereas Hempel's appeal to the meaning of 
predicates is not (but because of its incidental character it does not seem to be 
quite relevant, since he quickly takes refuge in the safe context of an artificial 
language). There is no empirical ground on which to found intentions in a logic-
al positivist context. Therefore there is neither a foundation for analytical state-
ments which would express the result of an analysis of such intentions. Quine's 
attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is justified 9 6 , but we should keep 
in mind that it is only justified as an attack against this distinction within the 
logical positivist context. The impossibility of a predicate having an intentional 
meaning has neither been proved by QUINE nor by GOODMAN. But the regularity 
view is embedded in this context and, therefore, this second objection scores a 
point. It would be perfectly sound to ask what the status of a statement, explicat-
ing the meaning of a given predicate, would be. It would surely have to be a 
universal statement, but if it is called analytic (perhaps via Carnap's semantical 
rules of an artificial language) it would be vulnerable to Quine's criticism or, 
supposing that one could make sense of the analytic-synthetic distinction even 
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when accepting this criticism, the possibility of a lawlike statement being analytic 
should then also be reconsidered (we shall return to this point in ch. IV). If, on 
the other hand, such an explication of the meaning of a predicate is called syn-
thetic, formulating a regularity without exceptions, it would reintroduce the 
problem of distinguishing between lawlike and accidental universals, which 
we have tried to solve by means of the notion of purely qualitative predicates, 
at a'higher' level. 
A third objection against this second criterion was formulated by GOODMAN: 
"qualitativeness is an entirely relative matter and does not by itself establish 
any dichotomy of predicates" (compare note 54). If any predicates could be 
called purely qualitative, colour predicates would be amongst them. GOODMAN 
even tried to show that the qualitativeness of e.g. 'green' is an entirely relative 
matter. I think I have said enough about this in ch. II to substantiate the con-
clusion that this objection cannot be accepted as it is intended. If we take 
Goodman's problem seriously, it means that, at some or other time, a theory 
could be formulated in which the predicate 'green' can no longer be taken 
to be non-positional. However, as long as such an alternative theory has not 
been formulated, the thesis that qualitativeness is an entirely relative matter is 
mere speculation. Therefore this objection could be avoided. 
As a final objection it must be noticed that this criterion does not distinguish 
the famous 'all ravens are black' from 'all metals expand when heated'. Relying 
upon an intuitively clear notion of pure qualitativeness, both these statements 
should be called lawlike, but in the discussion about R the statement about the 
ravens is always taken to be accidental, a fact for which the proposed criterion 
cannot account. 
I now want to consider a third, and last, attempt to solve the problem: a 
universal statement is lawlike when it is unrestricted. 
The universal statement 'all F's are G's' or '(x) (Fx->Gx)' is unrestricted 
if F does not necessarily denote a finite number of instances or a closed or 
finite class 9 7 and it is restricted when the antecedent term indicates a finite num-
ber of elements. The antecedent term 'screws in Smith's car', for example, refers 
to a finite class of objects and this can be ascertained from an analysis of the 
term itself. We need not investigate any empirical facts to find out whether this 
is the case or not. HEMPEL formulated this requirement in a slightly different 
way: a lawlike statement should not be regarded as being logically equivalent 
to a finite conjunction of singular statements.98 POPPER makes the same distinc-
tion when talking about strictly and numerically universal statements, the latter 
being equivalent to a finite conjunction of singular statements while laws are 
always strictly universal.99 Of course, a class, e.g. the class of planets, denoted 
by an antecedent term, may prove to be closed on the basis of further empirical 
evidence, but this does not imply the restrictedness of the universal statement in 
question, e.g. Kepler's first law. The point is that the finiteness of the antece-
dent class should not be derivable from the meaning of the antecedent term. 1 0 0 
Therefore, "familiarity must be assumed with the use or meaning of the ex-
pressions occurring in a sentence, in deciding whether the statement conveyed 
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by the sentence is unrestrictedly universal".1 0 1 
This criterion of unrestrictedness must not be identified with Reichenbach's 
requirement of unrestricted exhaustiveness. LAUTER reformulated this require-
ment as: "(A universal statement) Q is unrestrictedly exhaustive if and only if 
it is not the case that (1) Q is about only a finite number of individuals and (2) 
the fact expressed in (1) is highly confirmed at some time." 1 0 2 And therefore 
"one must investigate non-linguistic facts to determine whether or not a sentence 
is unrestrictedly exhaustive while one only need consider syntactical and 
semantical matters to determine whether or not a sentence is an all-statement, 
general or universal."1 0 3 With this requirement in mind REICHENBACH tried to 
characterize fundamental lawlike statements. 
The criterion of unrestrictedness meets with the following difficulties. 
First, it implies an appeal to the meaning of the antecedent term, which is 
as objectionable here as in the case of the purely qualitative predicates. 
Second, it characterizes the famous 'all moa's die before reaching the age of 
fifty' (Popper's example) as lawlike, which is very questionable (compare ch. IV). 
Third, it supplies us with a reason to say of 'all gold-cubes are smaller than 
10m 3 ' that it is lawlike, while all of us would rather call it accidental. 
It also leads to the description of 'all ravens are black' as a lawlike statement, 
an idea which most authors would not be prepared to accept. There is at least 
an intuitive doubt concerning the lawlike character of this statement and a 
satisfactory explication of the concept 'lawlike' should account for this feeling. 
Reichenbach's requirement is not subject to the first and second objections, 
but the last two objections also hold against his proposal. Moreover, his distinc-
tion between fundamental and derivative lawlike statements is not of much 
help to show the lawlike character of such laws as Kepler's and Galileo's, 
as we have seen before. 
Looking back at these attempts to find a criterion of lawlikeness, we must 
say that this approach does not seem to be very fruitful. It seems that one 
should not restrict oneself to a syntactical-semantical analysis of universal 
statements in isolation. Such a restriction has been shown to have failed every 
time. 1 0* We shall therefore in the next sections discuss the problems of laws 
and counterfactuals (section 2) and of laws and confirmation (section 3). 
In both discussions it is the function of a law in scientific reasoning which will 
be in the foreground. 
2. LAWLIKE STATEMENTS AND COUNTERFACTUALS 
Of the copper screw, here on my desk, we may truly say: 
if that screw had been heated it would have expanded (III) 
but we would call the statement 
if that screw had been in Smith's car it would have 
been rusty (TV) 
false. 
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The universal statement 
all copper things expand when heated (V) 
gives us the right to call (III) true, but the universal statement 
all screws in Smith's car are rusty (II) 
does not give us the right to call (IV) true. 
In other words, (V) supports the corresponding counterfactual (or subjunc-
tive conditional - for the present these terms will be used interchangeably) (III), 
while (II) does not support the corresponding counterfactual (IV). 
These examples suggest the following criterion of lawlikeness: if a universal 
statement supports the corresponding counterfactual it is lawlike; if not, it is 
accidental.1015 
But such a criterion presupposes a satisfactory answer to 'the problem of 
counterfactuals', as it is usually called 1 0 6, in which one does not make use of 
the concept of lawlikeness. And we may agree with P A P 1 0 7 , that an acceptable 
answer is not available, at least not within a logical positivist context, and that 
it is therefore vain to propose this criterion of lawlikeness. But I shall, neverthe-
less, examine the problem of counterfactuals here. It is more than 'a fussy little 
grammatical exercise' and its importance has been stressed by different 
authors. 1 0 8 We can also learn something from it that is directly relevant to our 
central problem. 
Is shall by means of symbols express the form of a singular subjunctive con-
ditional as: 
Aa-o^Ba (VI) 
(in words: if a had been A it would have been B). 
For the time being, we have to assume with many authors, 1 0 9 that such a 
statement implies the falsity of 'Aa'. 
CHISHOLM proposed two ways to solve the problem: "The alternatives are: 
(1) (..) reduce the subjunctive to the indicative; (2) accept the subjunctive as 
describing some kind of irreducible connection and thus reject, or alter radical-
ly, the extensional logic which most contemporary logicians have tried to 
apply to the philosophical problems of science (compare my thesis v in ch. 
I, section 1). The problem is not an easy one; indeed, we may be justified in 
asserting that it constitutes the basic problem in the logic of science." 1 1 0 
Defenders of the regularity view have all chosen Chisholm's first alternative 
and the first proposal in this line has been to translate (VI) in: 
(Aa->Ba).~Aa (Via) 
This translation restores the possibility of an extensional analysis, but it has, 
from the extensional point of view, the disastrous consequence that all subjunc-
tive conditionals must be called true, their antecedent clauses being false. Not 
only (III), i.e. 'if that screw had been heated it would have expanded', would be 
true, but also 'if that screw had been heated it would have contracted' and 'if 
that screw had been in Smith's car it would have been rusty'. 
Therefore this proposed translation must be rejected and it as been generally 
rejected.111 Then, why mention this proposal here? Simply because the argu-
ment for rejecting it reveals an important point: it is taken for granted that an 
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indicative or 'normal' conditional, i.e. 'Aa^-Ba', is true merely because its 
antecedent, i.e. 'Aa', is false. This again illustrates the 'glasses of extensionality' 
most philosophers of science seem to wear during the investigation of their 
problems. This also became clear from the usual exposition of Goodman's 
riddle, reproduced in ch. IT, section 2, where 't t > t 0 ->a is blue' was taken to be 
true solely on the ground that t x was, as a matter of fact, before t 0. 
If this is not accepted, and I do not think that it can be accepted, the problem 
of counterfactuals becomes (part of) a problem of normal conditionals. In 
other words, even if we could reduce subjunctive conditionals to indicative 
conditionals, the problem of counterfactuals would reappear as the problem of 
analysing indicative conditionals. Like subjunctive conditionals, indicative 
conditionals require an analysis of 'the grounds upon which their truth or 
falsity may be decided' (NAGEL). But we must postpone this matter until later 
in this section. 
After the rejection of (Via) as a translation of (VI), authors like GOODMAN, 
CHISHOLM, H I Z 1 1 2 , N A G E L 1 1 3 , and BRAITHWAITE1 1 4 all want to remain within 
the extensional context: "The content of counterfactuals can nevertheless 
be plausibly explicated without recourse to any unanalyzable modal notions", 
as NAGEL put i t . 1 1 5 It is indeed admitted that there is a certain kind of connec-
tion between the antecedent and consequent of a subjunctive conditional, "and 
the truth of statements of this kind - whether they have the form of counter-
factual or factual conditionals or some other form - depends not upon the 
truth or falsity of the components but upon whether the intended connection 
obtains" and therefore "it must be borne in mind that a general solution would 
explain the kind of connection involved irrespective of any assumption as to 
the truth or falsity of the components". Thus GOODMAN. 1 1 6 This, I think, is an 
excellent statement of the problem through its emphasis on a connection between 
antecedent and consequent: it could be literally repeated with respect to 
normal or indicative conditionals. But let us first pay some attention to the 
second proposal for a translation of (VI) which purports to analyse the connec-
tion mentioned. 
A subjunctive conditional is then characterized not as a statement about 
facts, but as a statement about other statements or, as a meta-statement. A 
subjunctive conditional is interpreted as asserting that its consequent in the 
indicative mood follows logically from its antecedent in the indicative mood in 
conjunction with a law and a statement of the initial conditions, required by 
that law. 1 1 7 
For example, (TV), i.e. 'if that screw had been heated it would have expanded', 
is in fact a meta-statement, asserting that 
'that screw expands' follows logically from 'that screw is heated' 
and 'all copper things expand when heated' and 'that screw is copper'. 
Or, in general, (VI) is rendered by: 
Aa.L.C. logically entails Ba (VTb) 
in which L is the law and C the set of required initial circumstances. 
In this way it becomes completely overt that this analysis must presuppose 
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a solution of the two major problems, mentioned by GOODMAN, namely to 
define relevant conditions and to define what laws are . 1 1 8 
But apart from this, (VTb) could not be the correct expression of what is 
intended by the proponents of this proposed translation. What is intended may 
be better expressed by: 
there is a law L and a set of relevant conditions C such that Aa.L.C 
logically entails Ba. (Vic) 
So, in order to verify a subjunctive conditional, we must, while clearly assum-
ing a (limited) concept of the nature of a law, investigate scientific textbooks 
and see whether there is indeed such an L and such a C. If we succeed, the 
subjunctive conditional is true; if not, it is false. Such a procedure would imply 
that "the introduction of modal categories other than those of formal logic is 
entirely gratuitous", as NAGEL expressed i t . 1 1 9 Chisholm's second alternative, 
'reject or alter radically the extensional logic', need not be considered. 
I shall not continue with a review of other attempts, e.g. those of HAMPSHIRE 
and RESCHER, who both made a distinction between two kinds of subjunctive 
conditionals, i.e. the nomological ones, which can be translated in the way 
of (Vic), and the purely hypothetical ones, which cannot be so translated.1 2 0 
What has now been said about the usual ways in which the problem has been 
tackled will do for our purpose, and we shall have the opportunity to come 
back to Rescher's view in the next chapter. 
I shall now try to show that the problem of counterfactuals, taken as a 
separate problem, requiring a separate answer to the question about the grounds 
on which these statements could be called true or false, does not exist. But there 
is a problem concerning normal conditionals which may be described in the 
same words in which NAGEL described the problem of counterfactuals (see note 
106) and which cannot be solved by 'a reduction to the indicative' because it is 
a problem of conditionals in the indicative mood. 
Up to now we have used the terms 'counterfactuar and 'subjunctive con-
ditional' interchangeably, but it has been stressed by different authors that a sub-
junctive conditional does not entail the denial of its antecedent and that 
many counterfactual statements are not expressed in the subjunctive mood, so 
that the identification of these terms should be avoided. 1 2 1 
I shall not go into this matter, but shall simply take it for granted that the 
grammatical distinction between the subjunctive and the indicative mood is 
not parallelled by the distinction counterfactual-noncounterfactual. We are 
here interested in the latter distinction in connection with the concept of law. 
When is a conditional 'if Aa then Ba' counterfactual? Its being expressed in 
the subjunctive mood is not a good guide. I think it is correct to say, that an 
empirical conditional is counterfactual in a certain situation or context, when 
it is clear from that situation or context in which it has been uttered that its 
antecedent is false. It is true that in such a case the conditional is often express-
ed in the subjunctive mood, but the use of this grammatical device to convey 
what is clear from context or situation does not introduce by itself an extra 
problem of verification or falsification. The problem, with which we have to 
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deal is one of analysing the grounds upon which a normal conditional may be 
said to be true or false, in a situation in which its antecedent is false. The sub-
junctive mood may also be used to suggest that the antecedent of the condi-
tional expressed in it is true, as may be clear from Anderson's example: when 
a physician tries to establish the cause of John's death and says that, if John 
had taken arsenic he would have shown the same symptoms, then that physician 
intends saying that it is highly probable that John has taken arsenic, rather than 
that he wants to announce that he decidedly did not take the poison. 
Therefore a satisfactory analysis of empirical conditionals should include an 
answer to the question on what grounds such a conditional may be called true 
or false when it is uttered in such a situation or context that the falsity of the 
antecedent is clear, whether or not it happens to be formulated in the subjunct-
ive mood. And if one wants to make a distinction between 'real' counterfactuals, 
i.e. conditionals uttered in a context from which it is clear that their antecedents 
cannot be true now or in the future, and 'contingent' counterfactuals, whose 
antecedents may become or be made true in the future, we must say that the 
analysis of conditionals should include an analysis of both kinds of counter-
factuals. (An example of a real counterfactual would be 'if that piece of but-
ter had been heated to 150°F., it would have melted', uttered in a situation 
where it is clear that that piece of butter was eaten yesterday - Goodman's 
example; an example of a contingent counterfactual is 'if that screw here on 
my desk is heated, it expands', uttered in the present situation, where I can 
directly see that it is not heated). 
1 shall now consider some typical cases which have to be solved by an analysis 
of conditionals, in order to determine whether the use of such an analysis 
is a satisfactory undertaking. 
I shall make some suggestions and also indicate where the usual extensional 
analysis is inadequate. 
First, we consider a situation in which someone says: 
if that is water then it boils at 212°F. 
or: if WathenB 2 1 2 a (VII) 
When uttering this statement a bottle containing a colourless liquid is pointed 
to. The refractive index of that liquid is determined, and we infer from this, 
that 'Wa' is true. The boiling temperature of the liquid is measured to be 
212°F., so that ' B 2 1 V is also true. 
Upon an extensional analysis, the logical structure of (VII) is 
Wa >B 2 1 2 a (Vila) 
and (VU) is said to be true when (Vila) is true and this latter statement is 
true if both its components are true, as in the present case. Does the evidence 
indeed constitute good grounds for the truth of (VII)? That we should be care-
ful with an affirmative answer may be seen from a second example. 
Again we measure the liquid's refractive index and conclude that it is water. 
Then we measure its boiling temperature: 216°F. The usual analysis results in: 
(Vila) and hence (VII) is false. But should we take this evidence as a good 
ground for the falsity of (VII)? "Of course not", someone might remark, 
64 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wagerdngen 73-2 (1973) 
"because the pressure increased in the meantime, as I myself established, so 
that the second experiment just had to yield a boiling temperature higher than 
212°F. If you only had taken care of the relevant circumstances, the second 
experiment would also have led you to the truth of (VII), like the first. But now 
that the circumstances have changed the evidence has no verifying or falsifying 
significance." This rejoinder is justified and it shows that the extensional analysis 
of (VTI) is insufficient. An appeal to relevant circumstances is made: extensional 
evidence cannot count as evidence for or against the truth of a conditional if 
it is taken in isolation; it can only count as such when it is obtained in an exper-
iment in which the required circumstances have been fulfilled. This is also valid 
for the first experiment: the knowledge of the truth-values of the components 
alone is not enough, even if this knowledge implies that both are true; we 
also need knowledge about the relevant circumstances (and in this connection, 
STEVENSON speaks of'intensional evidence'122). But this means that what GOOD-
MAN called 'the first major problem' in connection with the analysis of counter-
factuals also arises in connection with the verification or falsification of normal 
fulfilled singular conditionals. I want to suggest that we formulate this problem 
as: What are relevant circumstances? How can we judge certain conditions to be 
relevant and others to be irrelevant? What is our norm for accepting the eviden-
ce of one experiment as relevant for the truth or falsity of a conditional and for 
rejecting the result of another experiment as irrelevant? 
I now want to formulate my answer briefly, and I will try to substantiate this 
in chapter V. 
The covering law of the conditional, taken as a statement within a theory or 
conceptual system can provide us with such a norm. I also want to add that it 
follows that the analysis of conditionals also meets with what GOODMAN calls 
'the second major problem' in connection with counterfactuals, namely the 
problem of an empirical law. An extensional analysis fails to bring these points 
to light. Of course, one frequently does refer to the required circumstances by 
means of such remarks as 'provided the system is in a normal state' or 'on the 
condition that suitable circumstances are fulfilled' or something similar. But 
it is one thing to pass such a remark rather incidentally and quite another to 
take full account of these relevant circumstances in a systematic philosophical 
analysis. GOODMAN tried to do this in connection with counterfactuals because 
these statements give rise to a very strong feeling of uneasiness whenever one 
adopts an extensionalist view. It is, however, necessary to offer a systematic 
account of conditionals in general simply because the counterfactuals are only 
a sub-class of this general class. 
Let us now investigate a situation when we say: 
if that copper screw is heated then it expands 
We say this about that screw over there at a time when we can easily see that 
it is not heated. 'Hs' would, therefore, be false. 
According to the extensional analysis of (VILT), 
or: if Hs then Es (VIII) 
Hy-^Es (Villa) 
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this conditional should now be called true. 
But should we regard our evidence, namely that that screw is not heated, as 
a sufficient reason for the truth of (VTIT)? Of course, (Villa) is true, but should 
one regard (VIII) as true for this reason only? An extensionalist must answer 
"Yes" and we have met with two examples where he indeed said exactly that. 
In the normal exposition of Goodman's riddle (reproduced in ch. II, section 2) 
the conditional \ > t 0 - ^ a is blue' is taken to be true solely because tt is in fact 
prior to t 0. 
When GOODMAN, NAGEL, CHISHOLM, and many others reject the translation 
of a counterfactual as '(Aa->Ba).~Aa', they do so simply because the first con-
junct, i.e. 'Aa-^Ba', is true when its antecedent is false. When CARNAP proposed 
his method of reduction sentences for the introduction of dispositional predic-
ates in the empirical language, he did so on the basis of the consideration that 
normally a conditional is true when its antecedent is false; if he had not taken 
this for granted, there would have been no direct need for an alternative method 
of reduction, but there would still have been a problem of conditionals. 
I think it is necessary to state clearly that the falsity of the antecedent of an 
empirical conditional as such never constitutes sufficient evidence for the truth 
of that conditional. Every scientist would agree to this and I think this is fully 
justified. Should we then rather say that we do not have good grounds from 
which the truth or falsity of (VIII) may be inferred in the situation mentioned 
above? Must we not rather say that we should wait for the results of an exper-
iment in which that screw is really heated? In other words, should we not rather 
in this situation view (VLTl) as a prediction whose truth-value still remains to be 
established? It would be wrong to do that because every scientist would be 
prepared to call (VTH) true in this situation. Conditionals like (VIII) are taken 
to be assertible with warranty even when their antecedents are false. But is it not 
strange to appeal to scientific practice in a case like this? Certainly not, because 
this appeal to scientific practice is also made in connection with the formulation 
of the problem of subjunctive conditionals or, of what I have called, real counter-
factuals. These real counterfactuals cannot be viewed as predictions, simply 
because their antecedents cannot be established as true in the future. The butter 
I ate yesterday cannot be heated now or in the future in order to test the state-
ment 'if that piece of butter is heated then it melts'. These real counterfactuals 
cannot, therefore, be accounted for by regarding them as predictions, but nor 
can they be rejected as genuine empirical statements since they are used in 
scientific practice every day and are there taken to be completely bona fide 
empirical statements which are either true or false. But so are the contingent 
counterfactuals like (VIII), and it is therefore correct to ask on what grounds a 
counterfactual conditional could be called true or false, independently of the 
fact whether or not its antecedent may, as yet, be found to be true in the future. 
When we do this, we should also say that (VIII) is true of that screw which is on 
my desk and which is not heated, because it is deducible from the law that all 
copper things expand when heated, provided that the required conditions are 
fulfilled. And the conditional 'if that screw is heated it contracts' is false, even 
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if a truth-functional analysis would make us believe that it is true. This follows 
from the fact that the connection asserted in this conditional is excluded by 
the connection laid down in the law mentioned before. 
Therefore, a counterfactual, whether real or contingent, whether expressed 
in the indicative or subjunctive mood, is true when it can be inferred from a 
law. This means that the connection intended by that counterfactual obtains*. 
And a counterfactual is false when the intended connection does not obtain, 
since it is excluded by a connection laid down in a law. It should be obvious 
that in this way the analysis of conditionals can be completely reduced to the 
analysis of laws and relevant circumstances. Moreover what we have said seems 
to imply that an experimental test is superfluous; the evidence obtained in 
the first example does not by itself verify the conditional 'If Wa then B 2 1 V . 
However, I have to postpone any further discussion of this matter until ch. V. 
We should at this stage become aware of the distinction between normal and 
(Revolutionary science. Whenever we appeal to scientific practice, we appeal to 
normal science and it is called normal because of the very fact that we are taking 
for granted certain laws embedded in a theory. 
We must still make one short remark about conditionals, which are uttered 
in a situation where we have no idea about the truth-value of the antecedent. 
This is a simple matter as such a conditional is true when it applies a connection, 
laid down in a law, to a particular case, and it is false when the intended con-
nection does not hold or is excluded by a law. 
What has been said so far is restricted to conditionals which can be related 
to available laws. We could call such conditionals nomological conditionals, 
in the same way that RESCHER speaks of nomological counterfactuals.120 Our 
analysis has no bearing on purely hypothetical conditionals (cf. again RESCHER). 
Our conclusion must be that the analysis of conditionals, whether fulfilled 
or not, whether they are expressed in the subjunctive mood or the indicative, 
requires an answer to the question what an empirical law is. Our answer to 
this question must, if it is to be satisfactory, also supply an answer to the problem 
of relevant circumstances. This problem has never been answered by proponents 
of the regularity view and. I think, it would be extremely difficult to realize this 
within this view because knowledge of these conditions seems to require the 
occurrence of exceptions or irregularity (compare ch. I, section 6). R, on the 
other hand, characterizes a law as the formulation of a regularity without excep-
tions. But it may be that the appeal to a theory, to which the proponents of R 
also take recourse, could answer this question. 
3. LAWS AND CONFIRMATION 
Our analysis in section 1 showed that from the various attempts at a solu-
tion of the problem no satisfactory criterion of lawlikeness could be obtained. 
* Us ing G o o d m a n ' s terminology. 
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Tn section 2, which did not aim at the establishment of such a criterion, the 
need for such a criterion was stressed by pointing at the fact that we will not 
be able to offer a satisfactory analysis of empirical conditionals (including 
counterfactuals) as long as we are unable to give a satisfactory analysis of the 
concept of empirical law. 
We shall now consider yet another attempt at such an analysis. Laws, it is 
remarked, have a certain function in science: they are used to make predictions. 
Therefore, a universal statement is lawlike if it is acceptable as a true statement 
prior to the examination of all its instances.123 If the evidence for a law would 
coincide with its scope of predication, to use Nagel's term, it could not be used 
for making predictions. 
Of course it is not meant that a statement like '(x)(Ax->Bx)' is lawlike only 
if it is acceptable as a true statement and the class of A's is infinite, since this 
would make the criterion depend on the question whether or not the universe 
is infinite, as STEGMULLER remarked.1 2 4 What is meant by this proposal is that 
a universal statement is lawlike if it is acceptable as true before the examination 
of all elements of the antecedent class and it does not matter whether or not 
this class turns out to be finite in the future. 
It is intended that, given this criterion, the function of a law as supporting 
counterfactual conditionals can also be accounted for. Counterfactuals are 
taken to stand in the same logical relation to a law as predictions do; in the 
same way that a law enables us to make predictions, i.e. statements about as yet 
unobserved instances, it also enables us to formulate counterfactuals, i.e. state-
ments about unrealized, or rather unrealisable, instances.125 Predictions and 
counterfactuals are taken to be similar in this respect. 
After what has been said in section 2 about counterfactuals and conditionals 
in general, it may be clear that I fully agree with the idea of putting predictions 
and counterfactuals on the same level. Counterfactuals are, in the same way 
as predictions, derivable from a law in conjunction with the statements of 
relevant conditions. Whether they should be expressed in the subjunctive mood, 
a way in which predictions could also be expressed, is a matter of grammatical 
taste. But the assertion that a universal statement is lawlike if it supports the 
related predictions leads exactly to the same conclusion as the assertion that a 
universal statement is lawlike if it supports a corresponding counterfactual, i.e. 
the concept of lawlikeness presupposes a satisfactory analysis of (predictive) 
conditionals, which, as we have seen in section 2, requires an answer to two 
questions: What is a law? and What are relevant circumstances? Briefly, the 
fact that a law enables us to make predictions (and to assert counterfactuals) is 
a symptom of a universal statement's being lawlike and it cannot therefore be 
taken as a criterion to determine whether a statement is lawlike or not. 
But someone might remark that it is not the predictive force which is used 
in the criterion in question, but a statement's being acceptable before all its 
instances have been examined. This, however, directly poses the following 
question: Why do we accept one universal statement as true prior to such an 
examination and not the other? Supposing that we do not accept as true the 
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statement about the screws in Smith's car. i.e. 'all those screws are rusty', 
before we have examined them all and before we have established that all are 
in fact rusty, then why are not we prepared to do that? Supposing also that we 
do accept 'all copper things expand when heated' as true, while we have not yet 
examined everything referred to by the antecedent term, why are we allowed to 
do this? We may translate this into Goodman's formulation of the problem and 
ask why a positive instance of the copper-statement does have a confirming 
force, while a positive instance of the screws-statement has no such confirming 
force? 1 2 6 Goodman's answer is clear enough: "The difference is that in the 
former case (i.e. in the case of the statement about copper) the hypothesis is a 
lawlike statement; while in the latter case (i.e. in the case of the statement about 
screws), the hypothesis is a merely contingent or accidental generality. Only a 
statement that is lawlike is capable of receiving confirmation from an instance 
of it; accidental statements are not" . 1 2 7 Therefore the acceptability of a univers-
al statement as true before the examination of all its instances too must be called 
a mark of lawlikeness, rather than a defining characteristic. 
To conclude, if a universal statement is lawlike it has predictive force, it 
supports counterfactuals, it is confirmable by its positive instances, and it is 
acceptable as true prior to the determination of all instances. But all these 
indications presuppose the analysis of the concept of lawlikeness.128 Hence the 
proposed criterion must be dropped. It is, however, informative to apply it, 
taking it in its intuitively clear form, to the famous case of the black ravens, 
because this may clarify what exactly the debate between the regularity and the 
necessity view is about. 
I am taking it for granted that nobody would object if we were to say that 
all ravens are black (I) 
is accepted as true on the basis of the evidence available at this moment. This 
evidence is regarded as an exceptionless repetition by all proponents of R. It 
may also be taken for granted that this evidence does not exhaust the scope of 
predication of (I). Therefore, it should be called lawlike on the basis of the 
criterion under consideration. KNEALE, however, raised doubts with respect to 
such a view. 1 2 9 If (I) were a law, we should be justified to predict 
if that particular thing is a raven then it is black (II) 
and to assert 
if that particular thing had been a raven then 
it would have been black (III) 
But, according to KNEALE, it may be an historical accident that no ravens 
ever lived in very snowy regions, and under such circumstances the truth of 
(I) may simply depend upon such an accident. It is indeed possible that the 
progeny of ravens, which migrate to polar regions, will be white, a likely theory 
if we accept the idea of natural selection. If we realise this, it becomes doubtful 
whether (I) allows us to assert the predictive statement (II) and the counterfac-
tual (ni), since these statements can now be taken to refer to a member of the 
mentioned progeny of ravens. 1 3 0 
A universal statement may be regarded as confirmable if there are positive 
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instances and it may even be accepted as true prior to the examination of 
its instances, and yet be accidental in the sense of asserting an historical accident 
on a cosmic scale. It may be well confirmed, there may even be a very long series 
of positive instances without any exception, and it may, on such an inductivist 
basis, even be accepted as true. However, it may nevertheless fail to enable us 
to make predictions and to assert counterfactuals; in other words, to be lawlike. 
(It seems therefore not to be correct to identify, as GOODMAN does, confirmabil-
ity with lawlikeness). Such a statement is dropped when a negative instance 
turns up, as 'all swans are white' was dropped when black swans were discover-
ed. According to KNEALE, the regularity view entails that a law is only concern-
ed with actual and not with possible cases. This is the very point which makes a 
Humean account of laws, expressed in R, inadequate.131 
We shall return to this view in the next chapter. The question here is how 
the proponents of R would answer this objection. They should at this stage of 
the argument answer the more specific question how we are to distinguish be-
tween universal statements which assert a regularity that is only an historical 
accident and universal statements asserting a lawlike regularity. Regularity 
alone is not enough : "To say that valid predictions are those based on past 
régularités, without being able to say which régularités, is thus quite pointless. 
Regularities are where you find them, and you can find them anywhere. As we 
have seen, Hume's failure to recognize and deal with this problem has been 
shared even by his most recent successors." Thus GOODMAN. 1 3 2 Something 
else over and above regularity is needed in order to decide between those 
regularities that would lead to lawlike statements and those that do not. There 
must be some organizing factor, some point of view which would make this 
decision possible. In Goodman's view the organization can be found in the 
use of language and more specifically in the entrenchment of those predicates 
occurring in a statement.133 Such a criterion, however, has been put forward in 
connection with such a case as the green-grue conflict, which has been discussed 
in ch. II. I therefore fail to see the relevance of Goodman's 'organizing factor' 
for drawing a distinction between lawlike statements and accidental ones like 
'all ravens are black', 'all gold cubes are smaller than 10 m 3 ', 'all robins' eggs 
are greenish-blue', etc. 
But BRAITHWAITE, NAGEL and others do appeal to a theory or a scientific 
system or a corpus of knowledge whenever they maintain that a universal 
statement is lawlike if it occupies a certain logical position in a scientific theory.134 
With this criterion we have now reached the last attempt of proponents of R 
to make the required distinction. NAGEL, explicitly responding to Kneale's 
criticism, states: "The criticism under discussion does not undermine the 
Humean analysis of nomic universality. The criticism does bring into clearer 
light, however, the important point that a statement is usually classified as a 
law of nature because the statement occupies a distinctive position in the 
system of explanations in some area of knowledge, and because the statement 
is supported by evidence satisfying certain specifications."133 
Based on such a characterization of lawlikeness, the lawlike universals are 
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distinct from accidental ones in the following two respects: first, lawlike uni-
versals can, because of the fact that they occupy a logical position in a theory, 
be confirmed indirectly, while accidental universals cannot be confirmed in the 
same way, but only directly by means of their positive instances; second, law-
like universals come to be connected with relevant circumstances within the 
theory they are embedded in. 
Let us briefly consider both these points. 
The statement 'all ravens are black' can only be directly confirmed. It does 
not form part of a theory which would lead to any indirect evidence. The state-
ment 'all copper things expand when heated', on the other hand, can be confirm-
ed both directly and indirectly. The direct evidence for 'all iron things expand 
when heated' constitutes indirect evidence for 'all copper things expand when 
heated' via other statements within the theory, e.g. 'all metals expand when 
heated'. The latter statement is indirectly confirmable in a different way. It 
makes the derivation of other laws possible (e.g. the laws mentioned above 
about copper and iron things), and direct evidence for such derived laws would 
count as indirect evidence for 'all metals expand when heated'. It follows that 
there are two kinds of indirect evidence, and when applying the criterion of 
lawlikeness, which is now being considered, it would imply that indirect eviden-
ce of either kind should be available for a universal statement to count as law-
like. 1 3 6 But we should not take the availability of indirect evidence of either 
kind in the case of a universal statement as a criterion for the lawlikeness of 
that statement, a point which GOODMAN conclusively established. The fact - let 
us suppose it to be the case - that all screws in the cars of my friends are rusty, 
would have to count as indirect evidence for 'all screws in Smith's car are rusty' 
via the higher-level statement 'all screws in Smith's car and the cars of my 
friends are rusty', as long as we have no criterion for distinguishing between 
this latter statement and, for example, 'all metals expand when heated'; this 
means as long as we have no criterion of lawlikeness.137 When we use the 
criterion of a universal statement being lawlike due to its occupation of a certain 
position in a theory - the very criterion we are considering here - Goodman's 
criticism poses the following question: What should count as a theory and what 
does it mean for a statement to occupy a position in such a theory 1 The analysis 
of the concept of lawlikeness then presupposes an adequate analysis of the 
concept of a theory.1 3 8 
Let us now turn to the second and, I think, far more interesting point. By 
making the being lawlike of a universal statement depend upon its being part 
of a scientific system, the proponents of R also intend to answer Kneale's cri-
ticism (stated above) in such a way that a Humean view of laws can be main-
tained. The introduction of modal concepts would then become entirely super-
fluous. Let us now examine Nagel's answer to K N E A L E . 1 3 9 Suppose there were 
a biological theory about the factors determining the colour of the plumage of 
birds and that one of these factors is the genetic code of birds. In such a case we 
would be able to give a reason for the blackness of all ravens by means of the 
theory to which 'all ravens are black' belongs (compare BRAITHWAITE in note 
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134). This generalisation should then be regarded as lawlike. Accepting the exist-
ing biological theories we know that the genetic code of an animal can be chang-
ed by e.g. X-ray radiation. In other words, the presence of X-ray radiation 
constitutes a relevant circumstance as regards the colour of a bird's plumage. 
When we now normalize this circumstance in such a way that the presence of 
X-ray radiation of an intensity below a certain minimum becomes a normal 
circumstance, then 'all ravens are black' enables us to predict 
if that polar inhabitant is a raven then it is black, provided 
that all circumstances are normal 
and to assert 
if that polar inhabitant had been a raven then it would have 
been black, provided that all circumstances are normal. 
The addition of such a ceteris paribus clause is completely in order. Every 
prediction and every counterfactual, that means every conditional derivable 
from a law, is only taken to be true on the tacit assumption that the required 
circumstances are fulfilled in the case in question. When, for example, we say of 
a liquid 'if it is water then it boils at 212°F.', we always do so on the assump-
tion that the circumstances required by the law, 'all water boils at 212°F.', 
have been fulfilled, e.g. a pressure of 1 arm. 
In my opinion, NAGEL makes a first step in the right direction in his answer 
to Kneale's criticism: once 'all ravens are black' is embedded in such a theory, 
in which a reason can be given for the blackness of ravens and in which certain 
relevant circumstances come to be known, this statement may count as a law. 
But this attempt should not be taken as a final step. Moreover, it is a step which 
seems to be hardly compatible with the distinction between experimental laws 
and a theory, which is presupposed by the proponents of R, including NAGEL. 
Let us now consider these points. 
Nagel's attempt should be followed by an analysis of the concept of a theory 
and in particular by an answer to the question as to how a theory is to be 
constructed in order to account for such a universal statement. An answer to 
this question could, perhaps, make it clear what it means to say that a universal 
statement is embedded in a theory and it could thereby, taking this embedding 
as a criterion of lawlikeness, perhaps supply us with a satisfactory analysis of 
lawlikeness. But to me it seems impossible to answer this question as long as 
one insists on the idea that a law, basically, asserts an exceptionless repetition 
which can be known through direct or theory-free observation. The reason being 
that I cannot find any statement, that would now qualify as a law, which is merely 
the assertion of an exceptionless regularity given in theory-free observation. 
Let us take as an example the following statement 
all water boils at 212°F. 
This statement is undoubtedly not the expression of a theory-independent 
constant conjunction. Isolated from the theory within which this statement 
functions as a law, there is no regularity at all, but an irregularity. In all cases 
of 'direct observation', which here means the separation of an 'observation' 
from a theory about boiling-point-retardation, increase of the boiling-point by 
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impurities, the connection between pressure and boiling-point, the existence 
of the hydrogen isotope deuterium, the connection between the structure of 
a liquid and its boiling-point, etc., we face an irregularity and could at best say 
that water often boils at 212°F. The statement 'all water boils at 212 °F.' could 
then be falsified a great many times and it would be completely nonsensical to 
insist on regarding it as the formulation of a regularity without exceptions. 
What happens here is simply that the negative instances are not taken as 
falsifications, but as genuine exceptions (compare ch. II, sections 5 and 6) on the 
basis of the normative but conjectural statement 'all water boils at 212°F.'. 
And these genuine exceptions constitute the incitement to further theory formation, 
i.e. the formation of other conjectural universals and the discovery of relevant 
circumstances. In such a way the statement 'all water boils at 212 °F.' loses its 
ad hoc character and comes to be confirmed as the assertion of a necessary 
connection by its being an element within the newly formed theory. It is because 
an observation is made by means of this theory, that one can assert a regularity. 
Without a theory there are at best regularities as historical accidents on a cosmic 
scale, and such historical accidents are of no interest within the formation of a 
theory and the growth of science. Lawlike regularities are co-constituted by means 
of our theories. This is only a very brief formulation of the idea that will be 
developed in ch. V. I regard it as the greatest shortcoming of the proponents of 
the regularity view that they take a naive and unexplicated concept of regularity 
for granted. As long as they do that, their rejection of the necessity view, which 
is founded on the obscurity of the concept of necessity, cannot be very convinc-
ing. As long as they do this, all the attempts, considered in this chapter, to 
distinguish between accidental and lawlike regularities, are doomed to remain 
peripheral remarks. 
It seems to me to be correct to say that it is because it is part of a theory that 
a universal statement is lawlike. However, we should not interpret this to mean 
that we first of all have the universal statement in isolation, which is then follow-
ed by the theory in which it happens to be taken up. We can indeed say that a 
law asserts a regularity, but this regularity is only brought about by the confirma-
tion of the theory in which the law is 'automatically' embedded. A lawlike 
regularity is co-constituted by a theory and therefore the law, which formulates 
that regularity, is indissolubly bound to that theory. We can only divorce the 
law from the theory when we are prepared to sacrifice the regularity and thereby 
the law itself. The concepts 'water' and 'boiling-point', for example, which are 
connected in the law 'all water boils at 212 °F.', are not theory-independent 
concepts; they have a particular meaning because they are connected to a great 
many other concepts in the theory, and this is the reason why this law can neither 
be theory-independent. 
This contradicts the very starting point of the regularity view, namely the 
important distinction between experimental laws and theories, a distinction 
which goes back to the fundamental logical positivist distinction between obser-
vational and theoretical terms, which, again, is founded on the notion of 
direct or theory-free observation. 
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Within the logical positivist view, the meaning of the concepts in an experim-
ental law, the truth of a law and its confirmation, are all theory-independent 
(compare the beginning of this chapter and ch. I, section 1), but according to 
what has just been said about the relation between a law and a theory, such an 
independence cannot possibly exist unless one is prepared to waive the law. I 
therefore do think that Nagel's appeal to a theory in order to characterize 
lawlikeness, an attempt which I called a first step in the right direction, would 
appear on further elaboration to be incompatible with his own philosophical 
point of view. This appeal has by no means shown that a Humean analysis of 
nomic universality can be upheld or that the introduction of modal categories is 
entirely gratuitous.1 4 0 
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IV. T H E N E C E S S I T Y VIEW 
1. LOGICAL NECESSITY 
In the contemporary discussion between proponents of the regularity and the 
necessity view the possibility of an empirical law asserting a logically necessary 
connection has been rejected by both. 
However, I consider it as important to consider the reasons that have been 
given for such a rejection and this will be my primary aim in this section. 
The first requisite for such a rejection is a clear concept of logical necessity. 
This concept is usually taken to be quite transparent; a generally accepted 
analysis of this concept has been provided by logical theory.1 4 1 A statement, 
according to this theory, is logically necessary if its negation is a contradiction. 
If this concept of logical necessity is taken for granted, no empirical law is 
logically necessary, because logic alone does not enable us to prove its negation 
to be contradictory. NAGEL even goes further when asserting that logic enables 
us to prove that a law is not self-contradictory. If one nevertheless maintains 
that laws are logically necessary or that they assert a logical necessity, one should 
either say that there are no empirical laws (until now, at least, for in the future 
our insight may become sufficient to establish that they are logically necessary), 
or that the methods of logical proof can no longer be applied. 1 4 2 A second 
objection to the logical necessity view has been raised. If a statement is logically 
necessary it cannot have any empirical or factual content and, therefore, if 
it has such a content, it cannot be logically necessary.143 If a statement is 
logically necessary, empirical evidence cannot have the slightest influence 
on its truth-value; the statement cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified.144 
This would be sufficient to reject the necessity view in which necessity is inter-
preted as logical necessity. 
Of course, this rejection essentially hinges upon the concept of logical necess-
ity and we shall now see that the transparency of this concept is only apparent. 
First, there is the class of logically necessary statements which are usually 
called logical truths: "a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains 
true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical partic-
les " 1 4 5 , for example 'no unmarried man is married'. But if it is said that laws 
are logically necessary it is not intended that they are logical truths, but even 
with respect to these statements the matter is not as clear as the opponents of 
logical necessity take it to be, as Strawson has shown. 1 4 6 
Second, there is the class of logically necessary statements, which can be 
reduced to logical truths by means of an analysis of the non-logical terms oc-
curring in these statements: the analytic statements. One need not inspect em-
pirical matters in order to know that such statements are true, they have no 
empirical content and they cannot be denied without self-contradiction. If one 
rejects that an empirical law is logically necessary one also rejects the view that 
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it is an analytic statement. Therefore, the proponents of R, defending the syn-
thetic character of a law and taking the analytic-synthetic dichotomy for grant-
ed, reject the view of logical necessity. But they frequently add an interesting 
remark about the fact that laws often appear to be analytic. It is said that a 
sentence of universal form could be used in different ways. Consider for example 
(NAGEL), the sentence 'copper is a good electrical conductor'. It could be used 
to express an empirical law, in which case it is synthetic; but the same sentence 
could also be used to express a denning property of copper, namely its high 
conductivity. In the latter case the sentence is used to express a logically 
necessary truth and the statement 'copper is a good electrical conductor' is 
analytic: "(it) cannot be denied without self contradiction, so that it does not 
express an empirical law for which experimental evidence is relevant but states 
a logically necessary truth". And "Sentences which appear to state laws but 
which are in fact employed as definitions, are commonly called 'conven-
tions'.". 1 4 7 
If these two kinds of usage of sentences of universal form are distinguished 
we need no longer be deceived by the fact that, at first sight, empirical laws 
seem to be analytic. 
AYER has also drawn attention to this usage of a universal sentence which may 
sometimes assert an empirical law and at some other time express a convention 
and he adds that "we are free to settle the matterin whichever way we please". 1 4 8 
PAP also referred to this twofold status of a universal statement, characterizing 
it by the expressions 'a statement about the course of nature' and 'a statement 
about the meaning of a word'. 1 4 9 
But, first, the distinction between analytic and synthetic, and connected 
with it, the distinctions between nonempirical and empirical, definition (con-
vention) and empirical law, as well as statements about the meaning of a word 
and statements about the course of nature, is not at all as clear as would be 
required for an adequate rejection of the logical necessity view! 
Moreover, even if we take this questionable dichotomy for granted, the Good-
mannian question (for obvious reasons called 'Goodmannian') why in the one 
case such a shift of meaning of a universal sentence from synthetic universal 
statement to convention or definition takes place as a matter of fact and not 
in the other, still remains to be answered. 
We shall now examine both these points somewhat further. 
The transparency of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has been badly affect-
ed by Quine's attack. 1 5 0 All statements have, in Quine's view, the same cog-
nitive status within 'the whole of science', and the unit of empirical significance 
is not the empirical statement in isolation, but the conceptual scheme of science 
or the whole of science, which is, ultimately, an instrument for making predic-
tions. 1 5 1 
There are three theses here: first, the unit of empirical significance is the 
conceptual system as a whole and not the statement in isolation; second, this 
system is a tool for making predictions; and third, all statements have the same 
cognitive status within this system. 
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I am in complete agreement with the first of these theses, though for reasons 
different from those given by QUINE. I do not agree with the second thesis 
which expresses Quine's instrumentalist view, and I do not think that this 
thesis is a consequence of the other two, but I cannot go further into this 
point at present. Nor do I agree with the third thesis. Quine's argument for 
this thesis is that, within a conceptual system, and we cannot but consider 
a statement as being taken up into such a system (the first thesis), "Any state-
ment can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system (..). Conversely, by the same token, no statement is 
immune to revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle 
has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics".1 5 2 Appar-
ently we should interpret this as follows: analyticity is identified with 'true 
come what may' or with irrevisability and a statement's being synthetic is 
identified with its being révisable upon evidence that may come. It is clear that 
QUINE does not view the conceptual scheme of science as a conceptual system 
whereby the individual concepts acquire the meaning they have. For if this 
view were upheld, a 'drastic adjustment elsewhere in the system', in order to 
keep some statement true, would imply a change in the meaning of the con-
cepts of that very statement. The content of that statement would then also 
change and one can no longer say that the original statement is kept true. 
QUINE does indeed take the conceptual scheme as a tool for prediction. 
I have said that I do not agree with Quine's thesis that all statements have 
the same cognitive status, but let me first make it clear that I do agree with 
it if taken in one particular sense. I do agree with it if it is directed against those 
who take isolated statements as units of empirical significance which can be 
confirmed and which convey information. For, in such a case, to say of such an 
isolated statement that it is analytic could indeed hardly mean anything else 
than 'true come what may' or 'immune to revision'. But, and now I come to my 
disagreement with QUINE, one can subscribe to Quine's first thesis, that state-
ments in isolation should not be taken as the units of empirical significance, 
and at the same time uphold a distinction between analytic and synthetic state-
ments which occupy a position in a theory or conceptual system. In other words, 
it is possible to make sense of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy relative to 
a given conceptual system. It could be perfectly meaningful to say of a state-
ment that it is analytic when we do not view this statement in isolation, but as 
embedded into a theory. This has been the line of defense of the 'dogma' by 
GRICE and STRAWSON. 1 5 3 They argue that there is no necessity for the adoption 
of a conceptual system and, therefore, QUINE is right when he says that no 
statement, being taken up in such a system, is immune to revision, as the system 
as a whole may be rejected on the basis of what may come. But this does not 
exclude the possibility of there being necessary connections within a given con-
ceptual system which are expressed in analytic statements (cf. note 34). There 
are universal statements of which a revision, i.e. a switch from 'true' to 'false', 
would require a conceptual revision, e.g. 'all bachelors are unmarried men', and 
there are statements of which a revision does not require such a conceptual 
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change, e.g. 'all swans are white' or 'all screws in Smith's car are rusty'. A 
statement of the first kind may be called analytic and a statement of that latter 
kind synthetic.154 
Once we have adopted a certain conceptual scheme or theory-I would rather 
say: once we have formed a theory or conceptual system, because the term 
'adoption' of GRICE and STRAWSON suggests too much, it becomes a matter of 
take it or leave it - hence once we have formed a theory, we also know certain 
meaning connections to be necessary (compare as regards this point and what 
follows, ch. I, sections 4, 5 and 6). In other words, once we have formed a 
conceptual system, we also know certain statements to be analytic. The necessa-
ry connections expressed by those statements consitute that very system. The 
denial of those statements would come down to the denial of that system or 
part of it. But it is that very system that enables us to observe certain data 
through the very fact that they are but those data because they have been co-
constituted by that system. Without it we would not be able to observe certain 
data, we would not be able to consider them as confirmatory evidence for state-
ments in that system, and we would not be able to explain certain phenomena 
which can be observed through that system. And, of course, it has also been 
stressed in the sections of ch. I, just mentioned, that if QUINE intends saying 
that this system as a whole is not immune to revision, he is right: what may 
come may indeedforce us to dissolve these necessary connections. In this way the 
analytic statements are revisable in principle. But such a revision can only take 
place by the formation of new necessary connections, which are based upon new 
empirical evidence, not available before (evolutionary science) or by the forma-
tion of an alternative theory, which, in its turn, is marked by other necessary 
connections, making the alternative just that particular theory that it is (revol-
utionary science). The revision of analytic statements or the dissolution of 
necessary connections means that we must form new concepts in order to 
restore intersubjective understanding of the empirical phenomena. The revision 
of statements like 'all screws in Smith's car are rusty' does not imply anything 
of this kind, because this statement does not assert a necessary connection. 
This will, I think, do to show that the rejection of the logical necessity view of 
empirical laws, on the basis of a concept of analyticity that is indeed connected 
to statements in isolation, cannot be accepted. Of course, we may say that the 
negation of an analytic statement is a contradiction, but such a remark should 
be related to the system in which the statement in question is taken up and it 
does not imply that that statement is empirically or factually empty. An analytic 
statement, taken as a statement within a theory, of course has empirical content: 
it states that certain phenomena cannot occur in the empirical reality, but this 
reality, it must be stressed again, is not an observer- or theory-independent 
reality; it is the empirical reality, observable through or co-constituted by our 
theories. 
I want to clarify the notion of 'phenomena or events which cannot occur' 
by means of the following example. 
The classical theory of electromagnetism 'forbids' that a charged particle 
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be accelerated and at the same time not emit radiation. Therefore, the existence 
of a Bohr-atom is a phenomenon that could not occur in the eyes of a nineteenth-
century physicist. A physicist accepting the classical view can, in fact, only 
speak in a metaphorical way, of a 'forbidden' phenomenon or of an event that 
cannot possibly occur. He cannot answer the question "What do you understand 
by such an impossible event or phenomenon, or what do you imagine it to be?" 
because his conceptual system excludes such an understanding or imagining. 
In other words, if he could answer this question (and a 20th century physicist 
can), he would already have formed the required concepts (as a 20th century 
physicist has done). I hope it will be clear from this example in which sense we 
speak of forbidden or impossible phenomena or events. 
It might be remarked at this moment that, by relating analyticity to a con-
ceptual system or theory, I no longer speak of logical necessity (but, for example, 
of physical necessity, which will be examined in the next section). If this remark 
is intended to say that the being analytic of a statement is a characteristic of 
that statement in isolation, I would answer that the class of analytic statements 
should in that case be identified with the class of logical truths. If this remark, 
however, only means that 'logical necessity' is not any longer the appropriate 
term to be used, then I completely support the exchanging of it for a better one. 
Now if we use this concept of analyticity in relation to a conceptual system 
or theory, and in particular to conceptual change, I think the possibility of a 
law being analytic is still open. The rejection of the logical necessity view on the 
basis of a concept of analyticity, that is taken to be applicable to statements in 
isolation, does not automatically imply the rejection of the logical necessity 
view in which a concept of analyticity, related to conceptual change and taken 
to be applicable to statements within a theory, is used. To show this was pri-
marily the aim of this digression concerning the famous dichotomy. 
We must now turn to what we called the Goodmannian question, posed in 
connection with the possibility of a sentence expressing a synthetic universal 
statement or an empirical law at one time and a definition or convention at 
another: why do we 'conventionalize', if we do, in some cases (e.g. of copper 
and its conductivity) and not in others (e.g. of ravens and their blackness) and 
why is this done at all at the moment it is done and not earlier or later? Ayer's 
'answer', that we are free to settle the matter as we please, says in fact that these 
questions are illegitimate, because we are indeed free to do what we want; thus 
there is no evidence upon which the matter can be settled and it is therefore 
not meaningful to ask for such evidence. As far as I am concerned, this view is 
completely unacceptable and I shall not go further into it. But NAGEL has made 
a very interesting remark: "the shifts in meaning to which sentences are subject 
as a consequence of advances in knowledge (my italics, H.K.) are an impor-
tant feature in the development of comprehensive systems of explanation".1 5 5 
It is this feature that will receive further attention in ch. V and which has already 
been analysed in connection with concept formation in ch. I; the advance of 
knowledge, the attempt to reach better understanding on the basis of new 
empirical evidence, forces us to regard certain connections necessary or lawlike. 
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At first these have an ad hoc status, but they may become empirically confirmed 
as necessary connections by the successful formation of a theory on the basis 
of on-going inquiry. It is in this way that these statements acquire a position 
within a theory and we are not free to settle the matter as we please, as we shall 
see later. 
Now when we leave open the possibility of laws being analytic stat-
ments, asserting a logical necessity, this does not mean that we agree with the 
views of e.g. BLANSHARD and E W I N G . 1 5 6 In these views a theory-independent 
reality, 'shot through with necessities', is presupposed and this is as unaccept-
able as the thesis that there are contingent regularities in an observer-independ-
ent reality. Empirical knowledge is not knowledge of such an independent 
reality, but of a theoretically or conceptually co-constituted reality. I shall 
therefore not further examine these views, but instead turn to Kneale's view. 1 5 7 
2. PHYSICAL NECESSITY 
The discussion in ch. Ill, section 3, of the raven-example has already given 
an idea of Kneale's view of empirical laws, but we shall briefly restate it here. 
Suppose that certain birds, called dodos, only lived between 1500 A.D. and 
1800 A.D. and suppose that every one had a white feather in its tail. Now 'all, 
dodos have a white feather in their tail' is a true universal synthetic statement 
and within the regularity view it should count as a law, according to K N E A L E 1 5 8 
(he takes the regularity view without its appeal to a theoretical context; cf. ch. 
Ill, section 3). But this dodo-statement does not enable us to assert a corres-
ponding counterfactual conditional, as laws are generally taken to do. The 
reason for this is, in Kneale's view, that this statement only asserts a regularity 
of actual instances and says nothing about possible but unrealized cases (cf. 
note 131). This statement may very well assert an historical accident, but a law 
must be more than the report of a factual regularity, it must also assert some-
thing about the unrealized possibilities if we want to account for counterfactual 
reasoning. 
The example of the raven-statement, discussed earlier, amounts to the same: 
a law formulates a stronger then purely extensional connection (cf. SCHEFFLER 
in note 70). 
A law, then, is a principle of necessitation: if '(x)(Ax->Bx)' is a law, then it is 
impossible for an A-thing not to be B. A law sets limits to what is possible. 1 5 9 
And then it can be understood that a law is the basis of counterfactual reasoning. 
The question, however, how the underlying concept of necessity or of neces-
sary connection should be further explained is not taken very seriously by 
KNEALE: "In fact, the word 'necessity' is the least troublesome of those with 
which we have to deal in this part of philosophy. For it has the same sense as 
elsewhere. A principle of necessitation is a boundary of possibility, and we 
know quite well how possibility is bounded from consideration of such cases 
as the incompatibility of redness and greenness".1 6 0 But this is not satisfactory: 
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the necessity of such statements as 'no red thing is also green' should first be 
analysed, in the way it has been done, for example, in ch. I, section 4, but 
KNEALE takes this necessity for granted or, as fundamental (note 160) or, as 
intuitively clear. 
POPPER has made a much greater effort to explain physical necessity than 
KNEALE has done and I shall now consider their discussion.161 
POPPER, whose objection to KNEALE is that he renders himself guilty of essen-
tialism 1 6 2, a point that will not be considered here, also says that a law is a 
boundary to what is possible, or that it forbids certain events to happen. 1 6 3 
He proposed the following definition of 'physically necessary': "A statement 
may be said to be naturally or physically necessary if, and only if, it is deducible 
from a statement function which is satisfied in all worlds that differ from our 
world, if at all, only with respect to initial conditions".1 6 4 We may explain this 
using his own example which is similar to the dodo-example of KNEALE. 
Suppose that within a certain period of time, and only at that time, moas lived 
only in New Zealand, and suppose that they all died before reaching the age 
of fifty, now 'all moas die before reaching the age of fifty' is a true synthetic 
universal statement (it is strictly universal in Popper's terminology; note 99). 
Nevertheless, it is not a law, but an accidental universal, because, as POPPER 
states it, "it would be possible for a moa to live longer, and it is only due to 
accidental or contingent conditions (cf. Kneale's historical accident) - such as 
the co-presence of a certain virus - that in fact no moa did live longer". 1 6 5 In 
another possible world, different from ours only in initial conditions, e.g. a 
world in which the mentioned virus would not be present, this statement about 
moas might well be false. Only if this statement were true in all possible worlds, 
different from ours only in the mentioned way, would it count as an empirical 
law. This also explains why the moa-statement does not permit the deduction of 
e.g. 'if this had been a moa, it would have died before reaching the age of 
fifty', for this possible moa could live in a different possible world in which it 
could easily have reached the age of, say, seventy. Like KNEALE, POPPER also 
connects the concept of law with the notion of its validity for possible events.1 6 6 
However, this definition directly confronts us with the question as to what 
we should understand by a 'possible world', different from ours only with 
respect to initial conditions. KNEALE, and also NERLICH and SUCHTING, de-
scribe these worlds as those in which the same properties and relations can be 
found as in our actual world, but in which the initial conditions may be differ-
ent. 1 6 7 POPPER also characterises such a world as one in which the same empir-
ical laws hold as in our world. 1 6 8 
Two objections can be raised, and have indeed been raised by NERLICH and 
SUCHTING 1 6 9 , against such a description of a possible world. First, it does not 
agree with Popper's definition of 'physically necessary', just given. For suppose 
that in our world, W,, the laws L are valid, that one of the initial conditions is 
the co-presence of a certain virus (C^, and that the moa-statement, M, is true. 
In a possible world, W2, the laws L hold, but Ct is supposed to be false. Now 
what about M ? When we say that M is false in W2, then W2 does not differ 
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from Wj in the way required by the definition, i.e. only in the initial conditions, 
but also with respect to M. W2 is then not a possible world as intended by 
Popper's definition. In fact, this definition only counts as possible worlds those 
worlds in which M is true, as is the case in Wt. But then M is a law, while the 
definition was intended to qualify M as an accidental statement. The definition 
appears to have no discriminating force at all. 
To meet this first objection, POPPER proposed a revised definition of physical 
necessity170, but this revised definition does not meet with the second objection 
to be examined in a moment and, as POPPER later remarked, his reply to this 
first objection was not satisfactory and we shall therefore not discuss this 
revision here. 1 7 1 
The second objection against his definition has also been stated by POPPER 
himself: the definition seems to become circular when we describe a possible 
world as one in which the same laws hold as in our actual world. For in that 
case the concept 'possible world' from the definiens presupposes the concept of 
law which, in its turn, presupposes the concept of physical necessity, which is 
the definiendum.172 POPPER does not take this to be a serious objection, because 
in this sense all definitions are circular. Circularity is only disastrous in the case 
of technical circularity i.e. in cases where an understanding of some term from 
the definiens goes straight back to the term to be defined. And this is not the 
case here: "the definiens operates with a perfectly clear intuitive idea - that of 
varying the initial conditions of our world". 1 7 3 In other words, the notion of 
different possible or accidental or contingent initial conditions should be taken 
as intuitively clear and may then be used to define 'physical necessity'; or the 
notion of possible initial conditions may adequately do the job of a primitive. 
But the appeal to intuition always leaves the possibility open of the discussion 
partner honestly not understanding what is intended. And, to be honest, I 
do not share the clear intuition POPPER seems to have with respect to this vary-
ing of initial conditions. In fact, I am not even sure of what has to be understood 
by initial conditions themselves. Intuitively, I would say that an initial condi-
tion is a fact or event that is not physically necessary but accidental, and in 
that case we have to deal with a genuine technical circularity. 
However, apart from the appeal to intuition, there is a more fundamental 
point involved, which has not received any attention as far as I know. We can 
make this point clear with some examples. Is 'all water boils at 212°F' accident-
al because it is not true in a world in which the pressure deviates from 1 atm.; 
must we refuse to call 'copper is a good electrical conductor' a law, because it is 
not true in a world in which the temperature is very high; etc.? The possible 
reply that, in these cases, we have not to do with initial conditions as they are 
intended by POPPER, would, of course, only strengthen the point I want to 
make, namely that the intuitive idea of initial conditions is not quite as clear as 
POPPER would make us believe. If the conditions referred to in the examples 
are not the Popperian initial conditions, what then are they? Necessary initial 
conditions perhaps? But then not physically necessary, unless one is prepared 
to accept a technical circularity once more. 
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Once again we meet with the problem of initial conditions or relevant (and 
irrelevant) circumstances, a problem which is not solved within the physical 
necessity view of KNEALE and POPPER. I think there is no law that is not connect-
ed with certain specific conditions, or that does not require the fulfilment of 
certain relevant circumstances for its applicability. Therefore the independence 
from initkl conditions of a statement, that is its being true in all possible worlds 
different from ours only in initial conditions (taking this expression for a 
moment for granted), can never supply a criterion of lawlikeness. I think that 
NAGEL, in this respect, is nearer to the truth than POPPER when he leaves room 
for the possibility of a statement being lawlike (e.g. 'all ravens are black'), even 
if it would perhaps not be true under certain conditions (e.g. in the case of the 
exposure of some generations of ravens to X-ray radiation of a certain intensity). 
But the proponents of the regularity view, including NAGEL, as well as those 
of the physical necessity view (e.g. KNEALE and POPPER) all fail to answer the 
fundamental question: What is the connection between a law and the circum-
stances required by that law; and how can we know this? 
If the proponents of the physical necessity view do not want to acknowledge 
such conditions as the pressure, the temperature, the presence of enough 0 2 , 
the presence of X-ray radiation, etc., as conditions of the same kind as the 
presence of a certain virus in the moa-period, they should formulate a criterion 
of distinguishing between these two kinds of conditions without becoming 
involved in the unacceptable circularity. As long as this has not been done they 
cannot use physical necessity as a criterion of distinguishing between accidental 
and lawlike universals. Neither Popper's appeal to the notion of initial condi-
tions, which should be intuitively clear, nor Kneale's reference to the incompati-
bility of redness and greenness, which should be intuitively clear, offers 
a sufficiently clear explication of the concept of physical necessity. Of course, 
we may, at some time, make use of concepts which are taken to be clear enough, 
but I think that we may make some progress in the analysis of the concept of 
law when we start from the notion of a necessary connection as it has been 
developed in ch. I. And then we do not any longer speak of a necessity in an 
independent reality, but of a necessity in a conceptually co-constituted empirical 
world. It is then such a conceptual system that provides us with a norm for 
judging the circumstances. 
3. RESCHER'S VIEW 
Rescher's view of laws 1 7 4 will be discussed separately because it introduces a 
new element in the discussion which I regard as important. 
A lawlike statement (Rescher's term is 'lawful') can be distinguished from 
an accidental statement by its nomic or physical necessity, which manifests 
itself particularly in its hypothetical force. This necessity introduces the element 
of inevitability: if '(x)(Ax->Bx)' is a law and a certain thing is A, then it must 
be B. By 'hypothetical force' RESCHER refers to the fact that a law supports 
corresponding counterfactual conditionals.173 This has also been said by 
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POPPER and KNEALE, but in connection with the question how an empirical 
generalisation, which, as such, is nothing else than the formulation of a de facto 
regularity, becomes lawlike or acquires nomic necessity and hypothetical force, 
RESCHER introduces the new element, mentioned before. There is neither a 
deductively sufficient nor an inductively sufficient evidential basis of lawlikeness: 
"The basic fact of the matter - and it is a fact whose importance cannot be 
overemphasized - is that the elements of nomic necessity and hypothetical 
force are not to be extracted from the evidence: they are not discovered on some 
basis of observed fact at all - they are supplied. The realm of hypothetical 
counterfact is inaccessible to observational or experimental exploration. Law-
fulness is not found in or extracted from the evidence, it is superadded to it. 
Lawfulness is a matter of imputation: when an empirical generalization is 
designated as a law, this epistemological status is imputed to i t " . 1 7 6 This 
imputation comes down to the accommodation of an empirical generalisation 
within the system of knowledge or within a conceptual system or theory. At a 
certain moment we decide to rank an empirical generalisation with respect to 
other laws in a theoretical system. And it is this fact that renders a universal 
statement lawlike. The individual properties of a statement in isolation, i.e. 
its form (it must be of universal form, it must not contain individual constants 
essentially, etc.) and its evidential basis (its being confirmed by an exceptionless 
series of positive instances) (for these two factors cf. ch. in) are not/enough. A 
third factor, namely its being taken up into a theory, plays a crucial role and 
this factor is imputed to the statement, which comes to be accepted as a law. 1 7 7 
Once such a status has been imputed to an empirical generalisation, it is law-
like ; it is then marked by nomic necessity and hypothetical force. 
This imputation, however, is not a matter of random choice or personal pre-
dilection. The shift in meaning of a sentence of universal form from expressing 
an empirical generalisation to expressing a lawlike statement, or a statement of 
a necessary connection, is not a matter of convention or arbitrary decision. 
(Compare what has been said about this shift in meaning at the end of section 1. 
Ayer's view is clearly rejected by RESCHER). The imputation is a decision, but it 
must have an empirical grounding in the evidence for the empirical generalisa-
tion upon which lawlikeness comes to be imputed, and in the theoretical context 
in which this generalisation comes to be taken up. Lawlikeness is imputed to an 
empirical generalisation, which has been confirmed by an exceptionless series 
of positive instances, on the basis of theoretical considerations: "Lawfulness 
is the product of the well-founded imputation to empirical generalisations of 
nomic necessity and hypothetical force". 1 7 8 
By introducing this decision by which necessity and hypothetical force are 
superadded to an empirical generalisation, RESCHER stands in radical opposi-
tion to the regularity view, the proponents of which also had their recourse, 
ultimately, to a 'third factor', i.e. being accommodated in a theory of an empiric-
al generalisation in order to count as a law (ch. Ill, section 3). But within R 
such an accommodation could never mean that that statement could acquire 
the character of necessity. 
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Let us now examine this view somewhat more closely. RESCHER himself says 
that his view agrees with that of HUME in that it states that lawlikeness can-
not be extracted from observational evidence. An extra factor (cf. Goodman's 
'organization'; note 133) is needed: the imputation, which is similar to Kant's 
view that lawlikeness is a matter of projection. However, RESCHER does not 
find the source of lawlikeness in the way in which the mind inherently works, 
but in the conceptual schemata that we in fact deploy for explanatory purposes. 
Lawlikeness is therefore mind-dependent.119 
It is this very point of mind-dependency which is at the same time the strong 
and the weak point of Rescher's view. It is the strong point because it indicates 
the direction in which a solution of the problem of lawlikeness can be found. 
It is weak, not because it is untenable, but because it does not go far enough and 
has thereby too much of an ad hoc status. There is, in Rescher's view, a mind-
independent and hence observer-independent reality, a nature which is in 
various respects regular 'an sich' and it would take a bold act of rashness to deny 
this. This regularity is an ontological fact; it is not man-made and it would be 
there even if there were no men or no rational minds (cf. note 5). These regular-
ities come to be formulated in empirical generalisations as isolated and theory-
independent statements (cf. ch. I, section 1). 
On the other hand, laws are the result of the imputation of necessity and 
hypothetical force to such empirical, generalisations, by which they come 
to be embedded in the conceptual system at hand, which is used for explanation. 
Regularities are, according to RESCHER, mind-independent and theory-
independent and they exist in an independent world. Laws, however, are man-
made, mind-dependent and indissolubly bound to a theory; they do not exist in 
a mindless universe.180 But if RESCHER now says that laws admit of no excep-
tions 1 8 1 (and we can agree with this), we must apparently assume that the 
underlying regularities, with their 'objective' status, are also without exceptions. 
But then RESCHER should have faced the fact that in scientific practice (and it is 
the same scientific practice that RESCHER appeals to in connection with hypothe-
tical or counterfactual reasoning!), one frequently seems to encounter excep-
tions to a 'regularity'. When we speak of regularities as 'given' independently 
from our theories or concepts and we simply become aware of them in direct 
observation, then there seems to be hardly any exceptionless regularity. At 
best we could then speak of such scientifically uninteresting regularities as 'all 
gold cubes are smaller than 10 m 3 ' , for these seem at the same time to be 
theory-independent and without exceptions. But regularities which could be 
taken to underly lawlike statements, such as 'all water boils at 2 1 2 ° F . ' and 
'copper is a good electrical conductor' are, taken as theory-independent state-
ments, certainly not without exceptions. When we view this point historically, 
we might say that at a time when the scientific theory of boiling phenomena 
was not yet available, so that no accommodation of an empirical generalisation 
could be made, there were many exceptions to the empirical generalisation 'all 
water boils at 2 1 2 ° F . ' ; and before the discovery of electricity, pieces of copper 
sometimes conducted electricity badly (Nagel's example); etc. So, what could be 
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these regularities, and hence these empirical generalisations, which are taken to 
be empirically well confirmed by an exceptionless series of positive instances, 
to which RESCHER, is referring? One cannot appeal to relevant circumstances 
because this would imply that one already had made the statement in question 
lawlike or normative, so that these relevant circumstances could be discovered; 
or this would imply that theory formation up to a certain level had already taken 
place. As long as one views regularities as theory independently given things, this 
appeal to circumstances is forbidden. 
We are drawn back to the problem of the circumstances and we find no syste-
matic treatment of it in Rescher's theory.1 8 2 The presupposition of there being 
empirical generalisations asserting a regularity in a theory-independent reality 
upon which, then, lawlikeness is imputed, cannot be upheld, in my view. 
Like all proponents of the regularity view, RESCHER takes some intuitive con-
cept of regularity for granted and, as I have already remarked in connection 
with R, it is a great shortcoming of Rescher's view that it does not present an 
analysis of this crucial concept and thereby no analysis of the notion of relevant 
circumstances. 
In my opinion, such an analysis would reveal that the establishing of a 
regularity usually also requires the imputational step of RESCHER. It requires the 
formation of a theoretical context or the formation of a theory in which the 
universal statement, asserting this regularity, is then automatically taken up. It 
requires a theory formation to which we were forced by exceptions, taken as 
genuine exceptions on the basis of the universal statement which has been made 
lawlike or normative. Of course, this does not lead to a restoring of a law as 
mind-independent or as a 'purely objective' statement. On the contrary, it 
leads to the view that a law asserts a regularity as a necessary connection not 
in an observer-independent reality, but in a conceptually co-constituted (if 
you like mind-dependent) empirical reality. 
I think it is correct to say that my view, which will be explained in the next 
chapter, follows the same general direction as Rescher's, but that it is taken 
much further and that the result is essentially different from his view. By 
recognising negative instances as genuine exceptions, I try to give an answer to 
the Goodmannian question as to why and when the imputation of lawlikeness 
takes place, such an imputation implying in my view the formation of the very 
theory in which the law comes to be accommodated. I do not think that Res-
cher's view contains a satisfactory answer to this question since he does not 
acknowledge the all-important function of genuine exceptions. 
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V. THE C O N C E P T OF E M P I R I C A L LAW 
1. LAWLIKENESS OF LAWS 
In this final chapter I shall develop my own view of what an empirical law is. 
This will be done in a way similar to my analysis of the lawlikeness of empirical 
concepts explained in ch. I, sections 5 and 6. The same terminology will be 
used here. 
I shall start the exposition using an example, which is not intended as a 
description of historical facts, but which may serve to clarify the general ideas 
I have in mind. Let us imagine a situation in which no theory about boiling 
phenomena is available as is the case at present. We assume the existence of a 
Fahrenheit thermometer. We also assume that some facts about water are 
known, e.g. that it is a colourless and odourless liquid, and that it is also 
known that a certain quantity of a liquid boils when bubbles are formed 
throughout the liquid. 
Suppose that the temperature at which n samples of water start to boil is 
measured and that the results are (W = water, B x = boils at x °F.): 
W^ .B 2 1 2 - °at 
W a a B 2 1 1 ' 8 a 2 
Wa 3 .B 2 1 1 - 9a3 
Wa 4 .B 2 1 2> laA 
Wa 5 .B 2 1 2> 2 a 5 
Wa n .B 2 1 1- 9an 
When we now take an experimental error within a certain margin for granted 
(say, ± 0,2 °), this would seem to be the ideal result for a proponent of R. We 
have a constant conjunction or an exceptionless repetition of our samples 
being W and being B 2 1 2 . Via a process of inductive generalisation to all cases 
in the past, present and future, we arrive at: 
all water boils at 212 °F. 
or: all W is B 2 1 2 . 
Such an empirical generalisation, based on an exceptionless repetition, is 
also needed in Rescher's view because it constitutes that to which lawlikeness 
may be imputed. 
Such an exceptionless regularity, in other words, is the ideal of both the 
regularity view and a necessity view. But however natural this view may seem, 
it will prove to be entirely inadequate if we desire to understand what empirical 
laws are. 
The statement arrived at above, i.e. 'all W is B 2 1 2 ' , is very much like the 
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statement 'all ravens are black' or 'all gold cubes are smaller than 10 m 3 ', 
and it may at the time of its formulation very well be the expression of an 
historical accident, possibly on a cosmic scale. It is an empirical generalisation 
to which no exceptions are known and it is therefore not armed against negative 
instances. This is, I think, the point of greatest importance. What will be our 
reaction towards an observation of a negative instance? This is a very urgent 
question in connection with the analysis of the concept of empirical law. The 
answer of a persistent positivist or proponent of the regularity view would 
surely be that the empirical generalisation has been falsified, that the negative 
instance is a falsification and the regularity in nature, as it was supposed to 
exist, simply appears not to exist. Now, in this view the statement 'all W is B 2 1 2 ' , 
not being armed against negative instances, becomes directly vulnerable to such 
a case. Hence it cannot in any way support corresponding retrodictions, 
predictions or counterfactuals, simply because these could supply, or could 
have supplied, those negative instances against which it has not yet been armed. 
Therefore such empirical generalisations are quite barren and scientifically 
uninteresting. 
However, in scientific practice, negative instances play a completely different 
and even fundamental role (and, fortunately, the proponent of R is not as 
consistent as he was taken to be a moment ago, although this does imply the 
inadequacy of his regularity view). In order to elucidate what has just been 
said, let us now see what happens in the case of a negative instance. 
Suppose a scientist to observe: 
Wc.B 2 1 6 o 
When confronted with such a result the empirical generalisation is not rejected 
on the grounds of such an observation. The scientist does not regard this as a 
falsification, but as a genuine exception, enabling him to establish 'all Wis £212' 
as a law, or, enabling him to arm the generalisation against negative instances. 
But to do this he first has to change the epistomological status of the state-
ment. He takes it as necessary that water boils at 212°F. and on this basis he 
views 'Wa.B 2 1 6a' as a genuine exception. In other words, he takes 'all W is 
B 2 1 2 ' as the formulation of a necessary connection or, he makes this statement 
lawlike. 
Without such a norm he could never face his observational result as an 
exception; without such a norm it would count as a falsification and thereby 
as normal a case as e.g. 'Wa k .B 2 1 2 > °ak\ He would have no problem, but then 
neither would he be able to discover a law. 
Now this lawlikeness is imputed to a statement, to borrow Rescher's term, 
but we have to keep in mind that there is not, first of all, the statement of an 
empirical generalisation, based on an exceptionless repetition, to which, after-
wards, lawlikeness is superadded. On the contrary, it is the very occurrence of 
a negative instance that seems to break the regularity which constitutes the 
occasion for the imputation of lawlikeness. Sticking to the evidence only, there 
is no regularity without exceptions, which RESCUER supposes to exist in a mind-
independent world. The same objection could also be applied to GEURTS. There 
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is not, as he maintains, first of all, a synthetic universal statement of which a 
great number of positive instances and no negative instances are known, which 
is later taken to be analytic or necessary. On the contrary, observed negative 
instances constitute the occasion for taking the statement to be the formulation 
of a necessary connection. It is by means of such an imputation of lawlikeness, 
which is an ad hoc manoeuvre, that the scientist keeps open the road to a 
better understanding of the observed phenomena. If he keeps to the observa-
tional results, he would block this road and he could at best say that water very 
often boils at 212°F., but that it may also boil at 216°F., and that there is 
nothing more to say. Of course, the ad hoc conjecture that water must boil 
at 212 °F. does not by itself yield this better understanding, but it is a first step 
towards it. The confirmation of this lawlike statement, and thereby the establish-
ing of an empirical law, can be gained by on-going concept or theory formation 
on the basis of further empirical inquiry. Such a dynamic process should remove 
this ad hoc character since the conjecture is an integral part of the extended or 
newly formed theoretical framework. And the scientist should then be able, 
through observing by means of this theory, to see the earlier genuine exception 
as a normal or explainable case. If he succeeds in doing this, he has really esta-
blished an empirical law which has been armed against certain negative instances 
and which then enables him to make retrodictions and predictions, and it 
forms a basis for counterfactuals. 
Now, after this first step, a second step must necessarily follow, else no better 
understanding would be gained either and the scientist in question could just 
as well have taken the negative instance as a direct falsification. He then 
formulates a new conjecture: in order to obtain the correct (!) boiling tempera-
ture of a liquid, the liquid must be pure. In other words, he states a connection 
between the boiling temperature of a liquid and its purity. In other words, he 
claims that the purity is a relevant circumstance for the determination of the 
boiling temperature of a liquid. And indeed he finds that if sugar is dissolved in 
sample a, the result is different; it is an exception. He continues his investiga-
tion, trying to establish a quantitative relationship between the concentration 
of a solution (possibly a new concept) and the increase of boiling point (a new 
concept), a phenomenon he has now learned to observe, and which he could 
not observe before. He may find positive instances of this quantitative relation, 
but also negative ones. By taking the latter as genuine exceptions he may dis-
cover ionization phenomena, which caused the exceptional or abnormal 
rise in boiling point (and again he forms a new concept of new phenomena). 
But he will also meet with exceptions to the conjecture that the boiling point 
of a liquid is increased by dissolving a certain chemical compound in it (a 
qualitative relation): he may e.g. establish that the addition of AgCl to water 
does not cause an increase of the boiling point; he is bound to discover pseudo-
solutions and colloids and at the same time will form a more precise concept of 
solution. And so on. 
Negative instances, which cannot be reduced to normal cases, even when they 
are observed through the extended or newly formed conceptual system, may 
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then occur. A sample of water heated at the top of the Mont Blanc may be pure, 
yet it will not boil at 212 °F., but at some lower temperature. Again this is not 
taken as a falsification, but as a genuine exception initiating further theory 
formation. 
A first ad hoc conjecture might be that the height is a relevant circumstance. 
And indeed, when the same sample is brought to the boil in a laboratory in 
Wageningen, it boils at 212,1 °F. There is no beaten road to 'the true' conjec-
ture. And it may take a long time before one discovers that the conjecture leads 
to a piling up of adhocness, so that it is at last rejected. One should try again and 
the pressure is then established as a relevant circumstance and new concepts like 
'vapour pressure', 'partial pressure', etc., are formed. In such a way the result 
of the Mont Blanc experiment becomes normal within the context of the newly 
extended conceptual system. It would now even be abnormal if that sample 
boiled at 212 °F! 
Once again negative instances which cannot be explained may be observed, 
e.g. 
WZ>.B214- 5b. 
It may take him a very long time before he is able to understand this, the water 
being pure and the pressure normal, but the result being abnormal. 
The lawlike conjecture, however, is still not rejected on the basis of such 
isolated negative instances. We may have a sample of D 2 0 instead of H 2 0 , and 
the discovery of the hydrogen isotope deuterium is required in order to restore 
an understanding of this phenomenon (Urey, 1932). 
We shall not continue this very fragmentary and artificial reasoning. I think 
that what has just been said is enough to make the idea clear, if we keep in 
mind what has been said in sections 5 and 6 of ch. I about the lawlikeness 
of concepts. 
We may summarize this in a schematic way, and at the same time generalise it. 
i. Knowing A and B to be mutually independent concepts, one may on the 
basis of 
Atfi .Bo!, Aa 2 .Ba 2 , , Aan.Ban 
by induction arrive at 
All A's are B's. 
As long as no theory has been formed in which this statement comes to be 
embedded, it has the same status as statements like 'all ravens are black' and 
'all gold cubes are smaller than 10 m 3'. That is to say, it may just as well be an 
assertion of an historical accident on a cosmic scale; it does not supply any 
better understanding of the phenomena which have been observed (i.e. an 
exceptionless repetition) than the finite series of conjunctions does; it does not 
enable retrodiction, prediction or the assertion of a counterfactual because it 
has not been confronted with negative instances and therefore not been armed 
against them. Such an empirical generalisation is quite barren, it leads nowhere. 
ii. Contrary to the positivist ideal of exceptionless regularities (also presupposed 
by proponents of a necessity view), negative instances are exactly what are 
needed for the formulation of an empirical law. In order to reach an understand-
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ing of the observed phenomena, one should wait for, or rather look out for 
negative instances (in accordance with Popper's view as against the inductivists). 
Fortunately, exceptionless repetition is nearly always absent in scientific prac-
tice. The search for negative instances is nearly always a succesful undertaking. 
It is even true to say that it is usual for negative instances to be present from the 
very beginning. 
iii. There are, therefore, two cases that do not differ in principle. First, there 
is a situation in which an empirical generalisation, based on an exception-
less series of positive instances plus induction, happens to be confronted with a 
negative instance. 
Second, the situation may be such that an irregularity is observed from the 
beginning, and in this case there is not, first of all, an empirical generalisation. 
But it happens to be the case that neither the negative instances of the first 
case, nor the irregularity of the second, prevent the scientist from asserting a 
universal statement. If he were to take the negative instances of the first case as 
falsifications, or the irregularity of the second case as a sign of the absence of 
regularity, he would deprive himself of the possibility of reaching a better 
understanding of the phenomena he can observe through the concepts he has 
formed before. This would in fact mean abandoning science. He could at best 
arrive at unfertile empirical generalisations when adopting such a methodologic-
al point of view. 
iv. The real scientist will, in the first case, ascribe lawlikeness to the generalisa-
tion or take it to be the expression of a necessary connection; and, in the 
second case, he will formulate a lawlike conjecture, in spite of the negative 
instances it has to face from the very beginning. On such a basis he will regard 
the negative instances as genuine exceptions. He knows that such an ad hoc 
manoeuvre opens the possibility to reach a better understanding. 
v. It is by means of the discovery of new relevant circumstances and the forma-
tion of new concepts or the extension of the 'old' conceptual system, that the 
ad hoc character of the lawlike conjecture is removed. In such a way an empir-
ical law comes to be confirmed, not as an isolated universal statement that 
may survive the eventual demise of the theory, but as the statement of a regular-
ity being a necessary connection within that theory which was formed in esta-
blishing the law. 
The genuine exceptions then have been turned into normal cases, explainable 
by means of the theory available by now, in particular by the appeal to normal 
or relevant circumstances which are laid down in that theory. These relevant 
circumstances came to be known in the same process of theory formation in 
which the law was established and the law and 'its' circumstances are therefore 
indissolubly connected within that theory. 
The law is now a universal statement that has been armed against negative 
instances. It is not the formulation of an historical accident, possibly on a 
cosmic scale, but it sets a boundary to possibilities and it may thereby perform 
its function in scientific prediction, in retrodiction and in supporting counter-
factuals. 
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vi. An empirical law, then, may indeed be characterized as the formulation of a 
regularity, but this is a regularity that is shaped by the theory in which the law 
has been taken up, or, to put it more clearly, it is the formulation of a regularity 
as a necessary connection. 
In the same way that all empirical data are modeled (FEYERABEND) by some 
theory, a regularity is also modeled by a theory, viz. that theory in which the 
law that asserts it is embedded. The regularity can only be observed as a 
regularity through that theory by which it has been co-constituted. It is therefore 
completely inconceivable that a law could be an isolated statement. The sugges-
tion of, e.g. NAGEL and BRAITHWAITE (compare ch. Ill, section 3) that a univers-
al statement counts as a law when it "occupies a distinctive position in the system 
of explanations in some area of knowledge" (NAGEL) is correct. But it is also 
true that genuine exceptions, and therefore necessary connections, are needed 
somewhere in the on-going inquiry in order to form the very theory in which the 
universal statement is accommodated, which makes it a law and which lays down 
the relevant circumstances. Genuine exceptions enable the scientist to jump to 
new concepts and the formation of the required theory. 
At this stage we must return to our example and examine the question when 
the ad hoc character of the original lawlike conjecture, i.e. that water must boil 
at 212°F., can be dismissed. We have examined the analogous question in con-
nection with the lawlikeness of colour concepts in ch. I. 
Is it not true, one might ask, that only a shift of the ad hoc character to 
other conjectures has taken place, and hence that the original conjecture can 
never be taken to be definitively confirmed? 
At a particular moment we met with a negative instance, 'Wa.B 2 1 V, and 
viewed it as a genuine exception, conjecturing that a was not a sample of pure 
water, and we called this a case of the increase of boiling point. In other words, 
the exception was given a name, in the same way as the exception in ch. I, 
section 5, was called 'colour blind' and the exception in ch. I, section 6, 'phos-
phorescence'. But, of course, naming by itself does not solve any problem. The 
on-going investigation then led to theories of ionization and colloids, a number 
of new phenomena was discovered and many new concepts were formed. 
But does not this simply mean a shift of ad hocness? I think we should here 
give the same answer as that given in ch. I. When we take the theoretical system 
as a system of explanations for doing normal science, the answer is a definite 
"no". In that case, the boiling point of water is a means for determining the 
purity of a sample of water; the relation A T = A . ^ (AT = the increase of 
boiling point, C == concentration, M = molecular weight) is used to determine 
the molecular weight of a certain compound, or the degree of ionization of a 
compound in a certain solvent; etc. 
At a particular moment, then, a conceptual system or theory acquires a 
relatively closed status or a great stability. It makes normal science possible by 
providing its norm. It enables us to observe and explain many empirical pheno-
mena which we could not understand, and of which we could not even be aware 
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without this theory. Internally, to use the same term we used in ch. I, i.e. looking 
at the theory from within, it is a well-confirmed system of lawlike connections, 
excluding or forbidding certain events to happen. But externally, viewing the 
theory as a stage in an on-going inquiry, it has 'open ends' everywhere. This 
means that there is no guarantee whatsoever, that new genuine exceptions can 
be continually accounted for, or be explained by the system at hand or by an 
extension of it, i.e. without the dissolution of certain necessary connections. 
Such exceptions may occur at all levels; with respect to the most advanced 
as well as less advanced statements. 
The fact should, however, be noticed that even if we view a theory in this way, 
it is taken to have a relative stability; it then functions as a take-off point towards 
new concepts, laws and theories. 
2. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THIS VIEW 
I now want to compare this view with the regularity and necessity view. I 
shall do this by examining a few crucial concepts. For the sake of clarity, I 
want to formulate my view very briefly: 
an empirical law asserts a regularity as the necessary connection between 
two or more concepts, and hence also between the empirical data which 
are co-constituted by these concepts, 
i. The concept of regularity. 
The proponents of the regularity view make use of a concept of regularity 
which is not further analysed, but taken to be intuitively clear: regularities can be 
directly, i.e. independently of a theory, observed as a series of conjunctions. 
When GOODMAN appeals to an 'organization effected by the use of language', 
he does so in order to distinguish between those regularities which give rise to 
lawlike universal statements and those which do not. He does not appeal to an 
organization in order to co-constitute regularities themselves because these are 
taken to be given independently, using the rather naive notion of regularity. 
POPPER is much nearer to the truth when he says: "The kind of repetition 
envisaged by Hume can never be perfect; the cases he has in mind cannot be 
cases of perfect sameness; they can only be cases of similarity. Thus they are 
repetitions only from a certain point of view. But this means that, for logical 
reasons, there must always be a point of view-such as a system of expectations, 
anticipations, or interests - before there can beany repetition; which point of 
view, consequently, cannot be merely the result of repetition."183 What POPPER 
in fact says here is that a regularity is co-constituted by the theory through which 
it can only be observed. The regularity is present only when it is observed from 
the required point of view. The regularity only allows itself to be observed when 
it is observed in the appropriate way. But Popper's view suggests that there is, 
temporally, first a theory or point of view which is then followed by the regular-
ity, while, according to my view, these should not be separated in this way. The 
formation of the theory which is required for the observation of a repetition is, 
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at the same time, the co-constitution of that regularity, as the formation of an 
empirical concept is, at the same time, the co-constitution of those date of 
which the concept is formed and to which it can be applied afterwards. Of 
course, such a process entails 'illogical' steps, but if one wants to do justice to 
the growth of science one should fully recognize such steps. 
We may then say that the regularity expressed by an empirical law is a regular-
ity co-constituted by the theory, through which it can be observed, as a necessary 
connection between certain empirical data. The organizing factor is not a means 
of distinguishing between two kinds of given regularities, but it is the factor that 
co-constitutes them. When explicated in this way, Nagel's and Braithwaite's 
appeal to a theory as a criterion of distinguishing between accidental and law-
like universals is justified, but I doubt whether they had such an explication in 
mind, since they adhere to direct or theory-free observation. 
Although I agree with Rescher's view in many respects, I disagree with his 
presupposition of there being regularities in an observer-independent reality. 
I agree that lawlikeness is a matter of imputation, but this imputation has to be 
explicated, in my view, as the co-constitution of a regularity as a necessary con-
nection. There is not, and I want to repeat this, first of all a given regularity, 
expressed in an empirical generalisation, upon which lawlikeness is then imput-
ed by accommodating it within a theory. The co-constitution of a regularity as 
a necessary connection implies the formation of the theory in which the law, 
asserting such a regularity, occupies a distinctive position. This determines the 
'epistemic commitment' we make to a law, and to which RESCHER rightly 
draws attention: the laws come to be armed against negative instances and they 
are to certain extent (see below) 'justifiably regarded as immune to rejection in 
the face of hypothetical considerations'.184 Laws are indeed man-made, as 
RESCHER has said. But I want to add that this is true only because they assert 
regularities which, being necessary connections, also have to be taken as man-
made. 
ii. The concept of necessity. 
I hope it will be clear, that the necessity, which is claimed as an essential 
characteristic of a law, is not a necessity in a 'mindless' universe. When I 
say that an empirical law asserts a necessary connection, I am referring to a 
necessary connection in a conceptually or theoretically co-constituted empirical 
world. The necessary connections laid down in empirical laws are bound to a 
theoretical context and thereby to particular circumstances which are called 
relevant by their being bound to such lawlike connections. In the empirical 
world it is necessary that water, under normal circumstances, boils at 212 °F., 
but it is equally necessary that a sample of water in which some NaCl has been 
dissolved boils at a higher temperature, or that a sample of water to which 
some AgCl has been added boils at 212 °F., or that water boils at a temperature 
below 212 °F. at the top of the Mont Blanc. 
The necessity of laws is a necessity within the theoretical framework in which 
those laws are indissolubly taken up. Therefore, the negation of those laws would 
be completely ununderstandable or unintelligible, as HANSON says. 1 8 5 The 
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revision of a law would make a more or less drastic conceptual change necessary, 
so that the phenomena, which could be observed and explained by the theory 
of which the law is an essential part, cannot any longer be observed and explain-
ed in what way. A law cannot simply be replaced by an alternative universal 
statement because the system in which it occurs has not been constructed to 
accommodate that alternative. On the contrary, it will exclude the accommoda-
tion of such an alternative. In this sense a law is necessary, not as an isolated 
unit, but as a statement within a theory, and in this sense it sets limits to what 
is possible (KNEALE) or forbids certain events to happen (POPPER). 
To accept a theory or, better perhaps, to form a theory, implies the establish-
ing of laws as asserting necessary connections because these determine the 
theory to be what it in fact is. Once a theory is formed, normal science has been 
made possible, i.e. science guided by the theory and its laws, functioning as the 
norms of that activity. 
Does it follow that laws are analytic statements? I think it follows, if we 
adopt the notion of analyticity proposed by GRICE and STRAWSON in their 
defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction against Quine's attack. If we adopt 
the notion of 'analyticity within a conceptual scheme', as it has been called by 
GRICE and STRAWSON, we are fully justified in calling a law an analytic state-
ment (compare ch. IV, section 1): the revision of a law, i.e. the change of its 
truth-value from true to false, undoubtedly causes a conceptual change. 1 8 6 
When we are forced to revise 'all water boils at 212°F.', we would also be 
forced to re-form the concept of 'water' and along with it many other concepts 
within that theory of boiling phenomena from which the boiling point of water 
may also be inferred from statements about the energy which are based on the 
structure of the liquid. 
Analyticity in this sense, however, does not mean irrevisability come what 
may, nor the absence of any empirical or factual content. I have already men-
tioned this point several times and shall only briefly deal with it here. A law, as 
the statement of a necessary connection, has an empirical content since it co-
constitutes part of the empirical world, known in science, but the results of 
on-going investigation ('what may come') may force us to dissolve lawlike 
connections and thereby to form an alternative theory co-constituting another 
empirical reality. 
This means that we should not oppose statements about the meaning of a 
word, in which 'the linguistic component is all that matters' 1 8 7, to statements 
about facts. This opposition should be dropped. 1 8 8 Once a theory, including 
empirical laws, has been formed, once a relatively stable situation has been 
reached, "scientists will cease to distinguish between its structure and that of 
the phenomena themselves", as HANSON put it. An empirical law is an analytic 
statement and asserts a necessary connection between empirical concepts, but it 
thereby asserts a necessary connection between the empirical data, which can 
only be observed as being those very data through these concepts. 
When we no longer oppose statements about the meaning of words to state-
ments about facts by emphasizing that the empirical world, known in science, is 
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always a conceptually or theoretically co-constituted world, we are able to 
see how a statement can have empirical content and at the same time be neces-
sary. The question "How could a statement be logically necessary or analytic 
and at the same time have empirical content?" only becomes rhetorical (as it 
is taken to be, e.g., by AYER, HAMLYN, WAISMANN) when the opposition be-
tween 'logical' and 'factual' is presupposed. 
We may now say that a law like 'copper is a good electrical conductor', to 
use Nagel's example, asserts that conductivity is a defining property of copper. 
This, however, should not be taken as a matter of convention. We are not free 
to settle the matter as we please, as AYER would make us believe. On the con-
trary, a scientist has to make the assumption that certain connections are 
necessary or lawlike if he wants to leave open the possibility for science to be 
a dynamic undertaking. If he maintains the possibility of our understanding the 
phenomena, he needs necessary connections and it can, therefore, not be a mat-
ter of 'take it or leave it'. The result of on-going investigation also confirms, 
with retrospective effect, the necessary connections that hold in the empirical 
world. We are, for example, not free to choose between 'it is necessary that 
water consists of H 2 0 ' and 'it is not necessary that water consists of H 2 0 ' 
(Ayer's example). We must choose the first alternative, else an integral part of 
our theories would be radically undermined. What would it, e.g., mean to talk 
about the boiling point of water when we are allowed to say that water consists 
of H 2 0 and N a + and Cl~ ions? What would be the sence of the statements 
about the cohesion energy of water? Many phenomena would then indeed 
become unintelligible. The 'method of conventionalizing' does not solve any 
methodological problem. In a way similar to the colour-blind person who is 
someone who does not understand what certain concepts mean, and not 
someone who refuses to join a convention (ch. I, section 5), a person who 
denies that water consists of H 2 0 is someone who does not understand certain 
parts of scientific theory and not someone who refuses to join a convention. 
When we say that a law asserts a necessary connection, does it mean that it 
is true in all possible worlds different from ours, if at all, only as regards initial 
conditions? If such a possible world is a world in which only a few of the rele-
vant circumstances of the law, known by means of the theory in which it is 
taken up, differ from those in the actual world, the answer should obviously be 
"Yes". For a law is that very statement that has been armed against possible 
negative instances brought about by a change of relevant circumstances. The 
theory in which the law has its place, is a theory about all such possible worlds. 
It is the theory that determines what these possible and impossible worlds are. 
A world in which water does not boil at 212°F. or in which copper is not a good 
electrical conductor is impossible, provided that the relevant circumstances are 
taken into account. By binding the law to the relevant circumstances, a theory 
determines a set of possible worlds, and these worlds should not be imagined as 
being theory-independent. This means that we cannot explain the concept of 
law using the concept of possible world, 
iii. The concept of confirmation. 
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My view on confirmation and falsification has already been stated in this 
inquiry. I shall now briefly summarize it and add some remarks about singular 
empirical conditionals, regardless of whether they be expressed in the indicative 
or the subjunctive mood. 
A law, being the formulation of a regularity as a necessary connection, comes 
to be confirmed as such by the success of on-going theory formation. It is estab-
lished as a law by the removal of the original ad hoc character, which means 
the formation of a theory that enables us to face the former genuine exceptions 
as normal cases, or the restoration of the possibility of normal science, i.e. 
science governed by this theory. Confirmation is, in this way, clearly a process 
of feedback; it is realized in such a way as to have a retrospective effect. 
Examples of such a way of confirmation, in which negative instances taken as 
genuine exceptions play a fundamental role, are well known. Leverrier's predic-
tion and discovery of Neptune to explain the genuine exception constituted by 
the abnormal (!) orbit of Uranus 1 8 9 constituted an excellent confirmation of 
the law that planets move in elliptical orbits around the sun, provided that no 
disturbing (!) forces are present, in which case the orbit cannot (or may not) 
be elliptical. Other examples are the discovery of certain chemical elements, 
using the theory of the periodical system as a norm; the discovery of the meson 
on the basis of the laws of conservation; Eddington's experiment as a confirma-
tion of Einstein's theory; and the artificial case of the discovery of the increase 
of the boiling point on the basis of our paradigm law. 1 9 0 
But there is no guarantee at all that on-going investigation will always lead 
to a positive result confirming the former ad hoc conjecture. An on-going in-
vestigation may remain without such a required result, as it may lead to mere 
piling up of ad hoc conjectures. Instead of reducing the exceptions to normal 
cases, more and more ad hoc conjectures have to be added leading to a result 
which is no longer intelligible. Instead of reaching a better understanding of 
the observed phenomena, any further investigation leads to a state of complete 
incomprehensibility. And in a way similar to the success of an on-going investi-
gation leading to a firm belief in the theory where we cannot but conceive and 
observe the empirical world to be as it is co-constituted by that theory, the 
failure of an on-going investigation makes us lose our confidence in the theory 
and thereby in the necessary connections asserted by the laws belonging to that 
theory. 
And here the genuine exceptions start to function as falsifications. An em-
pirical law may be falsified. This means that the necessary connection may be 
dissolved by the failure to reduce genuine exceptions to normal cases. What 
may come may then force us to give up the previously accepted conceptual 
framework, because this, at a certain time, may be the only way to restore 
the understanding of the phenomena considered. Sticking to the previously 
accepted theory may, in many cases, block the road to a better understanding. 
Evolutionary science will then not do any longer because a revolutionary alter-
native theory is needed to restore normal science. The accumulation of ad hoc 
conjectures to save the ether theory against the result of the Michelson-Morley 
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experiment is a good example: the contraction hypothesis of Lorentz and Fitz-
gerald remained an ad hoc conjecture. 
It should be noticed, however, that necessary connections are not dissolved 
and that the theory is not abandoned before the alternative, referred to above, 
has been formulated. Only then can a genuine exception be taken as a falsifica-
tion. Mercury's unexplained orbit, for example, existed for a long time alongside 
classical mechanics. Evolutionary science, although successful in the case of 
Uranus, did not lead to an understanding of this phenomenon. The conjecture 
of the existence of Vulcan could only be maintained by the formulation of 
additional ad hoc conjectures. Nevertheless, the theory was not dropped on this 
basis and only Einstein's theory could bring an end to this situation by restor-
ing understanding through a new conceptual framework. We may again quote 
HANSON, as we did in ch. I: "Should someone claim that he has a good reason 
for abandoning a theory T, but can suggest no alternative to T, no other way 
to form concepts about the phenomena T covers, I deny that he has good reasons 
for abandoning T ' . " 1 9 1 
Now, what are the consequences of this view of confirmation and falsification 
for the analysis of singular empirical conditionals in general (compare ch. Ill, 
section 2)? Such an analysis should make it clear what the grounds are on 
which a decision about the truth or falsity of these statements is founded. 
When we now try to do this, using 
if something is water then it boils at 212°F. (I) 
as a law and taking 
if this here is water then it boils at 212 °F. (II) 
as an example of a singular empirical conditional, the meaning of the concept 
'if-then' must be examined first. I want to propose the following: the empirical 
concept Hf-then', i.e. the concept 'if-then' as it is used in empirical reasoning, 
is a means for asserting a lawlike connection. 
The concept 'if-then' in general, may be used to express quite different things. 
It may be used to express a relation of entailment, or the making of a promise, 
or for threatening somebody, etc. 
In all cases the concept 'if-then' serves to convey that the parts connected 
by it (whether or not these could truly be called statements) 'have something 
to do with each other'. In a singular empirical conditional this notion of 'hav-
ing to do something with each other' can be explicated as 'connected in a lawlike 
manner within a certain conceptual system'. The empirical concept 'if-then' 
serves to tell us that the parts connected by it in an empirical conditional are 
lawlikely connected, if that conditional is true. This, now, is an intentional con-
nection that cannot be rendered tram-functionally. The empirical concept 'if-
then' may be said to have been designed to express such a lawlike connection. 
Hence, a singular empirical conditional is true when the lawlike connection 
which is intended by it, and which is applied by it to a particular case, obtains; 
and it is false when the intended connection does not obtain. Based on such an 
analysis it is completely irrelevant whether the conditional happens to be ex-
pressed in the indicative or in the subjunctive mood. 
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Now (II) is true, because the lawlike connection intended by (II), and applied 
to 'this here', obtains since (I) is a law. But, e.g., 
if this here is water then it boils at 190°F . 
is false, since the intended connection does not obtain: it is excluded by (I). 
It is interesting to compare some remarks quoted previously about the 
analysis of counterfactuals with what has just been said: "the truth of a state-
ment of this kind depends not upon the truth or falsity of the components but 
upon whether the intended connection obtains" (GOODMAN, quoted in ch. Ill, 
section 2, with respect to counterfactuals); "a counterfactual is true if a certain 
connection obtains between the antecedent and the consequent" (GOODMAN 
again, cf. note 116) ; "A subjunctive conditional is one such that we can know 
that the antecedent in some sense implies the consequent without knowing the 
truth-values of either" (CHISHOLM, note 116). All these remarks are valid for 
singular empirical conditionals in general, in which 'if-then' should be taken to 
express that 'intended connection', or that 'certain connection', or the 'in some 
sense implying', which has been identified as a lawlike connection, explicated 
in section 1 of this chapter. 
But what could then be the role of experimental evidence, e.g., of the so-called 
positive and negative instances? 
Let us consider different cases. Suppose the observation 
Wa.B212a (HI) 
to be true. We can infer from this 
W a ^ B 2 1 2 a 
and which is thus also true. But we cannot infer (II) from the conjunction (III). 
When we look upon this conjunction as the assertion of two isolated obser-
vational data, it does not have any confirmatory force as to the empirical 
conditional (II), let alone the law (I), but when we face it within the context of 
the theory in which (I) is taken up, taking care of the relevant circumstances as 
required by the law (I), we can say that our observational result is in conformity 
with the law (I); not that it confirms, but illustrates this law. 
Suppose we now observe 
~ W a (IV) 
to be true. We can logically infer from this the following: 
Wa->B212a 
Wa->B100a 
W a ^ ~ B 2 1 2 a 
etc. 
These logical consequences are also true. But we cannot infer (II) from (IV). 
This piece of evidence has no confirmatory force at all, nor could it be regarded 
as an illustration of (I), because that law has not been applied here. (II) is true 
because the intended connection obtains, which is formulated in (I), and, e.g., 
ifWathenB 1 0°a 
is false, because the intended connection does not obtain, since it is excluded 
by (I), although the corresponding material implication, stated above, is true. 
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 99 
Suppose that we now observe 
W a . ~ B 2 1 2 a 
to be true. Taken in isolation, this piece of evidence again does not have any 
confirmatory or falsifying force. When it is taken in the context of the theory 
of boiling phenomena, which means that we are taking into account the relevant 
circumstances, and when this does not enable us to view the result as a normal 
case, we should say that the observational result is not in conformity with the 
law. It constitutes a genuine exception which leads to further theory formation. 
Of course, many 'abnormal' results of experiments are disqualified as mistakes, 
and this manoeuvre again stresses the normativity of the theory, but obstinate 
cases cannot be 'explained away' in this manner (cf. the bad teacher who contin-
ues to 'explain' his pupil's answers, deviating from his own, by saying that the 
pupil has not yet formed the appropriate concepts) and they must lead to 
further investigation. The result of our observation has been expressed in the 
concepts of our theory, but it is nevertheless 'systematically unintelligible'. 
Whether this result, i.e. this obstinate case, will at last turn out to be a falsifica-
tion or a normal case within an extended conceptual framework can, in general 
not be decided in advance. 
In this way we are back at the notions of confirmation and falsification with 
which we started our examination of the concept of confirmation. It should 
now be clear that, at the 'singular level', our concept 'if-then' has the following 
consequences: first, a singular empirical conditional, e.g. (II), cannot be inferred 
from a conjunction, i.e. (ni), while a material implication, e.g. 'Wa->B 2 1 V, 
does follow; second, an empirical conditional may be false, while the correspon-
ding material implication is true. 
This concept 'if-then', however, also has consequences at the 'universal 
level'. The statement 
all gold cubes are smaller than 10 m 3, 
taken as the formulation of an exceptionless repetition, can be reformulated as 
(x)(Gx->Sx) 
(G=gold cube, S = smaller than 10 m3) 
but it is not equivalent to 
if something is a gold cube then it is smaller than 10 m 3 
because the latter is the statement of a regularity as a necessary connection, 
which has not been established. 
On the other hand it is correct to say that from a law the corresponding 
all-statement can be inferred. We can for example infer from (I) that 
all water boils at212°F. 
The transition from an all-statement to an empirical law, however, requires 
a process of theory formation by which a law is formed as the expression of a 
regularity being a necessary connection. In the same process the law is armed 
against negative instances. 
We may, therefore, conclude that the distinction between accidental and 
lawlike universal statements can be reduced to this transition. 
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S A M E N V A T T I N G 
De hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie ('philosophy of science') is voor verre-
weg het grootste deel ontwikkeld binnen een logisch positivistische wijsgerige 
context. Dit heeft met zieh meegebracht, dat de Problemen, die in de weten-
schapsfilosofie aan de orde zijn, én de oplossingen die voor die problemen wor-
den voorgesteld en acceptabel geacht, vrijwel steeds het Stempel dragen van de 
wijsgerige uitgangspunten van het logisch positivisme. Het probleem van en de 
discussie rond het begrip 'empirische wet' vormen hiervan een treffend voor-
beeld. 
Men kan echter heel duidelijk een andere benaderingswijze in de wetenschaps-
filosofie onderkennen, waarin van andere wijsgerige Stellingen wordt uitgegaan. 
In verband hiermee wordt wel gesproken van een post-positivistische weten-
schapsfilosofie. 
In deze studie wordt getracht een analyse van het begrip 'empirische wet' te 
geven vanuit deze post-positivistische context. Voordat deze analyse ter hand 
kan worden genomen, moet eerst een korte schets van de logisch positivistische 
context worden gegeven en een uitwerking van de post-positivistische. 
I 
Uitgaande van de notie van directe of theorie-vrije waarneming, welke funda-
menteel geacht moet worden voor het logisch positivisme, wordt een model 
geschetst van de logisch positivistische context in de vorm van een vijftal Stel-
lingen. Dit model, dat sterk simplificerend is en niet als het resultaat van een 
historische analyse mag worden gezien, dient als hulpmiddel bij het systema-
tisch onderzoek, dat hier wordt ondernomen. Pas daarin krijgt dit model zijn 
betekenis. 
De genoemde Stellingen luiden : 
i. Er is een waarnemer-onafhankelijke werkelijkheid, waarop de directe of 
theorie-vrije waarneming is betrokken. 
ii. In die werkelijkheid bestaan geen noodzakelijke verbanden tussen de de-
menten. Alleen contingente, tijd-ruimtelijke relaties tussen die elementen 
worden erkend. De elementen zijn als zodanig onderling onafhankelijk. 
iii. Waarnemingstermen zijn geïsoleerde of theorie-onafhankelijke betekenis-
eenheden en hun betekenis moet als zuiver extensioneel worden gekarakteri-
seerd. Alleen dan kunnen deze termen de dubbelrol speien, waartoe ze in een 
logisch positivistische méthodologie zijn voorbestemd, te weten beginpunten 
van betekenis en eindpunten van confirmatie zijn. 
iv. Waarnemingsuitspraken hebben eveneens een geïsoleerde of theorie-onaf-
hankelijke status. In het bijzonder geldt dit voor empirische (i.tt. theoreti-
tische) wetten: hun waarheidswaarde en betekenis ligt vast onafhankelijk van de 
theorieën waarin ze eventueel zijn opgenomen. 
v. De élémentaire, extensionele logica vormt een adequaat middel voor kennis-
theoretisch en methodologisch onderzoek. Het spreken over intensionele bete-
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kenis en intensionele verbanden is overbodig (soms: zinloos) binnen dit terrein 
van wijsgerig onderzoek; het extensionele kader is dan ook toereikend. 
In het werk van o.a. HANSON, FEYERABEND en KUHN, en vooral in de dissertatie 
van GEURTS, wordt de notie van theorie-geladen waarneming tegenover die van 
een theorie-vrije waarneming gesteld. 
Een tweetal consequenties hiervan is: 
i. De empirische werkelijkheid en de dementen daaruit kunnen niet als waar-
nemer onaf hankelijke grootheden worden gekwalificeerd. Als alle waarneming 
theorie-geladen is, dan is datgene wat wordt waargenomen ook steeds theoretisch 
mede bepaald. 
ii. Elk empirisch begrip, hoe 'eenvoudig' ook, bezit betekenis door het inten-
sioneel verbonden zijn met meer of minder andere empirische begrippen. Als 
zodanig kan elk begrip een théorie in miniatuur worden genoemd. Aangezien 
dan het empirische begrip niet als een geïsoleerde betekeniseenheid kan worden 
getypeerd, kan het ook niet meer de eerder genoemde dubbelrol spelen. 
Het post-positivisme kan in eerste benadering door deze twee Stellingen wor-
den gekenmerkt. Een uitwerking hiervan rieht zieh primair op de notie van 
theorie-geladen waarneming en bouwt voort op een aantal gedachten, ontwikkeld 
door GEURTS. Waarneming van empirische verschijnselen is altijd waarneming 
op een bepaalde, gerichte wijze. Anders gezegd: waarneming is pas mogelijk 
als het een op de vereiste wijze theoretisch geladen waarneming is. Waarneming 
is steeds waarneming 'door de geschikte begrippen heen', waarbij die begrippen 
als miniatuur théorie fungeren. 
Begripsvörming is dan ook primair een leren waarnemen; het is de vorming 
van die théorie die een bepaalde waarneming mogelijk maakt. Iemand, die een 
empirisch begrip heeftgevormd, heeft de (miniatuur) théorie gevormd waardoor-
heen een bepaalde vorm van waarnemen mogelijk is. Tegelijk echter heeft hij 
een stukje empirische werkehjkheid ontdekt waarvan hij eerder geen weet had. 
Van dit stukje werkehjkheid kan dan ook alleen maar op zinvolle wijze gezegd 
worden dat het bestaat, binnen de betreffende begripscontext. 
Nadere analyse laat zien, dat het empirische begrip, hoe 'eenvoudig' het ook 
möge lijken, steeds een wetmatig karakter bezit, waardoor het idée van het be-
grip als miniatuur théorie kan worden gepreciseerd. Dit wetmatig karakter is 
uiteraard niet gerechtvaardigd per se - het vereist empirische confirmatie, die 
niet als een confirmatie d.m.v. positieve gevallen kan worden omschreven. Een 
analoge wijze van confirmatie treffen we aan bij empirische wetten (zie onder V). 
II 
Op Goodman's z.g. 'new riddle of induction', dat in de discussie rond het 
begrip 'empirische wet' steeds een belangrijke rol speelt, wordt apart ingegaan. 
Als inductieprobleem heeft het enige consekwenties, die het onderzoek van het 
begrip 'empirische wet' uitermate bemoeilijken. Een analyse van het probleem 
leert echter, dat het als inductieprobleem niet formuleerbaar is, indien we ten-
minste Goodman's expositie serieus nemen : het is primair het probleem van de 
keuze tussen twee coneurrerende theorieën. 
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Als het niet gaat om net onderzoek van verschijnselen van principled statis-
tische aard, zoals in Goodman's voorbeelden, dan kan men in het empirische 
begrip een wetmatige trek ontdekken, die we met een voorbeeld kunnen ver-
duidelijken. 
Onderdeel van de betekenis van het begrip 'groen' is: 
als iets groen is op tijdstip t 0, dan is het groen (zou het groen zijn; zou het 
groen geweest zijn) op enig ander tijdstip tn, mits alle relevante omstandig-
heden gelijk zijn (gelijk zouden zijn; gelijk zouden zijn geweest). 
Wanneer Goodman's probleem wordt geformuleerd als een conflict tussen 
een spreker van de 'gewone' groen-blauw-taal, L 1 ? en een spreker van de grauw-
bloen-taal, L 2 , dan blijkt, dat beide gebruik maken van een dergelijke wetmatige 
trek in hun eigen begrippen. 
Gebruik makend van de door BARKER en ACHINSTEIN voorgestelde wijze van 
definieren, moet dan worden geconcludeerd, dat het conflict tussen beide spre-
kers van begripsmatige aard is en zieh afspeelt op het niveau van de singulaire 
beschrijvingen van wat ze waarnemen. Er is, met andere woorden, sprake van 
een conflict tussen twee begripssystemen of theorieen - de groen-blauw-theorie 
en de grauw-bloen-theorie - die in L j resp. L 2 kunnen worden uitgedrukt. Er is 
daarom geen sprake van een inductieprobleem, maar van het probleem van 
theoriekeuze. Beide sprekers nemen geheel verschillende dingen waar, omdat 
hun waarneming door verschillende theorieen heen plaatsvindt. Om vanuit zo'n 
conflictsituatie te komen tot een voor beide aanvaardbare theorie, spelen heel 
andere factoren een rol dan het feitelijk taalgebruik, waarop GOODMAN een 
beroep doet om zijn probleem, als inductieprobleem, tot een oplossing te bren-
gen. Sterker, zo'n beroep op het gewone taalgebruik zal steeds leiden tot de 
keuze van de oude, vertrouwde theorie en biedt daarmee een nieuweling geen 
kans. 
Ill 
De regelmaatsopvatting van een empirische wet kan als volgt worden gefor-
muleerd: 
een empirische wet is een ware, synthetische, universele uitspraak, die 
een regelmaat zonder uitzonderingen onder woorden brengt. 
Het centrale probleem binnen deze opvatting is steeds de vraag hoe wetmatige 
universele uitspraken kunnen worden onderscheiden van accidentele universele 
uitspraken. En dat dit als het centrale probleem wordt gezien impliceert, dat 
begrippen als 'waar', 'synthetisch', 'regelmaat' en 'uitzondering' als voldoende 
duidelijk worden geaccepteerd. 
Alle voorgestelde syntactisch-semantische criteria - een empirische wet is een 
universele uitspraak, die geen onelimineerbare individuconstanten bevat, die 
alleen zuiver kwalitatieve predicaten bevat, die een in principe niet-gesloten 
toepassingsbereik heeft - lijden schipbreuk. 
Hoewel een wetmatige universele uitspraak corresponderende z.g. 'counter-
factual conditionals' steunt, d.w.z. mede de basis vormt waarop de waarheids-
waarde van zo'n 'conditional' kan worden vastgesteld, terwijl een accidentele uit-
Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 103 
spraak dat niet doet, kan dit feit toch ook niet als het gezochte critérium dienst 
doen. Een analyse van deze 'counterfactual conditionals' zelf leidt namelijk tot 
het stellen van twee onderling samenhangende vragen: i. Wat is een empirische 
wet? en ii. Wat moet onder relevante of normale omstandigheden worden ver-
staan? Nader onderzoek leidt er echter toe om het probleem van de 'counter-
factual conditionals' in een veel breder verband te stellen: ook de analyse van 
'gewone' empirische als-dan uitspraken ('singular indicative conditionals') -
zoals die bij een voorspelling, verklaring of retrodictie worden gebruikt - loopt 
uit in de zojuist geformuleerde vragen. Het probleem van de 'counterfactual 
conditionals' is slechts een onderdeel van het probleem van de analyse van 
'singular conditionals' in het algemeen. Dat de analyse van 'counterfactual 
conditionals' steeds als een apart probleem is gezien, is een gevolg van de op-
vatting als zouden 'gewone' empirische als-dan uitspraken adequaat zijn geana-
lyseerd binnen een extensioneel-logisch kader. 
De laatste poging van de voorstanders van de regelmaatsopvatting, die wij 
hier onderzoeken, kan aldus worden geformuleerd: een universele uitspraak is 
wetmatig als hij een positie binnen een théorie bekleedt. Gegeven dit critérium, 
kan men recht doen aan de functie van een wet in het wetenschappelijk redene-
ren, i.e. in het doen van voorspellingen, het geven van verklaringen en het 
formuleren van 'counterfactual conditionals'. 
Hoewel dit critérium, mits nader uitgewerkt, mijns inziens inderdaad kans van 
slagen biedt, is het binnen de logisch positivistische context waarin de regel-
maatsopvatting wordt verdedigd, nauwehjks acceptabel. In de eerste plaats is 
de analyse van het begrip 'empirische wet' nu vervangen door een analyse van 
het begrip 'théorie', en in het bijzonder door de vraag wat het betekent dat een 
wet een positie bekleedt binnen zo'n théorie. Aan de vraag hoe de relatie is 
tussen een wet en de 'bijbehorende' relevante omstandigheden is in dit verband 
echter nog nauwehjks aandacht besteed en het is juist deze relatie, die ophel-
dering zou moeten krijgen vanuit het gebonden zijn van een wet aan een théorie. 
In de tweede plaats en geheel afgezien van het eerste, is de theorie-binding in 
strijd met de basis-gedachte, dat een empirische wet in principe een theorie-on-
afhankelijke grootheid is, die een regelmaat zonder uitzonderingen formuleert. 
Het ontbreken van een analyse van dit begrip 'regelmaat', dat in feite als een 
intuïtief voldoende duideüjk begrip wordt gehanteerd, moet als één van de be-
langrijkste obstakels op weg naar de oplossing van het probleem van de em-
pirische wet worden gezien. Het volledig voorbijzien van de essentiêle roi, die 
uitzonderingen speien - juist uitzonderingen leiden tot de formulering van 
relevante omstandigheden en daarmee tot de vorming van de théorie waarin een 
wet een positie bekleedt - is hiervan het gevolg. 
IV 
De noodzakelijkheidsopvatting kan in eerste benadering worden geformu-
leerd als: 
een empirische wet brengt een noodzakehjk verband onder woorden. 
Hierbij is dan de explicatie van het begrip 'noodzakehjk verband' het centrale 
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probleem geworden in de analyse van het begrip 'empirische wet'. 
Wanneer dit verband wordt geïnterpreteerd als een logisch noodzakelijk 
verband - een empirische wet is een analytische uitspraak - dan werkt men 
weliswaar met een duidelijk begrip 'noodzakelijk', maar dan is tegelijk volko-
men duidelijk, dat empirische wetten niet in déze zin een noodzakelijk verband 
uitdrukken. Aldus tenminste de tegenstanders van een dergelijke noodzakelijk-
heidsopvatting. Immers, zo vervolgen zij, dit zou in de eerste plaats betekenen, 
dat de negatie van een wet een contradictie zou opleveren - quod non - en in de 
tweede plaats, dat een wet nooit gefalsificeerd zou kunnen worden en dus geen 
enkele empirische inhoud zou bezitten, wat geheel onacceptabel is. 
Toch is de verwerping van deze noodzakelijkheidsopvatting, op basis van een 
als volledig doorzichtig opgevat noodzakelijkheidsbegrip, niet overtuigend. 
Quine's aanval op het onderscheid analytisch-synthetisch wordt dan immers ge-
heel genegeerd. En vooral de verdediging door GRICE en STRAWSON van dit 
onderscheid tegen QUINE, maakt een dergelijke verwerping dubieus. Wanneer 
we met Grice en Strawson het onderscheid in déze zin handhaven, dat binnen 
een begripssysteem of théorie wel van analytische en synthetische uitspraken kan 
worden gesproken, daarbij de mogelijkheid van verwerping van de théorie als 
geheel open latend - hetgeen betekent, dat we met Quine's belangrijkste punt 
van kritiek instemmen - dan moet ook de mogelijkheid, dat een empirische wet 
in déze zin analytisch zou kunnen zijn, opnieuw aan een onderzoek worden 
onderworpen. Dit onderzoek is deste belangrijker, omdat het kan worden ver-
richt in aansluiting aan de vraag waarop we bij de regelmaatsopvatting uit-
eindehjk zijn gestuft: Wat betekent het dat een wet een positie bekleedt binnen 
een théorie? Bovendien wordt het belang van dit onderzoek nog benadrukt door 
het feit - en ook aanhangers van de regelmaatsopvatting vermelden dit feit -
dat een universele uitspraak, als gevolg van voortgaande theorievorming, ken-
nelijk de status van analytische uitspraak kan verkrijgen. Het dynamisch mo-
ment, waarop dan wordt gewezen, zal blijken van zeer groot belang te zijn. 
Een analyse van het begrip 'noodzakelijk' als 'fysisch noodzakelijk' is met 
name door KNEALE en POPPER ondernomen. Een wet moet in hun ogen een 
noodzakelijkheidskarakter bezitten, omdat hij anders nooit de basis kan vor-
men voor het waar-zijn van een corresponderende 'counterfactual conditional'. 
Zelfs als we zouden weten, dat de uitspraak 'alle raven zijn zwart' (Kneale's 
voorbeeld) een feitelijke regelmaat zonder uitzonderingen formuleert, dan nog 
zou dit een accidentele uitspraak kunnen zijn, die geen basis biedt voor b.v. de 
uitspraak 'als deze raaf een antarctica-bewoner zou zijn, dan zou hij zwart zijn'. 
Het waar-zijn van de raven-uitspraak, m.a.w. het zwart-zijn van alle raven, kan 
een historisch toeval zijn: als het toevallig is, dat er nooit raven in poolstreken 
hebben gewoond, dan is het waar-zijn van 'alle raven zijn zwart' mogelijk af-
hankelijk van deze toevallige omstandigheid en in dat geval moet deze uitspraak 
accidenteel worden genoemd. In tegenstelling tot wat in genoemde 'counter-
factual conditional' wordt gesteld, zou een antarctica-raaf waarschijnlijk wit zijn 
geweest. 
Een universele uitspraak is pas een wet, wanneer zijn waarheid onafhankelijk 
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is van de toevallige begin-omstandigheden van onze actuele empirische wer-
kelijkheid. Of, wanneer hij waar is in alle mogehjke werelden, die hoogstens van 
onze wereld verschillen voor wat betreff begin-omstandigheden. Hiermee stui-
ten we andermaal op de kwestie van de omstandigheden en het blijkt, dat de 
explicatie van het begrip 'noodzakelijk' in termen van 'mogehjke werelden' en 
'begin-omstandigheden' nauwelijksenige verheldering biedt. Kneale's beroep op 
een intuïtief duidelijk noodzakelijkheidsbegrip doet dat evenmin. 
RESCHER introduceert echter een nieuw en m.i. belangrijk element in het 
onderzoek van de empirische wet. Een wet heeft inderdaad een noodzakelijk-
heidskarakter, dat zieh vooral manifesteert in de mogelijkheid om 'counter-
factual conditionals' waar of onwaar te noemen. Dit karakter heeft een wet 
echter niet op grond van waargenomen feiten, maar omdat het is aangebracht 
door de onderzoeker. Dit aanbrengen van noodzakehjkheid betekent in feite 
het toekennen aan een empirische generalisatie van een plaats in een voorhanden 
théorie. Het is hetbegripssysteem of de théorie waarin een empirische generalisa-
tie wordt opgenomen, waaraan de wet zijn noodzakelijkheidskarakter ontleent. 
RESCHER handhaaft echter het bestaan in een onafhankehjke realiteit van een 
waarnemer-onafhankehjke regelmaat, die eerst wordt uitgedrukt in een empiri-
sche generalisatie, waarop dân, later, het Stempel van noodzakehjkheid wordt 
gedrukt door die generalisatie in een theoretisch kader in te passen. Juist hier-
door ontneemt hij zichzelf de mogehjkheid om een antwoord te geven op de 
vragen, die t.a.v. zijn théorie direct rijzen: Wat betekent het 'ingepast te wor-
den in een théorie'? Waarom wordt een universele uitspraak op een gegeven 
moment ingepast en waarom juist dân? 
Wanneer RESCHER niet zou zijn uitgegaan van het bestaan van waarnemer-
onafhankehjke regelmatigheden, dan zou hij mogelijk hebben ontdekt, dat 
reeds het vaststellen van een regelmaat zelf een 'imputation' vereist, en dat de 
theorie-binding reeds vanaf dit moment aanwezig is. 
V 
In tegenstelling tot de regelmaatsopvatting stellen wij, dat een waargenomen 
regelmaat-zonder-uitzonderingen niét de ideaal-basis vormt waarop een em-
pirische wet, door inductieve generalisatie, tot stand komt. Van een universele 
uitspraak die wél op deze wijze tot stand komt, en waarvan dus alleen positieve 
en geen negatieve gevallen bekend zijn, kan nooit worden beslist of hij wet-
matig dan wel accidenteel is. Een dergelijke uitspraak moet, wanneer zieh een 
negatief geval voordoet, als gefalsificeerd worden beschouwd: deze uitspraak is 
immers op geen enkele wijze gewapend tegen een negatief geval, dat dan ook 
slechts als falsificatie kan worden bestempeld. 
In het wetenschappelijk onderzoek spelen negatieve gevallen echter een 
geheel andere en zelfs fundamentele rol. Veelal hebben we in dat onderzoek 
niet te doen met een 'exceptionless repetition', die het ideaal van de aanhanger 
van de regelmaatsopvatting is. In het onderzoek wordt desondanks een hypo-
thèse geformuleerd van de vorm : 
alle A zijn B. 
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Dan zijn er vanaf het begin negatieve gevallen t.o.v. deze aangebrachte regel-
maat aanwezig. Die negatieve gevallen krijgen niet een falsificerende functie, 
maar worden als uitzonderingen bestempeld. Dit laatste betekent, dat de 
hypothèse als norm wordt gebruikt of als de formulering van een noodzakehjk 
verband. Om de negatieve gevallen als uitzonderingen te kunnen kwalificeren 
heeft men een dergehjke normering nodig. Erkent men dit niet, dan is de enige 
mogelijkheid om de negatieve gevallen, veelal vanaf het begin van het onderzoek 
aanwezig en soms pas later, als falsificaties te zien. Men komt dan öf überhaupt 
niet toe aan de formulering van een universele uitspraak, öf tot de verwerping 
van de uitspraak waarvan totnutoe alleen positieve gevallen bekend waren. 
De hypothèse is nu de uitdrukking van een regelmaat als noodzakehjk ver-
band, maar heeft in deze fase uiteraard een sterk ad hoc karakter. De verificatie 
van deze hypothèse, en daarmee het tot stand komen van een wet, die een 
regelmaat als noodzakehjk verband uitdrukt, bestaat nu juist uit het doen ver-
dwijnen van dit ad hoc karakter. En het möge duidehjk zijn, dat deze vorm van 
verificatie niet kan plaatsvinden op basis van positieve gevallen. Deze vorm van 
verificatie wordt gerealiseerd door middel van voortgaande theorievorming 
(hetzelfde geldt voor de verificatie van het wetmatig karakter van een empirisch 
begrip). 
Stel dat iemand in een période, waarin geen théorie over kookverschijnselen, 
laat staan een théorie over de structuur van vloeistoffen, voorhanden is, de 
volgende hypothèse formuleert : 
alle water kookt bij 212°F. 
Met deze hypothèse als norm zal hij sommige waarnemingsresultaten als uit-
zondering kwalificeren. Zijn hypothèse wordt nu geverifieerd, of als wet gevormd, 
wanneer hij er door voortgaande theorievorming in slaagt deze uitzonderingen 
te begrijpen als normale of verklaarbare verschijnselen. De ene uitzondering 
zal begrepen kunnen worden binnen een théorie over het verband tussen druk en 
kookpunt; de andere binnen een théorie over kookpuntsverhoging, ionisatie, 
etc. ; een derde misschien binnen een théorie over isotopen, waarin het bestaan 
van b.v. de waterstofisotoop deuterium wordt gesteld. 
Voortgaande theorievorming leidt aldus tot de vorming van een wet en in die 
voortgaande theorievorming kunnen de eerder bestaande uitzonderingen als 
normale gevallen worden begrepen, zodat het ad hoc karakter van de oor-
spronkelijke hypothèse verdwijnt. 
In een dergelijk procès komt een wet tot stand en tegelijkertijd betekent het 
de vorming van de théorie waarin die wet een bepaalde positie bekleedt. Bin-
nen die théorie liggen nu tevens de relevante omstandigheden vast, die bij de ge-
vormde wet behoren (b.v. voor 'alle water kookt bij 212 °F.\ dat de druk 1 atm. 
moet zijn, dat de vloeistof niet met b.v. NaCl verontreinigd mag zijn, maar 
soms wel met AgCl, etc.). 
Wanneer een wet op deze wijze is gevormd, dan is hij gewapend tegen ver-
schilfende negatieve gevallen. Het is nog sterker: die negatieve gevallen zijn nu, 
binnen het gevormde theoretisch systeem, even normaal als positieve gevallen 
(dat een hoeveelheid zuiver water op de top van de Mont Blanc bij een lagere 
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temperatuur dan 212°F. kookt, is precies even normaal als het koken bij 212 °F. 
van een zuiver watermonster in een laboratorium in Wageningen). 
Een wet brengtdus inderdaad een regelmaat onder woorden, maardeze regel-
maat is niet een waamemer-onafhankelijk gegeven; die regelmaat komt tot stand 
binnen en is pas waarneembaar door de theorie waarin de wet onlosmakelijk 
een positie bekleedt; een wet formuleert een regelmaat als noodzakelijk verband. 
De essentiele functie van de uitzondering, die de aanzet vormt tot voortgaan-
de theorievorming en die daarmee in belangrijke mate de dynamiek van het 
onderzoek bepaalt (vgl. KUHN), hebben wij op deze wijze geprobeerd recht te 
doen. 
Is het echter niet zo, dat nieuwe uitzonderingen steeds mogelijk blijven? En 
is het dan ook niet zo, dat het genoemde ad hoc karakter nooit geheel verdwijnt? 
In verband met deze vragen moet Kuhn's onderscheid tussen 'normal science' 
en 'revolutionary science' worden gemaakt. Normale wetenschapsbeoefening 
vindt plaats binnen een geaccepteerde theorie, die ons die wetenschapsbeoefe-
ning juist normaal doet noemen. In dit geval fungeert de theorie als norm voor 
de waarneming, als norm voor de omstandigheden, als kader waarbinnen de 
begrippen 'waar' en 'onwaar' worden gebruikt en als verklaringssysteem. 
Revolutionair onderzoek wordt daarentegen juist gekenmerkt door de po-
ging om tot de vorming van een alternatieve theorie te komen op grond van 
het optreden van nieuwe uitzonderingen, die men maar steeds niet kan gaan be-
grijpen binnen de 'oude' theorie. Met andere woorden, als men zieh gecon-
fronteerd ziet met een opstapeling van ad hoc hypotheses, waardoor die 'oude' 
theorie in discrediet geraakt. 
Binnen deze vorm van onderzoek speelt juist de mogelijkheid van het op-
treden van nieuwe uitzonderingen een belangrijke rol en binnen dit onderzoek 
worden juist de vertrouwde normen of wetmatige verbanden ter discussie ge-
steld. 
Tenslotte wordt, vanuit mijn omschrijving van het begrip empirische wet, 
een analyse gegeven van de begrippen 'regelmaat', 'noodzakelijkheid', 'con-
firmatie' en 'singular conditional'. 
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NOTES 
1. See for a short exposition of these views R. S. W A L T E R S 'Laws of science and lawlike 
statements' . (18, vol. 4, p . 4 1 0 ) * 
2. T h e term stems from Shapere 's 68. 
3. See Rescher's 66. 
4. I tried to show this in 48, where I also sketched the five theses, which are formulated here. 
5. In a recent article about lawfulness, R E S C H E R clearly states this in connection with regul-
arities in nature : " N o doubt nature is in various respects regular - it would take a bold 
act of rashness to deny that! A n d this regularity of nature in various respects is no doubt 
an ontological fact that would remain unaltered in the face of any hypothetical removal o f 
rational minds from within its purview." (66, p. 192) What R E S C H E R states here about 
regularities is a fortiori valid for empirical data, I think. The opposit ion between an 
independent reality and the observer is quite clear. 
6. E.g. R E I C H E N B A C H : "Al though we emphasize the indispensability o f synthetic connective 
operations, we should like to m a k e it clear that we reject any kind of mysticism in the 
interpretation of these relations. We do not wish to say that physical necessity is due to 
invisible forces tying things together (. . ) . We agree with Hume that physical necessity 
is translatable into statements about repeated occurrences, including the prediction that 
the s a m e combination will occur in the future, without exception. 'Physical necessity' 
is expressible in terms o f ' a l w a y s ' . " (62, p. 356) 
7. E.g. H E M P E L : "a l l that a causal law asserts is that any event o f a specified kind, i.e. any 
event having certain specified characteristics, is accompanied by another event which in 
turn has certain specified characteristics". (36, p . 253). 
O r : " I t (i.e. a statement o f universal form, H . K . ) is a statement to the effect that when-
ever and wherever conditions o f a specified kind F occur, then so will, always and wit-
hout exception, certain conditions o f another kind, G . " (39, p . 54) 
A n d A Y E R : " O n c e we are rid o f the confusion between logical and factual relations, what 
seems the obvious course is to hold that a proposit ion expresses a law of nature when it 
states what invariably happens . " (2, p. 220) 
BRAiTHWArrE: "Scientific laws will be taken as asserting no more (and no less) than the 
de facto generalizations which they include; the law that every hydrogen a t o m consists 
o f one proton together with one electron will be interpreted as meaning that, as a matter 
o f fact, every hydrogen a tom, past, present and future, has this constitution." (9, p . 10) 
A n d again R E I C H E N B A C H : " S ince repetition is all that distinguishes the causal law from 
a mere coincidence, the meaning of a causal relation consists in the statement o f an 
exceptionless repetition - it is unnecessary to a s sume that it means m o r e . " (63, p. 158) 
8. N A G E L : " ( a n experimental law) retains a meaning that can be formulated independently 
o f the theory; and it is based on observational evidence that may enable the law to 
survive the eventual demise o f the theory." (51, p. 86) 
9. Cf. Blumberg 's explication of an interpretation of the first-order predicate calculus, 
L P : " a n interpretation I o f L P (a) specifies a non-empty domain o f individuals or objects 
D as the domain of interpretation, (6) assigns to each individual constant of L P as its 
denotation an individual member o f D , and (c) assigns to each rc-place predicate constant 
o f L P a class o f (if n = 1), or an «-ary relation among, the members o f D . " (18, vol. 5, 
P. 29) 
10. " N o w , if confirmation is to be feasible at all, this process o f referring back to other 
predicates must terminate at s o m e point. The reduction must finally come to predicates 
for which we can come to a confirmation directly, i.e. without reference to other predic-
* References are to the B I B L I O G R A P H Y , p. 127. 
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ates. (. .) the observable predicates can be used as such a b a s i s . " ( 1 2 , p. 6 4 - 5 ) 
1 1 . 6 8 , p. 1 1 9 . 
1 2 . 4 9 , p. 1 0 2 . 
A n d : "S ince new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much 
of the vocabulary and apparatus , both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional 
paradigm had previously employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed elements 
in quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experi-
ments fall into new relationships one with the other. T h e inevitable result is what we 
must call, though the term is not quite right, a misunderstanding between the two compe-
ting s choo l s . " (ibid., p. 1 4 9 ) 
1 3 . " Introducing a new theory involves changes o f outlook both with respect to the observable 
a n d with respect to the unobservable features o f the world, and corresponding changes 
in the meanings o f even the most 'fundamental ' terms of the language employed. (. .) 
scientific theories are ways o f looking at the world ; and their adopt ion affects our general 
beliefs and expectations, and thereby a l so our experiences and our conception of real i ty." 
( 2 3 , p. 2 9 ) 
1 4 . 5 5 , p . 4 2 5 . 
1 5 . 3 4 , p . 1 5 and 1 9 . 
We may a d d that observation is not only " a systematic exposure o f the senses to the 
world; it is a lso a way of thinking about the world, a way of forming concept ions . " 
(ibid., p. 3 0 ) 
In 6 0 , R U T H A N N A P U T N A M has drawn attention to the fact that H A N S O N did not m a k e a 
sharp distinction between 'seeing' and 'observing' and that this obscures what he really 
means . In all cases when I quote H A N S O N , I have taken him to say something about 
observing. I agree with R u t h A n n a Putnam's remark that " i t is plausible to a s sume that 
he (i.e. Hanson, H . K . ) meant, at least often, 'observe' (when he used 'see', H . K . ) . F o r 
s o m e things which he says about seeing become true when they are taken a s claims about 
observing . " ( 6 0 , p. 4 9 9 ) 
1 6 . " T o a layman entering a n atomic physics laboratory it would not be at all obvious that 
certain pairs of scintillations over here are connected with the presence of a nuclear 
reaction over there, and that they confirm a theory which explains why certain other 
scintillations near the reactor have the character they have. But to the physicist they count 
as the detection of neutrinos whose presence was suspected because o f a loss o f energy in 
certain decay processes in the reactor . " ( 4 0 , p. 1 8 ) M A R Y H E S S E concludes with: " E a c h 
entity is observed in the ways appropriate to i t " , (ibid., p. 2 7 ) 
H A N S O N has also given this example and he ended up with the remark that " T h e layman 
must learn physics before he can see what the physicist s ee s . " ( 3 4 , p. 1 6 ) 
1 7 . G E U R T S tried to analyse the notion of theory-loaded observation (although he does not 
like the term) in his dissertation 'Het ervaringsgegeven in de natuurwetenschappen' 
( 'Experience in science'), Utrecht, 1 9 7 1 . 
1 8 . F E Y E R A B E N D : "Experimental evidence does not consist o f facts pure and simple, but o f 
facts analysed, modeled and manufactured according to s o m e theory." ( 2 3 , p. 5 0 - 1 ) 
1 9 . 2 4 , p. 1 8 0 . Somewhat further, F E Y E R A B E N D says : " T h e philosophies we have been discuss-
ing so far (i.e. versions o f empiricism, H . K . ) a s sumed that observation sentences are 
meaningful per se, that theories which have been separated from observation are not 
meaningful, and that such theories obtain their interpretation by being connected with 
some observation language that possesses a stable interpretation. According to the view 
I a m advocating the meaning of observation sentences is determined by the theories with 
which they are connected" , (ibid., p. 2 1 3 ) 
A n d in general : " the interpretation of a n observation-language is determined by the 
theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon a s those theories 
change . " ( 2 2 , p. 1 6 3 ) 
Cf. P O P P E R : " n o t only the more abstract explanatory theories transcend experience, but 
even the most ordinary singular statements. F o r even ordinary singular statements are 
always interpretations of'the facts' in the light of theories. (And the same holds for 'the 
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facts ' o f the case. They contain universals; and universals always entail a law-like behavi-
o u r . ) " ( 5 5 , p. 4 2 3 ) 
Somewhere else P O P P E R remarks that " the customary distinction between 'observational 
terms' (or 'non-theoretical terms') and theoretical terms is mistaken, since all terms are 
theoretical to some degree, though some are more theoretical than others " . ( 5 8 , p. 1 1 9 ) 
2 0 . H A N S O N : " I f seeing were just an optical-chemical process , then nothing we saw would 
ever be relevant to what we know (it would not constitute confirming evidence, H . K . ) , 
and nothing known could have significance for what we see. Visual life would be unintel-
ligible; intellectual life would lack a visual a spect . " ( 3 4 , p. 2 6 ) 
A n d M A R Y H E S S E : " T h e conditions given for phenomenal statements are not sufficient 
for them to have scientific significance (e.g. in confirmation, H . K . ) , and if they are to 
have such significance, there must be connections of meaning between them at a higher 
than common-sense level, and therefore the condition of complete theoretical independen-
ce between them must be d ropped . " ( 4 0 , p. 1 6 ) 
2 1 . C A R N A P : " O n e of the mos t important distinctions between two types of laws in science 
is the distinction between what m a y be called (there is no generally accepted terminology 
for them) empirical laws and theoretical laws. Empirical laws are laws that can be con-
firmed directly by empirical observations. The term 'observable' is often used for any 
phenomenon that can be directly observed, so it can be said that empirical laws are laws 
about observables . " ( 1 4 , p . 2 2 5 ) 
A n d N A G E L : " each descriptive term in an experimental law L has a meaning that is 
fixed by an overt observational or laboratory procedure . " ( 5 1 , p. 8 4 ) 
2 2 . 5 1 , p . 8 5 . 
2 3 . This example has originally been given by U B B I N K in his lectures at Utrecht in 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7 . 
G E U R T S has also mentioned it ( 2 6 , p. 1 3 9 ) , but neither of them worked it out. P O P P E R 
has given an analogous example ( 5 5 , p. 4 2 1 ) , but he did not work it out either. 
2 4 . "Perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research problems we have just encoun-
ered is how little they a im to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal . " 
( 4 9 , p . 3 5 ) 
2 5 . " I f one asks why it has for so long been considered necessary to accept the comparatively 
unproblematic character o f the observation predicates and statements in contrast to 
those o f theories, there seem to be two replies, neither of which has been m a d e very 
explicit. First , the pragmatic account o f observability is only a cover for a much more 
deeply rooted belief, stemming from phenomenalism and the British empiricist tradition, 
that there are entities (and their properties) which are directly given in perception and 
that more or less well-defined areas o f language directly describe these. (. .) Second, a 
half-conscious fear o f vicious circularity has inhibited investigation of alternative ac-
counts o f the observation language. I f we have no firm observation basis on which to 
stand, how can we begin to analyze the meaning and justification of theories that are 
erected upon observables? Worse, if observation itself is said to share the uncertainties 
o f theories in any important degree, how can we avoid being sucked into a logical vortex 
in which we lose all contact with empirical ev idence?" ( 4 2 , p. 1 0 3 ) 
2 6 . G E U R T S has also warned against such a separat ion: " I t is correct to say that the obser-
vational datum is co-determined by the context through which it is observed, but one 
should be careful not to conceive this theoretical connotation itself as a 'datum' in its 
turn. T h e theoretical connotation we are talking about , represents the structuring activity; 
it brings about a pattern, if you like, thanks to which the observational da tum is constitut-
ed. This theoretical connotation is a constitutive part o f the datum in this sense, that 
it contributes to its format ion . " ( 2 6 , p. 7 7 ; my translation) 
2 7 . See for a more detailed answer Geurt s ' criticism of the sense-datum theory, 2 6 , p . 3 1 - 6 1 . 
2 8 . 5 7 , p . 4 7 . 
2 9 . 5 5 , p. 3 1 . 
3 0 . C o m p a r e Popper ' s attack u p o n 'the primacy of repetit ions' : "General ly , similarity, and 
with it repetition, always presuppose the adopt ion of a point of view". ( 5 5 , p. 4 2 1 ) It is, 
in m y view, precisely this 'point o f view' which comes to be known in concept formation 
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as a learning of how one should observe. T h e 'how' is the 'point o f view', intended by 
Popper. 
31 . The element o f 'ordering' is fundamental in Geurt s ' view: " C o n c e p t formation comes 
about in a n ordering" , a s he expressed it. (26, p . 142; my translation) But he did not 
connect 'the learning how to observe' with 'the learning how to order'. 
32. " T h e concept is a possibility to order, and it is as such only a position that can be 
occupied" , as G E U R T S stated in connection with the universal character o f empirical 
concepts. (26, p . 1 5 1 ; my translation) 
33. 33, p. 38. 
34. This is also the way of defense o f the 'dogma ' by G R I C E and S T R A W S O N : " T h e point o f 
substance that Q U I N E is making, by this emphasis on revisability, is that there is no 
absolute necessity about the adopt ion or use o f any conceptual scheme whatever (. . ) . 
Bu t it is one thing to admit this, and quite another thing to say that there are no necessi-
ties within any conceptual scheme we adopt or u s e " . (30, p.158) I shall come back to this 
later, in connection with the necessity view of empirical laws. 
35. T h e difficulty o f revising sociological concepts is clearly illustrated by N O R B E R T E L I A S 
in his 'Was ist Soziologie? ' . The 'Wissenschaftstheorie', E L I A S opposes to is, by the way, 
a rather unrealistic one and I think that all o f us would reject it. 
36. The idea o f the lawlikeness o f a concept can be found at different places in Popper ' s 5 5 : 
" B y the word 'glass ' , for example, we denote physical bodies which exhibit a certain 
law-like behaviour". (55, p . 95) 
O r : "a l l universals are dispos i t ional" (ibid., p. 424) in which 'universal' may be identified 
with my 'concept' and 'dispositional' with 'lawlike'. 
Cf. : "universal terms (. .) entail dispositions to behave in a law-like manner, so that they 
entail universal l aws" , (ibid., p . 425) 
37. " m y view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical 
method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. M y view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an irrational element', or ' a creative 
intuition' in Bergson's sense . " (55, p. 32) In my opinion, however, P O P P E R has dismissed 
of an inquiry into concept formation too quickly. See also m y remarks at the end of 
section 3. 
38. 34, p . 30. Hanson ' s quotations of B r a g g and Herschel are also very illustrative in connec-
tion with this point (ibid., p . 1 8 3 - 4 ) and in his 33 we get a clear illustration of concept 
formation a s a learning to observe appropriately. 
39. 33, p . 32. 
40. 54, p. 22. 
4 1 . C A R N A P mentioned both, normal instruments and normal circumstances, in connection 
with the confirmation of a full sentence of, e.g., the predicate ' red ' : "Accord ing to the 
explanation given, for example the predicate 'red' is observable for a person N possessing 
a normal colour sense (which requires a lawlike character o f 'red' in my view, H . K . ) . 
F o r a suitable argument, namely a space-time-point c sufficiently near to N , say a spot 
on the table before N , N is able under suitable circumstances (and this again requires 
'red' to be a lawlike concept, H . K . ) - namely, if there is sufficient light at c - to come to a 
decision about the full sentence 'the spot c is red' after few observations namely by look-
ing at the t ab le . " (12, p. 64) 
I have worked out the consequences o f a concept being lawlike for the distinction between 
theoretical and observational terms in 48, in particular with respect to Ca tnap ' s view. 
42. In the sense in which P O P P E R described i t : " I t is the simple rule that we are not to aban-
don the search for universal laws and for a coherent theoretical system, nor ever give up 
our attempts to explain causally any kind of event we can descr ibe . " (55, p. 61) 
43. " i t is most important to realize that the recourse to probability laws under such circum-
stances (i.e. the analysis o f radiative phenomena, H . K . ) is essentially different in a im 
from the familiar application of statistical considerations a s practical means o f accounting 
for the properties o f mechanical systems of great structural complexity. In fact, in quan-
tum physics we are presented not with intricacies of this kind, but with the inability o f 
112 Meded. Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 73-2 (1973) 
the classical frame of concepts to comprise the peculiar feature o f indivisability, or 'in-
dividuality', characterizing the elementary processes . " (8, p . 203) 
Aga in and again B O H R stressed this 'individuality' of a tomic processes, which marks the 
essential difference between classical and modern physics : " a wholly new situation in 
physical science was created through the discovery of the universal quantum of action, 
which revealed a n elementary feature of 'individuality' of a tomic processes . " (7, p . 313) 
A n d : " i n quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a 
more detailed analysis o f atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that such an analysis 
is in principle excluded. The peculiar individuality o f the quantum effects presents us , a s 
regards the comprehension of well-defined evidence, with a novel situation unforeseen 
in classical physics and irreconcilable with conventional ideas suited for our orientation 
and adjustment to ordinary experience." (8, p. 235) 
It is precisely this individuality, that determines quantum mechanics as a principally 
statistical theory: " I n fact, the specification of a state o f a physical system evidently cannot 
determine the choice between different individual processes o f transition to other states, 
and an account o f quantum effects must thus basically operate with the notion of the 
probabilities of occurrence of the different possible transition processes. We have here to 
do with a situation which is essentially different in character from the recourse to statistic-
al methods in the practical dealing with complicated systems that are as sumed to obey 
laws of classical mechanics . " (7, p. 313) 
44. " T h i s novel feature (of individuality, H . K . ) is not only entirely foreign to the classical 
theories o f mechanics and electromagnetism, but it is even irreconcilable with the very 
idea o f causal i ty." (7, p. 313) 
O r : " the impossibility of subdividing the individual quantum effects and of separating a 
behaviour o f the objects from their interaction with the measuring instruments serving to 
define the conditions under which the phenomena appear implies an ambiguity in assigning 
conventional attributes to atomic objects which calls for a reconsideration of our attitude 
towards the problem of physical explanation. In this novel situation, even the old ques-
tion of a n ultimate deterrninacy of natural phenomena has lost its conceptional basis , and 
it is against this background that the viewpoint of complementarity presents itself a s a 
rational generalization of the very ideal of causal i ty." (7, p. 317) 
A n d a l s o : " Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agencies condition-
ed by the very existence of the quantum of action entails - because of the impossibility 
o f controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, if these are to serve 
their purpose - the necessity o f a final renunciation of the classical ideal o f causality and 
a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality." (8, p . 232-3) 
In such a situation Mr. A ' s concept of change cannot be applied to quantum effects, 
because this would require a further analysis o f these effects, which is forbidden by then-
individuality. 
45. E I N S T E I N : " W h a t does not satisfy m e in that theory (i.e. statistical quantum theory, H . K . ) 
f rom the standpoint o f principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to m e to be 
the programmatic a i m of all physics : the complete description of any (individual) real 
s ituation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act o f observation or substantiation) 
(. .) for such a complete description there is no r o o m in the conceptual framework of 
statistical quantum theory" . (20, p . 668) 
A n d : " F o r me, however, the expectation that the adequate formulation of the universal 
laws involves the use o f all conceptual elements which are necessary for a complete des-
cription, is more natural (. . ) . Assuming the success of efforts to accomplish a complete 
physical description, the statistical quantum theory would, within the framework of 
future physics, take an approximately analogous posit ion to the statistical mechanics 
within the framework of classical mechanics. I a m rather firmly convinced that the devel-
opment o f theoretical physics will be o f this type; but the path will be lengthy and diffi-
cul t " , (ibid., p. 672) 
Cf. 19, where E I N S T E I N has also defended the thesis o f the incompleteness of quantum 
mechanics and the possibility o f a further analysis o f quantum phenomena. In Einstein's 
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view, the classical concept o f change, a s it is used by our Mr . A , remains appl icable in 
principle to quantum effects. 
46. In his 'Studies in the logic o f explanation' H E M P E L used the universal s tatement 'all 
apples in basket b are red' a s an example o f an accidental statement, which cannot be 
used as a premise in his model o f a D-N-explanation. (36, p . 226) 
47. 46, p. 123. Hi s example runs a s fol lows: " T h e fact, if it is a fact, that no ravens have 
lived in very snowy regions m a y be only an accident o f history, and so too the fact, if it is 
a fact, that there has never been a raven that was not b l ack . " (ibid., p. 123) 
K N E A L E wanted to stress the possibility that 'all ravens are black ' is the expression of an 
historical accident on a cosmic scale, so that it is not a lawlike, but an accidental univers-
al. Cf. chapter IV, section 2. 
48. See 35, especially sections 3 and 6. H A R R E introduced a 'hypothetical mechanism' as a 
'candidate for reality'. A n 'ontological experiment' may prove this mechanism to be the 
real one and in this way its a d hocness, as I would call it, can be removed. 
49. C A R N A P : " T o be real in the scientific sense means to be an element o f the framework; 
hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the framework itself." (11, p . 
210-1) 
The internal question, i.e. the question about the existence o f certain entities within a 
framework, is a genuine theoretical question, but the external question of the choice o f 
that framework is a practical quest ion: " T h e acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic 
forms (. .) will finally be decided by their efficiency a s instruments, the ratio o f the results 
achieved to the amount and complexity o f the efforts required. " (ibid., p. 228) 
T h e difference between Carnap ' s internal-external distinction and mine lies in the fact 
that in my view the choice of a theory is not at all as non-obligatory as C A R N A P takes it to 
be, unless he takes 'linguistic framework' in a purely syntactical sense, but this is hardly 
compatible with what he says in his 'Testability a n d meaning' , where he offers an epistemo-
logical - as opposed to pragmatic - argument to choose the thing-language: "Accord ing 
to these considerations, it seems to be preferable to choose the primitive predicates f rom 
the predicates o f kind 1, i.e. o f the observable thing-predicates. These are the only inter-
subjectively observable predicates . " (12, p . 80) 
This cannot be said to be a practical reason of the kind quoted above. The choice o f a 
theory or a conceptual system is m a d e on the basis of empirical evidence, the predomin-
ant point being whether it enables us to understand or explain what can be observed 
through that theory. The instrumental efficiency is a derived aspect. 
50. 38, p . 11. 
51 . 28, p. 74. 
52. 28, p. 74. 
53. " W e have so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to a n answer to the question 
what distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses f rom accidental or non-confirmable 
ones ; and what may at first have seemed a minor technical difficulty has taken on the 
stature o f a major obstacle to the development o f a satisfactory theory of confirmation. It 
is this problem that I call the new riddle o f induct ion." (28, p. 80-1) 
54. " T r u e enough, if we start with 'blue' and 'green', then 'grue' and 'bleen' will be explained 
in terms of 'blue' and 'green' a n d a temporal term. But equally truly, if we start with 
'grue' and 'bleen', then 'blue' and 'green' will be explained in terms of 'grue' and 'bleen' 
and a temporal term (. .) . Thus qualitativeness is an entirely relative matter and does not 
by itself establish any dichotomy o f predicates . " (28, p . 79-80) 
55. 69, p . 128. 
56. G o o d m a n ' s remark that " T h e reason why only the right predicates happen so luckily 
to have become well entrenched is jus t that the well entrenched predicates have thereby 
become the right o n e s . " (28, p . 98) cannot be taken a s an adequate answer, o f course. 
57. B A R K E R and A C H I N S T E I N proposed the following definition of ' grue ' : " ( i t ) applies to a 
thing at a given time if and only if either the thing is then green and the time is prior to 
t 0 , or the thing is blue and the time is not prior to t 0 " . (4, p. 511) 
See for Blackburn's formulation 5, p . 140. 
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G O O D M A N criticised the proposal o f B A R K E R and A C H I N S T E I N in 2 9 , but he did not object 
to their definition. 
5 8 . 4 1 , p. 1 5 , under B. 
5 9 . 4 1 , p . 1 6 . 
6 0 . 2 8 , p . 7 4 - 5 . 
6 1 . C o m p a r e , e.g., S M A L L , who stated that, in order to uphold the symmetry, we have to 
suppose that there are human beings " w h o have a quite astonishing ability to look at a 
thing and say straight off whether it is grue or bleen without first determining whether it 
is blue or green and what their temporal location i s . " ( 7 0 , p. 5 4 8 ) 
But S M A L L forgets that Green must have the s ame astonishing ability in Grue ' s view in 
order to establish that a thing is green. 
6 2 . 7 5 , p . 3 8 8 - 9 . 
6 3 . C o m p a r e for the argument in the text N . R E S C H E R 'Hypothetical Reasoning ' , Amster-
d a m , 1 9 6 5 . R E S C H E R has m a d e use o f this kind of reasoning in 6 5 and 6 6 , where he 
considered the lawlikeness o f laws, not that o f concepts. 
6 4 . "Plainly 'green', a s a veteran o f earlier and many more projections than 'grue' , has the 
more impressive biography. The predicate 'green', we may say, is much better entrenched 
than the predicate ' g rue ' . " ( 2 8 , p. 9 4 ) 
6 5 . In 4 4 K A H A N E has drawn attention to the fact that one must appeal to the meanings of 
the predicates in question in order to m a k e sense of the notion o f conflict between those 
predicates : " o n e might claim that 'all emeralds are green' and 'all emeralds are grue' 
conflict because if something is grue after time t 0 then it is blue, and it follows from the 
meanings of the terms 'blue' and 'green* that if somewhing is blue it cannot be green. 
M y own personal inclination is to accept this line o f reasoning, but for many philosophers 
it is forbidden. In particular, G o o d m a n cannot accept it, since he denies the validity o f 
the synthetic-analytic distinction, and it is only be means of that distinction that one 
can know without inductive evidence that if something is blue it cannot be green. " ( 4 4 , 
p. 3 8 0 - 1 ) 
I agree with K A H A N E , but I have not paid much attention to this point in my examination. 
6 6 . 4 1 , p. 2 5 . 
6 7 . " U n l e s s G r u e has s o m e such long and non-trivial story available G o o d m a n ' s puzzle in 
practice is spur ious . " ( 4 1 , p . 2 3 ) 
6 8 . 4 1 , p . 2 5 . 
6 9 . N A G E L , 5 1 , p. 8 5 . 
7 0 . S C H E F F L E R proposed the following explanation o f this theory-independence of experiment-
al l aws : " T h e main proposa l I should like to m a k e here (. .) is that we reconstrue the 
possible meaning-independence of experimental laws, and indeed of observational formul-
ations generally, in terms of reference rather than sense or connotation. Experimental or 
observational laws, for example, formulate relationships o f one or another sort a m o n g the 
classes o f elements denoted by their constituent terms. The denotations or references o f 
these terms in specific cases can, a s we have earlier stressed, be determined independently 
of a characterization o f their respective senses. (. .) N o w it follows from such a view of 
the matter that the absorption of experimental or observational laws into different theore-
tical frameworks is compatiblew ith their constancy of referential interpretation." ( 6 7 , p. 
6 1 - 2 ) 
It m a y also be clear f rom this quotation, that the terms in a n experimental law, as a 
theory-independent statement, have a purely extensional meaning, i.e. they are the names 
o f classes. 
7 1 . C A R N A P : " n o sharp line can be drawn accross this continuum (of terms, H . K . ) ; it is a 
matter o f degree (. . ) . Individual authors will draw the line where it is mos t convenient, 
depending on their points o f view, and there is no reason why they should not have this 
privi lege." ( 1 4 , p. 2 2 6 ) 
A n d : " O n e of the mos t important distinctions between two types of laws in science is the 
distinction between what may be called empirical laws and theoretical laws. (. .) empirical 
laws are laws about observables . " (ibid., p. 2 2 5 ) 
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N A G E L : " t h e distinction between experimental laws and theories is not a sharp one, and 
(. .) no precisely formulated criterion is available for identifying the statements to be 
classified under these rubr ic s " ( 5 1 , p . 1 0 6 ) , but " D e s p i t e the admitted vagueness o f the 
distinction under discussion, we shall see that it is an important o n e . " (ibid., p . 8 3 ) 
7 2 . 6 3 , p . 1 5 7 . 
7 3 . 2 , p . 2 2 0 . 
7 4 . 3 9 , p. 5 4 . 
7 5 . 2 , p. 2 2 0 . 
7 6 . G O O D M A N : " F o r convenience, I shall use the term 'lawlike' for sentences that, whether 
they are true or not , satisfy the other requirements in the definition of law. A law is thus 
a sentence that is both lawlike and t rue" . ( 2 8 , p . 2 2 ) 
7 7 . H E M P E L : " W h a t distinguishes genuine laws from accidental generalizations? This intrigu-
ing problem has been intensively discussed in recent year s . " ( 3 9 , p . 5 5 - 6 ) 
O r : " T h e characterization of laws a s true lawlike sentences raises the important and 
intriguing problem of giving a clear characterization of lawlike sentences without, in 
turn, using the concept of law. This problem has proved to be highly recalcitrant" . 
( 3 7 , p . 3 3 8 ) 
A n d G O O D M A N : " t o define this distinction is a decilate mat te r " ( 2 8 , p . 3 8 ) and " W e have 
so far neither any answer nor any promising clue to an answer to the question what 
distinguishes lawlike or confirmable hypotheses from accidental or non-confirmable 
ones " , (ibid., p. 8 0 ) 
7 8 . S T B G M O L L E R has given a detailed survey of these attempts ( 7 1 , p. 3 0 0 - 3 1 4 ) and N A G E L 
has discussed them in 5 1 , ch. 4 . 
7 9 . N A G E L : " t h e accidental universal contains designations for a particular individual object 
and for a definite date or temporal period, while the nomological universal does n o t . " 
( 5 1 , p. 5 7 ) 
G O O D M A N : " T h e mos t popular way of attacking the problem takes its cue f rom the fact 
that accidental hypotheses seem typically to involve some spatial or temporal restric-
tion, or reference to some particular individual. (. .) Complete generality is thus very 
often supposed to be a sufficient condition o f lawlikeness; but to define this complete 
generality is by no means e a s y . " ( 2 8 , p. 7 7 ) 
8 0 . P A P : " L e t us call expressions by which we designate particular objects, times, or places 
individual constants, and predicates by means o f which we talk about repeatable qualities 
or relations and that are not defined in terms of individual constant purely general. A n d 
an individual constant will be sa id to occur essentially in a statement p if it occurs in p 
and p is not translatable without change of meaning into a statement in which it does not 
occur. A s a first approximat ion one might then define a lawlike generalization a s a 
synthetic universal statement in which no individual constants occur essential ly." ( 5 3 , 
p. 2 9 3 ) 
H E M P E L : " a fundamental lawlike sentence must be o f universal form and mus t contain 
no essential - i.e. uneliminable - occurrences o f designations for particular ob jec t s . " 
( 3 6 , p. 2 6 8 ) 
8 1 . R E I C H E N B A C H : " A n individual-term is a term which is defined with reference to a certain 
space-time region, or which can be so defined without change of meaning. T h e term can 
be a proper n a m e or a definite description." ( 6 4 , p. 3 2 ) 
T h e n : " A synthetic statement is universal if it cannot be written in a reduced form which 
contains an individual-term." (ibid., p. 3 3 ) 
N o w , for p to be a fundamental lawlike statement, " T h e statement p must be universal . " 
(ibid., p. 4 0 ) 
8 2 . According to G O O D M A N , 'all grass is green' m a y be equivalently reformulated a s 'all 
grass in L o n d o n and elsewhere is green' and his conclusion that " t o exclude all hypotheses 
that have some equivalent containing such a term is to exclude everything" ( 2 8 , p . 7 8 ) 
is correct in his context, but cannot be directed against the amended criterion in my 
text. 
A Y E R does not speak about uneliminable constants either if he says that " a s Professor 
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Nelson G o o d m a n has pointed out, generalizations o f law can themselves be expressed 
in such a way that they contain a reference to particular individuals, or to specific 
places and t imes . " ( 2 , p. 2 2 7 ) 
8 3 . 6 2 , p . 3 6 1 . 
8 4 . 3 6 , p. 2 6 7 . 
8 5 . N A G E L : " a distinction is introduced between 'fundamental ' and 'derivative' lawlike state-
ments. Ignoring fine points, a universal conditional is sa id to be fundamental if it con-
tains no individual names (or 'individual constants ') and all its predicates are purely 
qualitative; a universal conditional is sa id to be derivative if it is a logical consequence of 
some set o f fundamental lawlike s tatements" . ( 5 1 , p. 5 7 ) 
A n d P A P : "a. fundamental lawlike statement (is a) synthetic universal statement in which 
no individual constants occur essentially, and (. .) a derivative lawlike statement (is) one 
that is deducible f rom a fundamental lawlike statement though it contains individual 
constants essentially." ( 5 3 , p . 2 9 3 ) 
8 6 . Cf. N A G E L , 5 1 , p. 5 8 , note 1 2 . See a lso 5 3 , p. 2 9 4 . 
8 7 . See his 'Postcript' to 3 6 . 
8 8 . See 5 0 . 
8 9 . 5 1 , p. 5 8 . 
9 0 . Cf. G O O D M A N , 2 8 , p. 2 0 ; H E M P E L , 3 6 , p. 2 6 8 ; N A G E L , 5 1 , p. 5 9 . 
9 1 . G O O D M A N : " T h e next step, therefore, has been to consider ruling out predicates of 
certain kinds. A syntactically universal hypothesis is lawlike, the proposa l runs, if its 
predicates are 'purely qualitative' or 'non-posit ional ' . " ( 2 8 , p. 7 8 ) 
9 2 . H E M P E L : " the idea suggests itself o f permitting a predicate in a fundamental lawlike 
sentence only if it is purely universal, or, as we shall say, purely qualitative, in character; 
in other words , if a statement o f its meaning does not require reference to any one parti-
cular object or spatio-temporal locat ion. " ( 3 6 , p . 2 6 8 ) 
P O P P E R also pointed to this distinction between, in his terminology, individual and 
universal concepts : " A n individual concept is a concept in the definition of which proper 
names (or equivalent signs) are indispensible. If any reference to proper names can be 
completely eliminated, then the concept is a universal concept . " ( 5 5 , p. 6 6 ) 
9 3 . H E M P E L : " T h e stipulation just proposed (cf. note 9 2 , H . K . ) suffers, however, f rom the 
vagueness o f the concept o f purely qualitative predicate. T h e question whether indica-
tion of the meaning of a given predicate in English does or does not require reference to 
some specific object does not always permit o f an unequivocal answer since English a s a 
natural language does not provide explicit definitions or other clear explications o f 
meaning for its t e rms . " ( 3 6 , p. 2 6 9 ) 
A n d G O O D M A N : " T h e claim appears to be rather that at least in the case of a simple 
enough predicate we can readily determine by direct inspection of its meaning whether 
or not it is purely qualitative. But even aside f rom obscurities in the notion of 'the mea-
ning' o f a predicate, this claim seems to m e wrong. I simply do not know how to tell 
whether a predicate is qualitative or positional, except perhaps by completely begging the 
question at issue and asking whether the predicate is 'well-behaved'- that is, whether 
s imple syntactically universal hypotheses applying it are lawl ike . " ( 2 8 , p. 7 9 ) 
9 4 . 6 1 , p . 2 2 . Quine's allergy for intensions can be found in many of his articles e.g. 'On 
what there is' , 'The problem of meaning in linguistics' and 'Two dogmas o f empiricism', 
all contained in his ' F r o m a logical point of view'. 
9 5 . 2 7 , p. 4 , 
9 6 . " T h a t there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is a n unempirical d o g m a of empiri-
cists, a metaphysical article o f fa i th . " ( 6 1 , p. 3 7 ) 
9 7 . N A G E L : " let us call a universal whose scope of predication is not restricted to objects 
falling into a fixed spatial region or a particular period of time an 'unrestricted universal ' . 
It is plausible to require lawlike statements to be unrestricted universa ls . " ( 5 1 , p. 5 9 ) 
S T R A W S O N : " I t is customary to devide empirical general statements into restricted and 
unrestricted generalizations; or into generalizations about closed classes and generaliza-
tions about open classes ; or, we m a y put it, into general reports and forecasts on the 
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one hand, a n d laws on the o ther . " ( 7 3 , p . 1 9 8 ) 
9 8 . H E M P E L : "Sure ly a lawlike sentence must not be logically limited to a finite number o f 
instances: it must not be logically equivalent to a finite conjunction of singular sentences, 
or, briefly, it must be o f essentially generalized form." ( 3 7 , p . 3 4 0 ) 
9 9 . P O P P E R : " W e can distinguish two kinds of universal synthetic statement: the 'strictly 
universal ' and the 'numerically universal'. It is the strictly universal statements which I 
have had in mind so far when speaking of universal statements - o f theories or natural 
laws. The other kind, the numerically universal statements, are in fact equivalent to 
certain singular statements, or to conjunctions o f singular statements, and they will be 
classed as singular statements here. (. .) F o r m a l logic (including symbolic logic), which 
is concerned only with the theory of deduction, treats these two statements alike a s 
universal statements ( 'formal' or 'general' impl icat ions) . " ( 5 5 , p . 6 2 ) 
1 0 0 . N A G E L : " I t must a lso be noted that, though a universal conditional is unrestricted, its 
scope of predication may actually be finite. On the other hand, though the scope is 
finite, the fact that it is finite mus t not be inferrible f rom the term in the universal con-
ditional which formulates the scope of predication, and must therefore be established on 
the basis o f independent empirical evidence." ( 5 1 , p . 5 9 ) 
1 0 1 . 5 1 , p. 5 9 . 
1 0 2 . 5 0 , p . 1 3 9 . 
1 0 3 . 5 0 , p . 1 3 7 . 
1 0 4 . Cf. P A P : " W e have not succeeded in capturing any formal characteristic o f lawlike hy-
potheses that would reliably distinguish them from accidental s ta tements . " ( 5 3 , p . 3 0 1 ) 
A n d P O P P E R : " there may be true, strictly universal statements which have an accidental 
character rather than the character of true universal laws of nature. Accordingly, the 
characterization of laws of nature a s strictly universal statements is logically insufficient 
and intuitively inadequate . " ( 5 5 , p . 4 2 8 ) 
1 0 5 . N A G E L : " T h i s prima facie difference between accidental and nomic universality can be 
briefly summarized by the formula : A universal of law ' supports ' a subjunctive condi-
tional, while an accidental universal does n o t . " ( 5 1 , p . 5 2 ) 
A Y E R has given the following example : " I f it is a law o f nature that the planets move in 
elliptical orbits, then it mus t not only be true that the actual planets move in elliptical 
orbi t s ; it must also be true that if anything were a planet it would move in a n elliptical 
o rb i t . " ( 2 , p . 2 2 9 ) 
C H I S H O L M : " B o t h law and nonlaw statements may be expressed in the general form, ' F o r 
every x, if x is S , x is P ' . L a w statements, unlike nonlaw statements, seem to warrant 
inference to statements o f the form 'If a, which is not S, were S , a would be P ' and ' F o r 
every x, if x were S , x would be P ' . " ( 1 6 , p. 9 7 ) 
A n d finally R E S C H E R : " I n accepting 'all A ' s are B's* as a law, we have to be prepared to 
accept the conditional 'If x were a n A , then x would be a B \ It is preeminently this element 
o f hypothetical force that distinguishes a genuinely lawful generalization from an acciden-
tal generalization like 'all coins in my pocket weigh less than one half ounce. ' " . ( 6 6 , 
P . 1 7 9 ) 
H E M P E L suggested that G O O D M A N also wanted to m a k e the distinction via the support to 
counterfactuals : " G o o d m a n has pointed out a characteristic that distinguishes laws 
f rom such nonlaws : The former can, whereas the latter cannot, sustain counterfactual 
a n d subjunctive conditional s tatements . " ( 3 7 , p . 3 3 9 ) 
This , however, suggests too much. G O O D M A N posed the quest ion: " I s there some way of 
so distinguishing laws from non-laws, a m o n g true universal statements o f the kind in 
question, that laws will be the principles that will sustain counterfactual condi t iona l s? " 
( 2 8 , p . 2 0 ) and he then seeks a criterion. 
1 0 6 . N A G E L : " W h a t has come to be called the 'problem of counterfactuals ' is the problem of 
making explicit the logical structure o f such statements a n d of analyzing the grounds 
u p o n which their truth or falsity may be dec ided . " ( 5 1 , p . 7 1 ) 
1 0 7 . " w e need to invoke the concept 'lawlike generalization' in order to explain how a counter-
factual conditional can be asserted with warrant ; hence it would be running around in a 
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circle to define a lawlike generalization a s a universal statement that warrants a counter-
factual condit ional . " (53, p. 291) 
108. G O O D M A N : " T h e analysis o f counterfactual conditionals is no fussy little grammatical 
exercise. Indeed, if we lack the means for interpreting counterfactual conditionals, we 
can hardly claim to have any adequate philosophy of science. A satisfactory definition of 
scientific law, a satisfactory theory of confirmation or o f disposition terms would solve 
a large part of the problem of counterfactuals. Conversely, a solution of the problem of 
counterfactuals would give us the answer to critical questions about law, confirmation, 
and the meaning of potentiality." (28, p. 3) 
A n d C H I S H O L M : " G i v e n a method of treating the subjunctive, it may then be possible to 
throw light, not only upon disposition predicates, but also upon such notions as 'law', 
'cause' , 'physical necessity', e t c . " (15, p. 297) 
109. F o r example H A M P S H I R E : " T h e difference is that the subjunctive form explicitly implies 
that the condition specified is contrary to fact, the antecedent unfulfilled, while the 
indicative has no such explicit implication; it leaves it o p e n . " (32, p. 11) 
A n d B R A I T H W A I T E : " T h e assertion of a subjunctive hypothetical is similar to that o f an 
indicative hypothetical except that the assertion includes an assertion that p (i.e. the 
antecedent, H . K ) . is false (indicated by the use of the subjunctive m o o d or by some other 
device)" . (9, p . 316) 
N A G E L examined two examples and then stated: " I n both conditionals, the antecedent 
and consequent clauses describe suppositions presumably known to be f a l se . " (51, p. 
71) 
G O O D M A N explicitly confined himself to conditionals o f which we know the antecedent 
to be contrary to fact. (28, p. 4) 
110. 15, p . 302. 
111. Cf. G O O D M A N : "Cons idered as truth-functional compounds , all counterfactuals are of 
course true, since their antecedents are fa l se . " (28, p. 4) 
A n d Nagel ' s example : " C (i.e. the statement 'if the length of pendulum a had been 
shortened to one-fourth of its actual length, its period would have been half its actual 
period') is not rendered by the statement: 'The length of a was not shortened to a fourth 
of its actual length and if the length of a was shortened to one-fourth of its present length 
then its period was half its present period' . The proposed translation is unsatisfactory, 
because, since the antecedent clause of the indicative conditional is false, it follows by 
the rules o f formal logic that if the length of a was shortened to a fourth of its present 
length, its period was not half its present period - a conclusion certainly not acceptable to 
anyone who asserts C " . (51, p. 71) 
112. See 43. 
113. 51 , p. 68ff. 
114. 9, p.295ff. 
115. 51 , p. 71 . 
116. 28, p . 5. Cf. : " A counterfactual is true if a certain connection obtains between the antece-
dent and the consequent. But a s is obvious f rom examples already given, the consequent 
seldom follows from the antecedent by logic a lone . " (ibid., p. 7-8) 
A n d C H I S H O L M : " A subjunctive conditional is one such that we can know that the 
antecedent in s o m e sense implies the consequent without knowing the truth-values o f 
either." (15, p. 295) 
117. N A G E L has given a clear formulat ion: " a counterfactual can be interpreted as an implicit 
metalinguistic statement (i.e. a statement about other statements, and in particular about 
the logical relations of these other statements) asserting that the indicative form of its 
consequent clause follows logically from the indicative form of its antecedent c lause, 
when the latter is conjoined with some law and the requisite initial conditions for the 
l a w . " (51, p. 72) 
118. " T h e first ma jor problem is to define relevant condit ions: to specify what sentences are 
meant to be taken in conjunction with an antecedent as a basis for inferring the conse-
quent. But even after the particular relevant conditions are specified, the connection 
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obtaining will not ordinarily be a logical one. The principle that permits inference of 
"That match lights' from "That match is scratched. That match is dry enough. Enough 
oxygen is present. E t c ' is not a law of logic but what we call a natural or physical or 
causal law. The second ma jor problem concerns the definition of such l a w s . " ( 2 8 , p. 
8 - 9 ) 
C H I S H O L M also pointed to these two problems : " A s s u m i n g that the distinction between 
law statements and nonlaw statements is available to us, I shall now m a k e some informal 
remarks which I hope will throw light u p o n the ordinary use o f these condit ionals . " ( 1 6 , 
p . 1 0 1 ) and somewhat later: " T h e peculiar problem of interpreting ordinary counter-
factual statements is that o f specifying which, a m o n g the statements the asserter believes, 
he intends to exclude f rom his presuppos i t ions . " (ibid., p. 1 0 3 ) 
1 1 9 . 5 1 , p. 7 2 . 
1 2 0 . See H A M P S H I R E 3 2 and R E S C H E R 6 5 . 
R E S C H E R : " F i r s t we have the nomological counterfactuals. These do not pose any dis-
tinctively logical difficulties, although they may (and I think do) generate real problems 
for the proper understanding of the concept o f law. Secondly we have the purely hypothet-
ical counterfactuals . " ( 6 5 , p . 1 9 5 ) 
1 2 1 . A N D E R S O N : "Severa l recent articles have stated or implied that the true subjunctive 
conditional sentences entail the denial o f their antecedents. (. .) It will be the purpose o f 
this note to establish conclusively that this view is untenable . " ( 1 , p. 3 5 ) 
Cf. a lso D ' A L E S S I O , who wanted to give "further evidence against the widespread view 
that the grammatical distinction between subjunctive a n d indicative conditionals is 
associated with a logical distinction between two types o f statement, viz., counterfactual 
and noncounterfactual . " ( 1 7 , p. 3 0 6 ) 
C H I S H O L M remarked already in his first article that " M a n y contrary-to-fact conditionals 
are not expressed in the subjunctive m o o d and many conditionals which are expressed 
in this m o o d are not actually contrary-to-fact." ( 1 5 , p . 2 8 9 ) 
A t last A Y E R S : " W h a t is it about a conditional statement which makes it 'counterfactual' 
o r 'unfulfilled'? Certainly not any feature o f the statement itself or its expression. Whether 
a conditional is fulfilled is like the question whether or not a factual statement is true: 
the answer depends on something quite outside the meaning, form or category of the 
statement or the sentence by which it is expressed. A n empirical statement cannot by 
itself give us reason for saying that it is true or that it is false, since the assertion that it is 
either is one which must be checked against the facts. N o r can we read off from the mood 
or from any other feature o f an hypothetical statement whether or not the antecedent or 
the consequent is fulfilled, whether or not it is counterfactual. F o r this again has to be 
checked against the fact s . " ( 3 , p . 3 4 9 ) 
1 2 2 . See 7 2 . 
1 2 3 . G O O D M A N : " A s a first approximat ion then, we might say that a law is a true sentence 
used for making predict ions . " ( 2 8 , p . 2 0 ) and hence " A general statement is lawlike if 
a n d only if it is acceptable prior to the determination of all its instances . " (ibid., p . 2 2 ) 
and somewhat later: " A sentence is lawlike if its acceptance does not depend upon the 
determination of any given ins tance . " (ibid., p. 2 3 ) 
N A G E L : " T O call a statement a law is to ass ign a certain function to it, and thereby to 
say in effect that the evidence on which it is based is a s sumed not to constitute the total 
scope of its predicat ion." ( 5 1 , p. 6 3 ) 
A n d S T R A W S O N : " A l l we need to a d d to our characterization of natural laws (i.e. that 
they are unrestricted generalizations, H . K ) is the requirement that such evidence a s this 
(i.e. evidence that there will be no more members , and that there never were more than 
the limited number o f which observations have been recorded) shall not be an essential 
part of our grounds for accepting t h e m . " ( 7 3 , p . 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 ) 
1 2 4 . S T E G M O L L E R : "d i e Brauchbarkeit dieses Kriteriums (hangt) von der Wahrheit einer recht 
unplausiblen empirischen Hypothese ab , namlich von der Annahme, da s die Endlich-
keitshypothese des Universums falsch ist. Unter dieser Endlichkeitshypothese verstehen 
wir dabei die Aussage , da sz das Universum eine endliche Zeitdauer besitzt, v o n endlicher 
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räumlicher Erstreckung ist und eine endliche Anzahl von Elementarpartikeln enthält. 
Ist die auf Grund heutiger physikalischer Erkenntnisse als fundiert zu betrachtende End-
lichkeitsannahme richtig, so gibt es nach diesem Kriter ium keine Gesetze. (. .) die Tat-
sache allein, dasz dieses Kriterium von der Wahrheit einer physikalischen Hypothese ab-
hängt, spricht gegen das Kriterium." (71, p. 305) 
H E M P E L has a lso drawn attention to this point : " I t would be excessive, however, to 
deny the status o f fundamental lawlike sentence to all statements which, in effect, m a k e 
an assertion about a finite class o f objects only, for that would rule out a lso a sentence 
such a s 'All robins ' eggs are greenish-blue', since presumably the class of all robins ' eggs 
- past, present and future - is finite." (36, p . 267) 
125. C o m p a r e , e.g., S T R A W S O N who stated, after he has given his characterization o f a law 
(cf. note 123) : "Ev idence which is both permissible and adequate to establish a law will 
then be adequate to establish also the related unfulfilled condit ionals . " (73, p. 200) 
126. G O O D M A N has given the following example : " T h a t a given piece of copper conducts 
electricity increases the credibility o f statements asserting that other pieces o f copper 
conduct electricity, and thus confirms the hypothesis that all copper conducts electricity. 
But the fact that a given man now in this room is a third son does not increase the credib-
ility o f statements asserting that other men now in this r o o m are third sons , and so does 
not confirm the hypothesis that all men now in this r o o m are third s o n s . " (28, p . 73) 
127. 28, p. 73. 
128. G O O D M A N has m a d e this clear enough with respect to the confirmability o f a statement 
and L A U T E R also pointed to the fact that an explication of the concept of law requires a 
solution of the problem of confirmation: " a theory of original nomological statements 
without a n explanation of their inductive confirmation is unable to explain the difference 
between accidental universals and l aws" . (50, p. 139-40) 
129. See 46 for the exposition of the raven-example. Cf. a lso 45, p. 75ff. 
130. K N E A L E : " T h e fact, if it is a fact, that no ravens have lived in very snowy regions may be 
only a n accident o f history, and so too the fact, if it is a fact, that there has never been a 
raven that was not black. But to say this is just to say that, even if (per impossibile) we 
could know the second fact, we should still not be entitled to assert such a contrary-to-
fact conditional a s 'If s o m e inhabitants o f snowy regions were ravens, they would be 
b lack ' . " (46, p . 123) 
131. "A l though we may not use any modal word such a s 'must ' or 'necessarily', we as sume 
that our pronouncement (i.e. 'all F is G' , H . K . ) commits us not only to asserting that 
everything which actually has been or will be F has been or will be G , but also to assert-
ing that if anything which is not a s a matter o f fact F were F it would also be G . This , I 
thought, was sufficient to show the inadequacy of a H u m e a n account o f natural l a w s . " 
(47, p. 97) 
A n d elsewhere: " a n unfulfilled hypothetical proposit ion cannot be derived from a prop-
osition which is concerned only with the ac tua l . " (45, p. 75) 
132. 28, p . 82. 
133. G O O D M A N : " Somewhat like K a n t , we are saying that inductive validity depends not 
only upon what is presented but also upon how it is organized (my italics, H . K . ) ; but 
the organization we point to is effected by the use o f language and is not attributed to 
anything inevitable or immutable in the nature of human cognit ion." (28, p. 96-7) 
134. BRArrawAiTE: " I f a reason can be given for the blackness o f all ravens by exhibiting such 
a scientific system, this generalization will be regarded a s lawlike." (9, p . 304) 
N A G E L : " o n e may refuse to label S (i.e. 'all ravens are black' , H . K . ) as a law, on the 
ground that only statements for which indirect evidence is available (so that statements 
must occupy a certain logical posit ion in the corpus o f our knowledge) can claim title 
to this label . " (51, p. 69) 
135. 51 , p . 70. 
136. N A G E L : " T h e evidence on the strength of which a statement L is called a law can be 
distinguished as either 'direct' or 'indirect', (a) It may be 'direct' evidence, in the familiar 
sense that it consists o f instances falling into the scope of predication o f L (. .) (b) The 
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evidence for L may be 'indirect' in two senses. It may happen that L is jointly derivable 
with other laws L i , L 2 , etc., from some more general law (or laws) M , so that the direct 
evidence for these other laws counts a s (indirect) evidence for L . (. .) However, the 
evidence for L may be 'indirect' in the somewhat different sense that L can be combined 
with a variety o f special assumptions to yield other laws each possessing a distinctive 
scope of predication, so that the direct evidence for these derivative laws counts as 
'indirect' evidence for L . " ( 5 1 , p. 6 4 - 5 ) 
P A P : " A universal statement is lawlike to the degree that it is indirectly confirmed by 
instances that directly confirm more general hypotheses f rom which it follows or less 
general statements that follow from it (. . ) . It is thus the concatenation of inductions by 
means o f unifying, comprehensive generalizations that confers lawlike character on state-
ments o f restricted generality a s well a s on statements o f unrestricted generality." ( 5 3 , 
p. 3 0 2 ) 
B R A I T H W A I T E : " T h e condition for an established hypothesis h being lawlike (i.e. being, 
if true, a natural law) will then be that the hypothesis either occurs in an established 
scientific deductive system as a higher-level hypothesis containing theoretical concepts or 
that it occurs in an established scientific deductive system as a deduction from higher-
level hypotheses which are supported by empirical evidence which is not direct evidence 
for h itself." ( 9 , p . 3 0 1 - 2 ) 
1 3 7 . G O O D M A N has given a different example. F o r the statement 'all copper conducts electrici-
ty' indirect evidence is available that is direct evidence for 'all iron conducts electricity', 
via the higher-level statement 'all metals conduct electricity' (H) . But the statement 'all 
iron things and all things on my desk conduct electricity' ( K ) does not put us in a posi-
tion to accept the direct evidence for 'all iron conducts electricity' as indirect evidence 
for 'all things on my desk conduct electricity'. "Wherein lies the difference? (. .) Clearly 
the important difference here is that evidence for a statement affirming that one of the 
classes covered by H has the property in question increases the credibility o f any state-
ment affirming that another such class has this property; while nothing of the sort holds 
true with respect to K . But this is only to say that H is lawlike and K is not. We are faced 
anew with the very problem we are trying to so lve : the problem of distinguishing between 
lawlike and accidental hypotheses . " ( 2 8 , p . 7 7 ) 
1 3 8 . Cf. L A U T E R : " a complete analysis o f the concept 'original nomological statement' must 
wait upon a n analysis o f what it is for a sentence to be part o f a n 'accepted scientific 
theory'. T h e prospects for the latter analysis are just a s remote as those for a direct 
analysis o f 'scientific l aw ' . " ( 5 0 , p. 1 4 2 ) 
1 3 9 . 5 1 , p. 6 9 - 7 0 . 
1 4 0 . 5 1 , p. 7 2 . 
1 4 1 . " I f this necessity is interpreted, as it has been, a s a form of logical necessity, the meaning 
of 'necessary' in this sense is quite transparent; and indeed a systematic and generally 
accepted analysis o f such necessity is provided by logical theory . " ( 5 1 , p . 5 2 ) 
1 4 2 . N A G E L : " n o n e of the statements generally labeled a s laws in the various positive sciences 
are in point o f fact logically necessary, since their formal denials are demonstrably not 
self-contradictory. Accordingly, proponents o f the view under discussion must either 
reject all these statements as not cases of 'genuine' laws (and[so maintain that no laws have 
yet been discovered in any empirical science), o r reject the proofs that these statements 
are not logically necessary (and so challenge the validity o f established techniques o f 
logical proof ) . Neither horn o f the di lemma is inviting." ( 5 1 , p. 5 3 ) 
1 4 3 . A Y E R : " i f we want our generalizations to have empirical content, they cannot be logically 
secure ; if we m a k e them logically secure, we r o b them of their empirical content. The 
relations which hold between things, or events, or properties, cannot be both factual and 
logica l . " ( 2 , p . 2 1 9 ) 
C A R N A P : " I t is true that we have obtained certainty (in the statements o f logic and mathe-
matics , H . K . ) , but we have pa id for it a very high price. The price is that statements of 
logic and mathematics do not tell us anything about the wor ld . " ( 1 0 , p . 1 0 ) 
A n d : " L o g i c a l statements are true under all conceivable circumstances ; thus their truth 
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is independent of the contingent facts o f the world. On the other hand, it follows that 
these statements do not say anything about the world and thus have no factual content . " 
(13, p. 25) 
Cf. the rhetorical questions o f H A M L Y N : " H O W is it possible for a statement both to be 
about something and to elucidate the concepts invo lved? " (31, p. 108) and of W A I S M A N N : 
" i f this item of knowledge (i.e. ' I see with my eyes', H . K . ) is based on experience, how can 
it be necessary"! And if it was necessary how could it tell us anything about experience?" 
(76, vol. 10, p. 117) 
144. A Y E R : " I t would be characteristic of such systems (of logically true statements, H . K . ) 
that no experience could falsify them, but their security might be sterile. What would take 
the place o f their being falsified would be the discovery that they had no empirical applica-
t ions . " (2, p. 217) 
145. QuiNE,61,p . 22-3 . 
146. Cf. his 74. 
147. Cf. Nagel ' s examples in 51. p. 54 and p. 55, footnote 8. 
148. Ayer 's example is this : " I f it suits us to regard heavy water as a species of water, then we 
must not m a k e it necessary that water consists o f H 2 0 . Otherwise, we may. We are free 
to settle the matter whichever way we p lease . " (2, p. 216) 
149. 53, p . 252. 
150. See 61 and also White's 77. Compare G o o d m a n ' s remark : " the notion of a necessary 
connection o f ideas, or o f an absolutely analytic statement, is no longer sacrosanct. S o m e , 
like Quine and White, have fortrightly attacked the not ion; others, like myself, have sim-
ply discarded it ; and still others have begun to feel acutely uncomfortable about i t . " 
(28, p. 60, footnote 1) 
151. " T h e unit o f empirical significance is the whole o f sc ience." (61, p. 42) and " A s an em-
piricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for 
predicting future experience in the light o f past experience." (ibid., p. 44) 
Statements in isolation cannot admit o f confirmation or information: " T h e d o g m a of 
reductionism survives in the supposit ion that each statement, taken in isolation from its 
fellows, can admit o f confirmation or information at a l l . " (ibid., p. 41) 
152. 61 , p . 43. 
153. See 30. 
154. G R I C E and S T R A W S O N : "Where such a shift in the sense o f the words is a necessary con-
dition of the change in truth-value, then the adherent of the distinction will say that the 
form of words in question changes from expressing an analytic statement to expressing a 
synthetic s tatement . " (30, p . 157) 
155. 51 , p. 55. 
156. B L A N S H A R D : " G r a n t e d that some things are related through a necessity linking then-
qualities, and that s o m e events are related through the necessity implicit in causation, is 
there any ground for holding that all things and events are interrelated necessarily? Yes , 
there is impressive g r o u n d " (6, p. 472), because " I t is part of reasonableness to accept a 
conclusion, even when undemonstrable, if it makes sense o f things, and no alternative 
d o e s . " (ibid., p. 471) 
And E W I N G , quoted by N A G E L : " T h e cause logically entails the effect in such a way that 
it would be in principle possible, with sufficient insight, to see what kind of effect must 
follow from examination of the cause alone without having learnt by previous experience 
what were the effects o f similar c a u s e s . " (51, p. 53) 
A n d : " C (a cause, H . K . ) may perfectly well entail E without our being able to see that 
it does so , and we may have general grounds for assuming the presence of a logical 
necessity which we cannot grasp ourselves, or at least see that this assumption is really 
presupposed in all our scientific reasoning . " (21, p. 167) 
157. We shall restrict ourselves to K N E A L E , but see a l so W . E . Johnson ' s 'Log ic ' (I, ch. 11 
and HI , ch. 1) and G . H . von Wright's 'Logical Studies ' (pp. 144-162). 
158. F o r the exposition of this example, see 45 , p. 75 ff. 
159. " W h e n we say that A-ness necessitates B-ness , we mean that it is impossible for an A -
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thing not to be B. Our idea of necessitation is, therefore, the notion of the boundary to 
possibi l i ty." ( 4 5 , p . 7 8 ) 
1 6 0 . 4 5 , p. 8 0 . 
Cf. a l so : " Ins tead of trying to reduce necessity to universality we should, I think, take 
the notion of necessitation a s fundamenta l . " ( 4 7 , p . 1 0 1 - 2 ) 
It is interesting that H E M P E L also introduced a kind of necessity which can be interpreted 
a s a boundary of possibilities: "whether a statement o f universal form counts as a law 
will depend in part upon the scientific theories accepted at the time. This is not to say 
that 'empirical generalizations' - statements of universal form that are empirically well 
confirmed but have no basis in theory - never qualify a s l aws : Gal i leo 's , Kepler ' s , and 
Boyle ' s laws, for example, were accepted a s such before they received theoretical ground-
ing. T h e relevance of theory is rather this : a statement o f universal form, whether em-
pirically confirmed or as yet untested, will qualify as a law if it is implied by an accepted 
theory; but even if it is empirically well confirmed and presumably true in fact, it will 
not qualify as a law if it rules out certain hypothetical occurrences (such as the fusion of 
two gold bodies with a resulting mas s o f more than 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ki lograms, in the case o f 
our generalization H , i.e. 'All bodies o f pure gold have a m a s s o f less than 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 kilo-
grams ' ) which an accepted theory qualifies a s pos s ib le . " ( 3 9 , p . 5 7 - 8 ) 
But this again remains an incidental remark and is not systematically elaborated. 
1 6 1 . See for this discussion Popper ' s 5 5 (par. 1 4 and new appendix X ) , 5 6 and 5 9 ; and Kneale ' s 
4 6 and 4 7 . 
1 6 2 . F o r a discussion of essentialism, see 5 8 . 
1 6 3 . P O P P E R : " T h u s natural laws set certain limits to what is possible. (. .) in fact, when I 
said, in several places in my book , that natural laws forbid certain events to happen, or 
that they have the character o f prohibitions, I gave expression to the s ame intuitive 
idea. A n d I think it is quite possible and perhaps even useful to speak of 'natural necessi-
ty' or o f 'physical necessity', in order to describe this character o f natural laws, and o f 
their logical consequences . " ( 5 5 , p. 4 2 8 ) 
1 6 4 . 5 5 , p . 4 3 3 . 
1 6 5 . 5 5 , p . 4 2 7 - « . 
1 6 6 . K N E A L E : " T h e important thing in Popper ' s new definition, a n d what makes it acceptable 
to me, is jus t that it connects the notion of natural law with that o f validity for states of 
affairs other than the ac tua l . " ( 4 7 , p . 9 9 ) 
1 6 7 . K N E A L E : "a l l worlds that differ f rom our world, if at all, only in initial conditions and 
these must clearly be naturally possible worlds with instances o f the s ame attributes and 
relations a s we find exemplified in our actual wor ld . " ( 4 7 , p. 1 0 1 ) 
N E R L I C H and S U C H T I N G describe these worlds a s 'all worlds which instantiate the prop-
erties and relations o f our world but which may differ from our world with respect to 
initial condi t ions . " ( 5 2 , p. 2 3 4 ) 
1 6 8 . " W h a t we mean is 'all worlds which have the s a m e structure - or the s ame natural laws -
a s our own wor ld ' . " ( 5 5 , p. 4 3 5 ) 
1 6 9 . See 5 2 . 
1 7 0 . 5 9 , p . 3 2 1 . 
1 7 1 . P O P P E R says this in an addendum of 1 9 6 8 to the X t h new appendix o f 5 5 , and he continues 
with: " I may perhaps s u m u p my position by saying that, while theories and the problems 
connected with their truth are all-important, words and the problems connected with 
their meaning are unimportant. F o r this reason I a m not really very interested in either 
the definition or in the definability o f 'natural necessity' ; though I a m interested in the 
fact (for I believe that it is a fact) that the idea is no,t meaningless . " ( 5 5 , p. 4 4 1 ) 
I do not think that this remark is a very g o o d one either. O f course , a quarrel about words 
is not very interesting, but it has much o f a purely a d hoc escape to qualify, the attempts 
for clarifying a concept (i.e. 'physical necessity') a s a quarrel about words. 
1 7 2 . P O P P E R : "Nevertheless , the phrase (in the definition) 'all worlds which differ (if at all) 
from our world only with respect to initial conditions' undoubtedly contains implicitly 
the idea o f laws of nature. (. .) (so it) may be said to be circular ." ( 5 5 , p. 4 3 5 ) 
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173. 55, p. 435. 
174. See 66. 
175. " l a w f u l n e s s manifests itself in two related ways : nomic necessity and hypothetical force. 
N o m i c necessity introduces the element o f must, o f inevitability. ( . . ) This nomic necessity 
manifests itself mos t strikingly in the context o f hypothetical supposit ions - especially 
counterfactual hypotheses. (. .) It is preeminently this element o f hypothetical force that 
distinguishes a genuinely lawful generalization from an accidental generalization like 
'All coins in my pocket weigh less than one half o u n c e ' . " (66, p. 179) 
176. 66, p . 185. 
177. R B S C H E R : " F o r no matter what the structure o f a generalization might be, or how well 
established it is by the known data, its acceptance a s a law demands some accommodat ion 
of it within the 'system' o f knowledge. Any ' law' occupies a place that is more or less 
fundamental within the general architectonic of our knowledge about the world - its 
epistemic status is a matter not only o f its own form and its own evidential support , but 
its placement within the woof and warp of the fabric comprising it together with other cog-
nate laws of nature." (66, p. 186) 
178. 66, p. 187. 
179. R E S C H E R : " O u r view of the matter agrees with Hume ' s that lawfulness is not an obser-
vable characteristic of nature, and it agrees with K a n t that it is a matter o f man ' s projec-
tion. But we do not regard this projection as the result o f the (in suitable circumstances) 
inevitable working of the psychological faculty-structure o f the human mind. Rather, 
we regard it as a matter o f warranted decision, a deliberate man-made imputation effect-
ed in the setting o f a particular conceptual scheme regarding the nature of explanatory 
understanding. We thus arrive at a posit ion that is Kant i an with a difference. K a n t finds 
the source o f lawfulness in the way in which the mind inherently works. We find its 
source in the conceptual schemata that we in fact deploy for explanatory purposes : A s 
we see it, lawfulness demands an imputational step m a d e in the context of a certain con-
cept o f explanation. Both these divergent views agree, however, in making lawfulness 
fundamentally mind-dependent." (66, p . 189-90) 
180. " A t this point, however, the distinction between laws and regularities becomes important. 
N o doubt nature is in various respects regular - it would take a bold act o f rashness to 
deny that! And this regularity of nature in various respects is no doubt an ontological 
fact that would remain unaltered in the face o f any hypothetical removal o f rational 
minds from within its purview. But the idea of a law involves - as we saw - more than 
just factual regularity a s such, since lawfulness is bound up with nomic necessity and 
hypothetical force. T o say that these factors do not represent objective facts but result 
from man-made imputations is not to gainsay the objective reality of regularities in 
na ture . " (66, p . 192) 
A n d : " D o e s it follow from this position that if there were no men - or rather no rational 
minds - that there would be no laws? (. .) The answer (. . ) , I believe, must b e : Y e s . " 
(ibid., p . 190) 
181. " L i k e rules, laws state how things 'must be' , yet unlike most familiar rules laws admit 
no exceptions, but are always ' obeyed ' . " (66, p. 178) 
182. We find the s a m e failure in Geurts ' treatment o f lawlike statements : first of all, we have, 
in his view, a synthetic universal statement, asserting a contingent regularity, be it, in 
his view, not a regularity in an observer-independent reality. Then the scientist makes it 
analytic by decision, and hence lawlike. But the presupposit ion of there being synthetic 
universal statements, asserting an observed regularity, as the basis of a law, is untenable. 
See 26, pp . 183-190. 
183. 57, p. 4 4 - 5 . 
184. R E S C H E R : " T h e appropriateness of such epistemic commitment revolves about ques-
tions of the type : 'To what extent is the 'law' at issue justifiably regarded as immune to 
rejection in the face o f hypothetical considerations? ' ' H o w should this generalization 
fare if {per improbabile) a choice were forced upon us between it and other laws we also 
accept? ' 'How critical is it that the law be true - how serious a matter would it be were 
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the law to prove f a l s e ? ' " (66, p . 186) 
185. " N o n e of these claims (i.e. ' N o object can m o v e faster than light', 'There cannot be a 
perpetuum mobile ' , 'A temperature registration o f less than -273 ° C . is impossible') 
state mere matters o f fact. E a c h essentially involves the conceptual principles o f entire 
physical theories. Similarly the propos i t ion: 'One must interact with microparticles to 
learn about them'. The negation o f this is none the less physically unintelligible, as with 
the claims a b o v e . " (33, p. 78) 
A n d : " I t is at this moment inconceivable - i.e. 'systematically unintelligible' - that we 
should ever encounter a perpetuum mobile, or accelerate particles faster than c . " (ibid., 
p. 83) 
186. C o m p a r e once again G R I C E and S T R A W S O N : " I f we can m a k e sense of the idea that the 
s ame form of words, taken in one way (or bearing one sense), may express something 
true, and taken in another way (or bearing another sense), may express something false, 
then we can m a k e sense of the idea of conceptual revision. A n d if we can m a k e sense o f 
this idea, then we can perfectly well preserve the distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic, while conceding to Quine the revisability-in-principle o f everything we s a y . " 
(30, p . 157) 
187. Q U I N E is right when he rejects the view that an analytic statement is one in which 'the 
linguistic component is all that matters ' . H e s a y s : " i t is nonsense, and the root o f much 
nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any 
individual s tatement . " (61 , p . 42) 
188. This opposit ion has also been accepted by F I S K , who speaks o f a necessary connection in 
nature to account for the fact that in nature only a few of a great many possibilities are 
realized: " I t is often supposed that the stable patterns required are simply regularities. 
One of the main points to be m a d e here will be that mere regularities are inferior to 
necessary connections in doing the j o b that must be done for data to serve as inductive 
support. The problem is not that da ta fail to have a chance of being representative o f the 
way things are if there are only regularities in the universe, a n d no necessary connections. 
It is rather that, without necessary connections, things could happen in so many ways 
that it would be unreasonable to suppose they happen in one of the relatively few ways 
in which regularties are preserved. A denial o f necessity makes unreasonable an as sump-
tion of regularities. (. .) only if there are a certain number o f unspecified necessary con-
nections believed to hold in nature is it consistent to hold that given data support a 
given hypothesis . " (25, p. 385) 
Such a necessity should be taken to be " a real necessity -a.de re necessity - and is not a 
preposit ional necessity, a de dicto necessity." (ibid., p. 389) 
189. Cf. H A N S O N 33, p . 26ff. H A N S O N has clearly seen the importance of necessary connections 
for scientific investigation. 
190. These cases also constitute examples o f Harry's so-called ontological experiment, 35, 
p. 40. 
191. 33, p. 32. 
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